









Title of Dissertation: FINDING MODAL FORCE 
  
 Anouk Dieuleveut, Doctor of Philosophy, 2021 
  
Dissertation directed by: Professor Valentine Hacquard 
Department of Linguistics  
 
Associate Professor Alexander Williams 
Department of Linguistics 
 
 
This dissertation investigates when and how children figure out the force of modals, 
that is, when and how they learn that can/might express possibility, whereas must/have 
to express necessity. Learning modal force raises a logical “Subset Problem”: given 
that necessity entails possibility, what prevents learners from hypothesizing possibility 
meanings for necessity modals? Three main solutions to other Subset Problems have 
been proposed in the literature. The first is a bias towards strong (here, necessity) 
meanings, in the spirit of Berwick (1985). The second is a reliance on downward-
entailing environments, which reverse patterns of entailment (Gualmini & Schwarz, 
2009). The third is a reliance on pragmatic situational cues stemming from the 
conversational context in which modals are used (Dieuleveut et al., 2019). This 
dissertation assesses the viability of each, by examining the modals used in speech to 
 
 
and by 2-year-old English children, through a combination of corpus studies and 
experiments testing the guessability of modal force based on their context of use.  
I show that negative and other downward-entailing contexts are rare with 
necessity modals, making them impractical on their own. However, the conversational 
context in which modals are used in speech to children is highly informative about both 
forces. Thus, if learners are sensitive to these conversational cues, they, in principle, do 
not need to rely either on a necessity bias nor on negative environments to solve the 
Subset Problem.  
Turning to children’s own productions, I show that children master possibility 
modals very early: by age 2, they use them productively, and in an adult-like way. 
However, they struggle with necessity modals: they use them less frequently, and not 
in an adult-like way. Their modal uses show no evidence for a necessity bias.  
To assess how children actually figure out modal force, and which of the 
available cues children use to figure out modal force, I then examine which aspects of 
children’s input best predict their mastery of modals. Preliminary results suggest that 
negation is predictive of children’s early success with necessity modals, and that 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
Imagine you are on your way to visit an old friend, who lives in a nearby city. You 
arrive at a crossing, with two roads: one goes through a forest, the other through the 
mountains. But you don’t know whether both would allow you to get to your friend’s 
place. It’s your lucky day, another person joins you, so you ask her for directions. She 
tells you: 
(1) You have to take the road through the forest.  
Hearing (1), you will understand that the road through the forest is the only way for 
you to arrive: the road through the mountains is not a possible option. However, if 
instead, she says (2): 
(2) You can take the road through the forest.  
You will not conclude that the other road, through the mountains, is not a possible 
option. Maybe the speaker doesn't know the status of that road, or maybe she does, and 
means to suggest that it is also possible, but the forest road is preferable. 
For adult speakers familiar with English, the difference in meaning between 
must and can may seem obvious. These words differ in ‘force’, i.e., in their logical 
strength: possibility modals such as can or might have a logically weaker meaning; 
necessity modals such as must or have to have a logically stronger meaning. Must(p) 





can’t, you also don’t have to. But from the perspective of the child learning language, 
figuring out this difference might not be so easy. 
To see this, imagine now that you are travelling to a faraway island where the 
language is similar to English, except for a few words, “modals”: words people use to 
talk about possibilities and necessities. You are again on your way to visit an old friend, 
who lives on the other side of the island; you arrive at a crossing, and there are two 
roads to follow, but you don’t know whether both would allow you to get to your 
friend’s place. Another lucky day, another person joins you, so you ask her for 
directions. She answers:  
(3) You sig take the road through the forest. 
What does sig mean? Do you think it means that it is necessary for you to go through 
the forest, i.e., that it is the only option for you to reach your friend’s place? Or does it 
mean that it is just a possibility, and that there might be other ways to go? How would 
you be able to tell?  
This is the main question this dissertation investigates. How and when do 
children figure out the force of modals? How do they learn the mapping between 
must/should/have to and necessity meanings, and can/could/might and possibility 
meanings? What kind of evidence can they rely on?  
Figuring out modals’ meaning presents particular challenges. As with any other 
words, children have to learn meanings just based on the way they are used by speakers 
around them. But modals are words used to talk about what is possible or necessary, 





necessary is, so to speak, more than actual: it is something that could not be otherwise. 
Talk of possibility or necessity therefore involves reference to a range of alternatives 
to the actual. And for this reason, these properties have few physical correlates, that 
can be seen or sensed in any way: when a speaker describes a situation as possible or 
necessary, there is no signpost indicating the range of options they are considering. 
Cues from the physical context of speech as to meanings of modal words are thus bound 
to be limited. This makes them what Gleitman et al.’s (2005) call “hard words”.  
It has been argued that to learn such words that express abstract meanings, cues 
from the syntax could play a crucial role. This is Landau & Gleitman’s (1985) syntactic 
bootstrapping hypothesis: the hypothesis according to which learners can home in on 
a word's meaning, by exploiting principled links between this meaning, which is closed 
to observation, and the word's syntactic distribution, which is easier to observe. Indeed, 
the modal’s syntactic position, before a verbal complement, might help narrow 
candidate meanings as expressing some kind of modal meaning—something that 
expresses a relation to (or property of) a situation or proposition. But the question this 
dissertation focuses on is not how children figure out that must and can have a modal 
meaning in general. It is how they figure out their difference in force, possibility and 
necessity. Here, syntax cannot help, since possibility and necessity modals belong to 
the same syntactic categories, and can appear in all the same syntactic environments.  
A main problem with figuring out modal force is that necessity entails 
possibility, provided we are considering the same range of options. What prevents 
children from hypothesizing a weaker possibility meaning for necessity modals? This 





considering the range of passable routes, then you can go through the forest, given that 
same set of options. Likewise, if you must eat with your right hand, given the rules of 
etiquette, then those same rules imply you can eat with your right hand. So, if you think 
that sig means ‘possible’ but in fact it means ‘necessary’, it is unclear how you can 
discover that in fact, sig has a stronger meaning: in situations where a necessity modal 
is used, a possibility statement is also systematically true. But then what prevents 
learners from postulating possibility meanings for necessity modals like must or have 
to? How do they know that they express necessity and not possibility? Are there 
situational cues that give away the contrast between possibility and necessity?  
To answer this question, I will explore in depth the speech young English 
children are exposed to, on the basis of a detailed corpus study of their linguistic input 
between 2 and 3-year-old, complemented by experiments based on the corpus. This 
study will allow us to identify what kinds of cues are in principle available in the input 
as to modal force. Identifying the kind of information that is available—and the kind 
of information that is not—will put us in a better position to assess the kinds of 
capacities and biases children need to make use of the available information 
successfully.  
The second question I address in this dissertation is the question of when 
children figure out force. How early do they use possibility and necessity modals? And 
do they use them appropriately? To answer it, I will explore 2- to 3-year-old English 
children’s own spontaneous productions of modals, again, by bringing together corpus 





In the remainder of this chapter, I break down the learning problem for force in 
more detail, to show what elements make it challenging. In section 1.1, I focus on the 
logical Subset Problem, explain its logic and situate it with respect to previous 
discussions of similar Subset Problems in word learning. In section 1.2, I focus on the 
semantics and pragmatics of modals, to get a better sense of the target grammar children 
need to acquire, and circumscribe the range of possible modal systems that they could 
in principle acquire, given what we currently know about the cross-linguistic diversity 
of modal systems. In section 1.3, I come back to the Subset Problem, and consider 
three possible solutions to it based on previous discussions of other Subset Problems. 
The goal of the input study (presented in Chapter 2) will be to evaluate the viability of 
each of these three solutions. Finally, in section 1.4, I describe the methods used in the 
dissertation, and present its outline.  
 
1.1 The Subset Problem2 
Figuring out modal force raises a logical Subset Problem for the learner. The problem 
comes from the fact that necessity entails possibility—if it is necessary to go through 
                                               
 
2 Originally, the Subset Problem (also known as the “entailment problem”) was discussed for the 
acquisition of syntax (see Chomsky & Lasnik, 1977; Dell, 1981, Berwick, 1985, Wexler & Manzini, 
1987, a.o.). In the case of syntax, the problem unfolds in a different way: The question is how learners 
choose between two grammars G1 and G2, when both G1 and G2 can generate their input, in the absence 
of negative evidence directly informing them that G2 overgenerates. A classic example is the so-called 
that trace effect (see Chomsky & Lasnik, 1977). For syntax, the set/subset are the sets of sentences 
generated by the grammar. The child prefers the grammar G1 that does not generate some ungrammatical 
sentences, over the more permissive grammar G2 that does generate it. The logic of the Subset Problem 
has then been applied to semantic issues, both at the level of word learning (e.g. fruit/apple), and at the 
sentence level (e.g., the acquisition of scopally ambiguous sentences) (e.g., Wexler & Manzini, 1987; 
Crain & Thornton, 1998; Musolino, 2006, a.o.). Applied to semantic issues, the set/subset correspond to 





the forest, then it is also possible to go through it, in relation to the same set of options. 
This means that if learners think that necessity modals like must or have to mean 
‘possible’—or if on the island, sig actually means ‘necessary’ but you think it means 
‘possible’—they have no direct evidence that it is wrong, since in a necessity situation, 
both can and must are logically true. So what keeps them from thinking that necessity 
modals mean ‘possible’? How can they determine that necessity modals have stronger 
meanings? 
This kind of logical Subset Problem has previously been discussed for other 
cases of word learning, in particular for content words, like apple/fruit (see Quine's 
1960 gavagai problem; Xu & Tenenbaum, 2007),3 and function words: quantifiers like 
some/every, and numerals (see Piantadosi, 2011; Piantadosi et al., 2013; Rasin & 
Aravind, 2021). I will take first content words and quantifiers some/every as an 
example, to see the logic of the problem; then, we will see how modals raise additional 
challenges. 
Imagine you are still on the island, but now you are unsure about what mala, a 
noun, means—you just know people use it to refer to objects. You hear it once, used to 
refer to what looks like an apple. If you think mala means ‘apple’ but it actually means 
‘fruit’, there is no problem: you might be able to revise your incorrect hypothesis, by 
                                               
 
section, I leave historical considerations aside, and focus on explaining the logic of the problem, in the 
case of word learning. I come back to these debates in section 1.3, when describing the proposed 
solutions to such Subset Problems. 
3 Quine's gavagai problem includes our Subset Problem, but is more general. He proposes the following 
thought experiment: Imagine hearing gavagai used when a rabbit crossed a road. How can you tell 
whether it means “rabbit”, “white”, or “animal” (or something else), since your observation is in 





hearing it in some other situations, used to refer to objects that are not apples, but still 
fruits. But on the other hand, if you think mala can refer to any type of fruit but it 
actually means ‘apple’, a problem arises: you might have no reason to change your 
hypothesis, as you will only see it used to refer to objects that are fruits. The problem 
arises because all apples are fruits: the set of apples is a subset of the set of fruits.4  
The same goes for quantifiers like some and all. All asymmetrically entails 
some: if the sentence “all roads are closed” is true, then it is also true that some of them 
are. Imagine you are unsure about what gleeb, a determiner, means, and you hear the 
sentence “gleeb roads are closed.” If you think that gleeb means ‘all’ (i.e., that it has 
the logically stronger meaning) but it actually means ‘some’, you might be able to 
revise your hypothesis, by hearing it used when only some roads are closed. But on the 
other hand, if you think that gleeb means ‘some’ (the logically weaker meaning) but it 
actually means ‘all’, you might have no reason to change your hypothesis, since you 
will only hear it used in situations logically compatible with ‘some’.  
The same logic applies to modals like can and must. Necessity entails 
possibility: if you are unsure about the meaning of a novel modal, sig, and if you think 
it means necessity (the logically stronger meaning) but it actually means possibility, 
you might be able to revise your hypothesis, by hearing it used in situations that express 
possibility but not necessity: for instance, if you can see that it is possible to go both 
ways. But on the other hand, if you think sig means ‘possible’ but it actually means 
                                               
 
4 Word (and sentence) meanings are here defined as their extension. For words like apple, this is the set 
of things to which the word applies truly, namely the apples. For words like must, this might be, on one 






‘necessary’, you might have no reason to change your mind, since you will only hear 
it used in situations logically compatible with a possibility interpretation. 
Such Subset Problems thus arise whenever the meaning of one word entails the 
meaning of another. Various solutions have been proposed in the literature for how 
children solve such problems, which I present in section 1.3. Before describing them, 
and seeing how they apply to the case of modals, I provide some background about 
modals’ semantics and pragmatics. This will allow us to see what elements make it 
challenging to solve the Subset Problem in the case of modals. More generally, it will 
allow us to get a better sense of the target grammar that children need to acquire, as the 
question I address in not only how children solve the Subset Problem: it is how children 
figure out force in general.  
 
1.2 Modal force in English and beyond  
1.2.1 Standard analysis of modal force and flavor 
We typically distinguish two main forces for English modals: possibility and necessity. 
Standardly, this is captured by treating modals as either existential or universal 
quantifiers over possible worlds, following the modal logic tradition (Carnap, 1947; 
von Wright, 1951; Prior, 1957, Kripke, 1963). Possibility modals are treated as 
existential quantifiers over possible worlds: can(p) means that in some worlds 
accessible from the actual world, the modal’s prejacent p is true. Necessity modals are 





accessible worlds, p is true. Possible worlds correspond to possible ‘ways things could 
have been’ (Lewis, 1973). 
This quantificational analysis captures the logical entailment relationships we 
described between possibility and necessity modals: they show the same patterns of 
entailments and logical equivalences as the quantifiers some and every in the nominal 
domain. This is illustrated in (4) and (4) (from von Fintel & Heim, 2011; see also 
Hacquard, 2020). Just like (4)a) entails (4)b), (5)a) entails (5)b); assuming that the 
domain is not empty, (4)a/c) and (4)b/d) are logically equivalent, as well as (5)a/c) and 
(5)b/d). 
(4) a. Everyone left.   c. It’s not the case that someone stayed.  
b. Someone left.   d. It’s not the case that everyone stayed.  
(5) a. You must leave.   c. It’s not the case that you may stay.  
b. You may leave.   d. It’s not the case that you must stay.  
Further force distinctions can be made for modals. In particular, necessity 
modals are often split into strong (e.g. must) vs. weak (e.g. should) necessity modals, a 
difference illustrated in (6) (see von Fintel & Iatridou, 2008). While functional modals 
seem restricted to possibility and (weak and strong) necessity, other grammatical 
categories such as nouns (e.g., possibility) and adjectives (e.g., likely) can encode even 
finer-grained strength distinctions. 





In this dissertation, I leave aside the learnability issues raised by these finer-grained 
distinctions, to focus on the main contrast between possibility and necessity modals.  
Up to this point, I described modals’ meaning focusing on the contrast in force, 
between possibility and necessity (i.e., in logical strength). But modals vary along a 
second dimension, ‘flavor’ (for a cross-linguistic perspective, see van der Auwera et 
al., 2005; for overviews, see Portner, 2009; Hacquard, 2011). Functional modals can 
express various types of possibilities and necessities: For instance, might and must in 
(7)a/b) express possibilities and necessities given some evidence (called epistemic 
modality), and can and must in (8)a/b) express possibilities and necessities given some 
rules (called deontic modality). In English, a given modal always expresses the same 
force (possibility or necessity), but it can be used for different flavors. Depending on 
the context, must in (9) can be used to mean that it is likely given what is known (or 
what can be inferred from the situation) that Anne sleeps a lot (epistemic modality, 
(9)a)), or that given the rules, it is necessary for her to sleep (deontic modality, (9)b)), 
or that to reach her goals, it is necessary for her to sleep (teleological modality, (9)c)). 
It is common in the semantic literature to distinguish between epistemic uses and non-
epistemic ones, the latter covering many different types: rule-based, goal-based, or 
based on physical capacities. Following Hoffmann (1966), I will use the term ‘root’ 
modality to subsume all non-epistemic flavors. 
(7) Given what we know…, 
a. The dog might be outside.  possibility (◊) 
b. The dog must be outside.  necessity (□)  





a. The dog can go outside.  possibility (◊) 
b. The dog must go outside.  necessity (□) 
(9) Anne must sleep a lot. 
a. Epistemic: according to what is known, … 
b. Deontic (root): according to the rules, … 
c. Teleological (root): according to the goals, … 
d. Ability (root): according to physical capacities, … 
e. Etc. 
In the now standard Kratzerian framework (Kratzer, 1981, 1991), these two 
dimensions of modals’ meaning are captured by having modals be lexically specified 
for force, but not for flavor. Flavor gets determined contextually by what Kratzer calls 
conversational backgrounds. These specify the set of worlds that the modal quantifies 
over, as the lexical entries in (10), slightly modified from Kratzer (1991), illustrate. The 
domain of quantification of the modal (i.e., the set of worlds it quantifies over) is 
determined by context. 
(10) For any world w, conversational background f:5  
a. [[can]]w,f = λq<st> . ∃w’∈ ∩f(w): q(w’) = 1  
b. [[must]]w,f = λq<st>. ∀w’∈ ∩f(w): q(w’) = 1   
This flavor variability has important consequences when we focus on the 
question of how children acquire a modal’s force. A first important clarification point 
is that the Subset Problem described in section 1.1 holds within a given flavor. Logical 
entailment relations hold within flavor: for instance, being able to does not mean being 
                                               
 
5 I ignore the ordering source here, which can derive further gradability and flavor differences amongst 





allowed, and conversely, being allowed does not mean you are able to; epistemic 
necessity (e.g. ‘given what we know, he must be outside.’) does not entail deontic 
possibility (e.g. ‘given the rules, he can be outside.’), and conversely.  
From the learner’s perspective, the fact that modals can express different flavors 
could make it easier to figure out force. If children expect that a modal like must always 
expresses the same force, having figured out that must expresses deontic necessity 
might allow them to conclude, by extension, that it also expresses necessity when used 
for another flavor. This might be especially helpful if the contrast in force is easier to 
grasp for some flavors than for others. But this flavor variability could also make the 
task harder, since the flavor intended by the adult can't always be interpreted 
straightforwardly. For instance, imagine a child who knows only the deontic use of 
must and not its epistemic use. She hears an epistemic use of must: “Al must be 
enjoying himself.” By assumption she will understand this, wrongly, as deontic. But 
what the speaker says is necessary epistemically (Al enjoying herself) need not be 
necessary deontically: Al is not required to enjoy herself. And in that case the child 
might be misled and conclude that must expresses possibility. Therefore, due to the 
logical independence of epistemic and deontic modality, the fact that a single word can 
be used for both, might sometimes cause trouble for the learner. 
1.2.2 Modals and negation 
Possibility and necessity modals are not uniform in their interaction with negation, 
neither force-wise nor flavor-wise. Cross-linguistically, epistemic possibility modals 





Drubig, 2001; Hacquard, 2011; for a typological overview, see de Haan, 1997; van der 
Auwera, 2001). This is illustrated for English in (11)a), (11)b) and (11)c): (root) can is 
interpreted below negation, (epistemic) might is interpreted above negation; may is 
interpreted under negation with a root interpretation, and over negation with an 
epistemic interpretation.  
(11) a. Jo can’troot sleep.   not > possible; *possible > not  
b. Jo mightepistemic not sleep.  *not > possible; possible > not  
c. Jo mayroot/epistemic not sleep. 
root: ‘it is not possible that Jo does’ not > possible; *possible > not  
epi: ‘it is possible that Jo does not’  *not > possible; possible > not  
Necessity modals, on the other hand, seem to always keep the same scopal 
behavior with respect to negation, regardless of flavor: they either systematically scope 
over negation, like must/should in (12)a) (Dutch moeten, German müssen) (a behavior 
Iatridou & Zeijlstra (2013) attributes to their being Positive Polarity Items), or 
systematically scope under negation, like need in (12)b) and have to in (12)c). English 
need, as well as Dutch hoeven and German brauchen, are commonly analyzed as 
Negative Polarity Items (NPIs).6 I come back to the consequences of these scopal 
interactions for the learner in section 1.3.2.  
(12) a. Jo must not/should not sleep.   necessary > not; *not > necessary 
epistemic/root: ‘it is necessary that Jo does not sleep’ 
                                               
 
6 NPIs are words that typically occur in the scope of negation, and more generally, are licensed by DE 
environments (they are ungrammatical in non-DE environments) (see Fauconnier, 1975; Ladusaw, 1979; 
Van der Wouden, 1994; a.o.). Other examples of NPIs are English any or ever (e.g. ‘Jo didn’t eat 
anything’, vs. * ‘Jo ate anything’). PPIs are in a sense the mirror image of NPIs: they tend to escape the 
scope of negation, and seem ‘banned’ from negative contexts (Szabolcsi, 2004). Other examples of PPIs 
are someone or something: in “Jo didn’t eat something”, some can only take scope over negation (‘There 





b. Jo needn’t sleep.    *necessary > not; not > necessary 
epistemic/root: ‘it is not necessary that Jo sleeps.’  
c. Jo doesn’t have to sleep.   *necessary > not; not > necessary  
epistemic/root: ‘it is not necessary that Jo sleeps.’  
1.2.3 Modals and scalar implicatures 
Possibility modal sentences are logically true in necessity situations: a speaker would 
not be considered a liar uttering (2), “You can go through the forest”, even if she 
actually thinks that going through the forest is the only option for you. However, uses 
of this sentence would generally be interpreted as conveying a stronger meaning: that 
the speaker does not believe that you have to take this road (i.e., she believes that there 
might be other options for you, or she does not know about them). This is an example 
of a scalar implicature, and common example to illustrate how sentence and speaker’s 
meaning differ (for various theoretical perspectives on scalar implicatures, see Horn, 
1972; Grice, 1975; Gazdar, 1979; Hirschberg, 1985; Sperber & Wilson, 1986; Spector, 
2006; Chierchia, Fox and Spector, 2012; Levinson et al., 2000; Sauerland, 2012; see 
Chemla & Singh, 2014, Noveck, 2018, for recent overviews of experimental 
approaches to the phenomenon). As we will see in Chapter 3, the study of scalar 
implicatures has generated many acquisition experiments focusing on children’s 
understanding of modal force (e.g. Noveck, 2001): modals were used as a case study 
to see whether children were able to understand scalar implicatures. I will now briefly 
describe the phenomena and explain how standard accounts capture these inferences. 
Readers familiar with this topic can skip to section 1.2.4.  
A possibility modal statement such as (2), “You can go through the forest” can 





case that you have to’). The same kind of inferences arises with quantifiers like some: 
use of a sentence such as “Some of the roads are blocked” is generally interpreted as 
conveying that it is not the case that all of them are. But this is not part of these 
sentences’ literal meaning: these inferences can be cancelled (e.g., one can say “some 
of the roads are blocked, in fact, all of them are”; “you can go this way; in fact, you 
have to’) or reinforced (“some of the roads are blocked, but not all of them”; “You can 
go this way, but you don’t have to’). The same applies with epistemic modals: might in 
(7)a) (“the dog might be outside”) can implicate that the dog doesn’t have to be outside 
(i.e. that the speaker is not certain that he is).  
According to the standard Gricean approach to scalar implicatures (Grice, 
1975), these inferences arise because the sentence containing the logically weaker term, 
(can/might/some) competes with another more informative sentence the speaker could 
have chosen instead, with the logically stronger term (have to/must/all). According to 
Horn (1972), this is because these terms form scales (e.g., <candeontic, have todeontic>, 
<mightepi, mustepi>, <some, all>, etc.),
7 which he defines as conventionalized 
associations of lexical items that can be ordered in term of informational (logical) 
                                               
 
7 Modal scales are defined within a given flavor. Note that ability modals (e.g. “Anne can speak Dutch”) 
raise an interesting puzzle here. As discussed by Horn (1972, Chapter 2), there is no clear scale for ability 
modals (see also Hackl (1998), who claims that “ability modals have no dual”). As noted by Hackl, 
necessity modals seem never used for ability ascriptions (Ability modal generalization (Hackl, 1998): 
“If a language uses a modal auxiliary to express ability, then it is always an existential modal and never 
a universal modal”. This gap might not be real: it has also been argued that as other modal flavors, ability 
modals have duals, compulsion modals (for instance, “I have to sneeze right now; see Mandelkern et 
al., 2015, 2017). That duals of ability modals are hard to identify would then come from the fact that 
people don’t often talk about compulsions. One consequence is that scalar implicatures almost never 
occur with ability modals. Note that, partially because of their lack of a clear necessity counterpart, the 
force of ability modals has been a matter of debate in the semantic literature: It is even sometimes argued 
that they have universal force (e.g. Kenny, 1976; Brown, 1988; Giannakidou, 2001), which is doubtful 





strength. Other standard examples involve logical connectives (<or, and>), or numerals 
(<1,2,3, …>). The implicature arises from the assumption that participants in a 
conversational exchange are cooperative agents who try to make their contribution as 
informative as required for the current purposes of the exchange, and do not say things 
for which they lack evidence (following Grice’s maxims of quantity and quality). 
Cooperative speakers should always prefer to use a logically stronger sentence (i.e., 
maximally informative) when it is relevant, if they believe it to be true. Listeners can 
thus infer, from the fact that the speaker did not choose the stronger (more informative) 
sentence, that it is not the case that the speaker believes it: otherwise, why not use it?  
Some scalar implicatures are triggered routinely, perhaps even conventionally. 
But even these are not utterly automatic or necessary. Their likelihood is still contingent 
on how relevant the stronger alternative is in the conversation. For instance, hearing 
(2), “You can take the road through the forest”, you might, but you won’t necessarily 
infer that you don’t have to go the other way (i.e., that it is also an option for you to go 
through the mountains), as what is crucial in this situation is for you to reach your goal, 
rather than how many different options would allow you to reach it. 
There are debates about the nature of scalar implicatures, which I won’t review 
here (see Sauerland, 2012, for a summary). Note that all approaches rely on the notion 
of scales, and take them for granted: The derivation of scalar implicatures depends on 
speaker and addressee shared knowledge of the scales.  
How do children learn those scales, given that these terms systematically lead 





1.2.4 Modal scales and crosslinguistic variation in the expression of force 
In Indo-European languages like English, possibility and necessity ‘duals’ are 
common. However, outside Indo-European languages, there are languages where we 
find no such scales. Instead, the same modals can be used both in situations where 
English speakers would use a possibility modal, and in situations where they would use 
a necessity modal.  
Such “variable force” modals have been described in a number of languages, 
and do not behave uniformly across different languages (see Yanovich, 2016, for a 
summary). In Nez Perce (Niimiipuutimt), the modal o’qa has been analyzed as a 
possibility (existential) modal, whose apparent variable force is due to the lack of a 
lexicalized stronger necessity dual in the language: o’qa does not belong to a Horn-
scale, therefore its use is never associated with a scalar implicature (Deal, 2011), and 
is thus deemed appropriate in situations of necessity. Gitksan (Tsimshianic) =ima is 
similarly analyzed as a possibility modal (Matthewson, 2013; Peterson, 2010). On the 
other hand, in St’´at’imcets (Lillooet Salish) and Washo (Hokan/isolate), “variable 
force” modals have been analyzed as being underlyingly necessity (universal) modals, 
which can be weakened by contextually restricting their domain of quantification to 
derive possibility readings (Rullmann et al., 2008; Bochnak, 2015). Other analyses take 
these modals to neither be underlying possibility, nor underlying necessity. In 
particular, Kratzer (2012) proposes that they can be analyzed as upper-end degree 
modals, roughly equivalent in meaning to ‘it is somewhat probable (/desirable) that p’ 





The range of cross-linguistic variation we find suggests that there are few 
constraints on the space of hypotheses learners entertain for modals. They can neither 
expect that their language must have a possibility modal, nor a necessity modal. 
Moreover, they can’t expect modals to come in duals. And even in a language with 
duals like English, knowing the force of one modal doesn’t guarantee that the next 
modal will express a different force, given that several lexemes can express the same 
force (e.g., can, might and may): children will thus have to figure out force for each 
modal anew.  
1.2.5 ‘Polite’ uses of modals  
As we saw in English, a language with scales, the use of a possibility modal can convey 
a scalar implicature. For example, “you can go” can be used to convey that ‘you don’t 
have to’. While logically true, possibility modal sentences are inappropriate in 
necessity situations, because under informative. This aspect of the pragmatics of 
modals could in principle help (English) learners distinguish possibility from necessity 
modals. If speakers systematically refrain from using possibility modals in necessity 
situations (because necessity modals would be more informative), situations in which 
possibility modals are used might never overlap with those in which necessity modals 
are used.  
However, speakers do not always aim for maximal informativity: other 
conversational principles can interfere. And in particular, issues for learners might arise 
from ‘polite’ uses of modals: Possibility modal statements can also be used to soften 





instance, could in (13) can be used to perform an order to be quiet, and might in (14) 
can be used to convey that it is too late (see Searle, 1975; Grice, 1975; Austin, 1975, 
Brown & Levinson, 1987, a.o.).8  
(13) “You could be a little more quiet”  ‘Be quiet!’ (order) 
(14) “It might be too late”   ‘It is too late.’ (assertion of certainty)  
Here, there is a mismatch between the force of the speech act performed (for 
instance in (13) an order, closer to necessity) and the actual force of the modal (its 
literal meaning: possibility). On the island, the speaker might just be polite, and 
perfectly well know that the forest is the only way to go. This aspect could, in principle, 
raise a problem in acquiring force. If children are often exposed to sentences like “the 
toy might be in the box” when parents clearly know it is in the box, what will they infer 
about the meaning of might? If these uses were systematic, children could be led to 
lexicalize necessity meanings for possibility modals.  
How do children interpret these uses? Are they able to ‘objectively’ evaluate a 
given situation (e.g., by discovering afterwards that the other option was not available), 
or are they more sensitive to the speech act performed? Do they have expectation for 
adults to be informative, or polite, or is this something they learn?9 There is no definite 
                                               
 
8 Note that these examples don’t necessarily involve politeness. In other contexts, (14) could be used 
ironically, or as a guessing game, etc. The general point is that the ‘force’ of the speech act and the force 
of the modal don’t align. 
9 According to Searle (1975), the understanding of a request e.g., in “Can you pass the salt?” arises by 
reasoning that the ability in question is so trivial that it cannot be intended as a real question about 
whether the addressee has this ability. But here, we put the problem backward and ask how learners can 





answer to those questions in the literature, and I will only start addressing them in the 
dissertation, but this is an aspect of the problem we cannot ignore. And these 
challenges, coming from the distinction between sentence and speaker meanings, are 
particularly acute in the case of modals.10  
The existing acquisition literature suggests that children are sensitive to the kind 
of speech acts speaker performs early on, and are able to track the goals and intentions 
of their interlocutors (see Baldwin, 1991; Bloom, 2002; Clark & Amaral, 2010, a.o.). 
But while the literature shows that children are sensitive to the difference between main 
types of speech acts (assertions/questions/requests), it has not been shown that they can 
tell the difference in their ‘force’—between, for instance, orders and permissions (for 
deontic modality), or between different levels of certainty and degree of commitment 
of the speaker (for epistemic modality).  
 
1.3 Solving the Subset Problem with modals 
How can children solve the Subset Problem with modals, given both what they mean 
and how they are used? That is, how do English learners figure out that necessity 
modals, like have to and must, have logically stronger meanings than their possibility 
counterparts, can and might?11 In this section, I will introduce three possible 
                                               
 
10 For a discussion of the role of pragmatics in the acquisition of attitude verbs such as think/want, see 
Hacquard and Lidz, 2018. 
11 Recall that according to the logic of the Subset Problem, it is words that have stronger meanings that 
are potentially problematic (e.g.: all does not mean ‘some’, apple does not mean ‘fruit’, must does not 
mean ‘possible’). In this section, as before, I focus the discussion on how children can solve the Subset 





“solutions” to the Subset Problem, based on what has previously been proposed in the 
literature for other instances of Subset Problems, and discuss their applicability given 
what we have just seen about the semantics and pragmatics of modals. The first solution 
we will consider is that learners would have a bias towards strong (here, necessity) 
meanings, in the spirit of Berwick (1985) (see also Manzini & Wexler, 1987). The 
second one is that they would rely on downward-entailing environments, which reverse 
patterns of entailment (Gualmini & Schwarz, 2009). I then put forward a third solution, 
where learners use pragmatic cues from the conversational context in which modals are 
used to draw inferences about modals’ force (Dieuleveut et al., 2019; see Rasin & 
Aravind, 2021, for a similar proposal for the acquisition of every).12  
1.3.1 A bias for strong (necessity) meanings 
A first way to solve Subset Problems is for learners to have an (innate) bias towards 
positing logically stronger meanings. This kind of idea, originally proposed for syntax 
Subset Problems, has many variants (see in particular Crain et al., 1994; Crain, 2012; 
                                               
 
debates. But our learning problem could, and maybe should, be framed in a more general way: how 
children can figure out the force of the modals of their language.  
12 Here, I won’t discuss two other possibilities found in the literature. First, that children would be 
directly corrected by adults when they “incorrectly” produce necessity modals. This type of solution has 
been criticized for syntactic Subset Problems (see Pinker, 1979), but could prove more relevant for 
semantic Subset Problems (Brown & Hanlon (1970) argue that while parents do not tend to correct their 
children for grammaticality, they do object to false statements made by children). In the case of modals, 
this kind of corrections would correspond to a child saying “It must/has to be in the box”, and being 
corrected by the adult: “no, you should have said ‘can’, it is not necessary that it is: it can also be in the 
drawer.” In their study on every, Rasin & Aravind (2021) report, out of 72 every uttered by children, 1 
case of such explicit negative feedback. I leave open the question of whether children (systematically) 
encounter such correction with modals. Second, I will not fully address the question of potential effects 
of contrast, even though knowing a dual might affect learning (following Clark’s principle of contrast, 
Clark & MacWhinney, 1987). Even thought, as mentioned, learners cannot expect two distinct lexemes 
to necessarily express different forces, since several lexemes can express the same force (e.g., must/have 
to/got to/need to all express necessity), such contrasts (seeing necessity modals explicitly contrasted with 





Crain & Thornton, 1998 Semantic Subset Principle).13 In the case of modals, this would 
mean that by default, children would assume necessity meanings for new modals—at 
the island crossing, you would by default assume that sig means that the speaker 
believes that it is the only option for you to reach your goal to go through the forest. 
Children would revise their hypothesis only for possibility modals, when hearing them 
used in situations of possibility but non-necessity—where a necessity modal cannot be 
used.  
Take a child who would have to learn two modals, sig and gorp. Sig means 
‘possible’, while gorp means ‘necessary’, but she does not know this. If she assumes 
by default that both express ‘necessity’, she never needs to change her hypothesis in 
the case of gorp (~ must), as it is the correct one. In the case of sig (~ can), she might 
be able to revise her hypothesis, by hearing it used to describe a situation that is plainly 
not necessary: For instance, hearing the sentence “You sig go through the forest” in a 
situation where she can see that it is possible to use either road.  
Do children need such a bias to solve the Subset Problem with modals? As we 
will see in the next two subsections, this type of proposal has been strongly criticized 
for other instances of the Subset Problem, both on conceptual (e.g., Gualmini & 
Schwarz, 2009) and empirical grounds (Xu & Tenenbaum, 2007; Musolino, 2006; 
                                               
 
13 The Subset Principle was originally proposed for the acquisition of syntactic phenomena (Baker, 1979; 
Pinker, 1979; Dell, 1981; Berwick, 1985; Manzini & Wexler, 1987, a.o.). Later on, the Semantic Subset 
Principle (SSP) was introduced by Crain and Thornton (1998) to account for semantic Subset Problems, 
at the sentential level (the acquisition of ambiguous sentences whose readings are related by entailment) 
(see also Crain et al. 1994; Crain 2012; Crain et al. 1994). Crain et al. (1994) discuss the case of the 
acquisition of only, and claim that the absence of truth-conditional evidence makes it impossible for a 
child to learn a strong reading after first learning a weak reading. They posit the Semantic Subset 





Piantadosi, 2011, Piantadosi et al., 2013; Rasin & Aravind, 2021; for a summary, see 
Musolino et al., 2019). Such a bias has been shown to be unnecessary in those cases, 
but the question is still open in the case of modals, where the learning problem might 
be more acute. 
1.3.2 Using Downward-Entailing environments  
Gualmini and Schwarz (2009) propose a general solution to semantic Subset Problems, 
which only requires relying on truth-conditional evidence. Children just need to 
observe words that express strong meanings (for us, necessity modals) in downward-
entailing environments (that is, environments that reverse patterns of entailment), for 
instance, under negation. They use this to argue that there is no Subset Problem, once 
we take downward-entailing (DE) environments into consideration.  
Again, the logic might be easier to grasp using first the example of content 
words. Recall our thought experiment with nouns, where the problem arises if you are 
unsure about the meaning of mala (~ apple), but think it means ‘fruit’. In fact, there 
exists a logical way to solve your Subset Problem, even just using truth-conditional 
evidence: hearing the sentence “This is not a mala” used when pointing at a banana, 
you should be able to infer that mala cannot mean ‘fruit’. 
So again, take a child who would have to learn two new modals, sig and gorp; 
sig means ‘possible’, gorp means ‘necessary’, but she does not know this. As before, 
there is no problem for sig (~ can): if she wrongly assumes that it means ‘necessary’, 
she should be able to revise her hypothesis by hearing it used to describe a situation 





in fact has a ‘logical’ way to solve the Subset Problem: by hearing 'you don’t gorp to 
(go down the forest)’, used to describe a situation where it plainly is possible to go 
down the forest. She should be able to infer that the meaning of sig cannot be ‘possible’: 
if it meant ‘possible’, then, under negation, it would mean ‘not possible’, and it could 
not be used in this situation. If we further assume that learners only consider a restricted 
space of hypotheses about possible meanings for modals ({possible, necessary}), they 
may further infer that, since gorp cannot mean ‘possible’, it has to mean ‘necessary’. 
If children can observe necessity modals in such negative environments, they 
thus have a systematic way to solve Subset Problems. In this case, as argued by 
Gualmini and Schwarz (2009), they don’t need a bias towards strong meanings. This is 
an elegant solution, since it only requires from learners to rely on truth-conditional 
evidence, and can in principle apply to any instances of semantic Subset Problems.  
However, problems arise from the irregularities of scope between negation and 
modals. As we saw in section 1.2.3, the scope interactions of modals and negation are 
not well-behaved. In particular, some necessity modals, for instance English must or 
should, systematically take scope over negation.  
We can thus separate two types of cases, depending on the scope interpretation 
that necessity modals receive when they occur with negation. First, for necessity 
modals that outscope negation, like must or should (“she mustn’t go”: necessary > not), 
the reasoning proposed by Gualmini and Schwarz (2009) cannot be applied. Indeed, 
these necessity modals do not occur in negative environments: Learners will never hear 
“she mustn’t go” in possibility situations, since this is not a possible meaning in the 





its scope relation (and maybe, its polarity restrictions) from negative environments; but 
then, they need to have figured out force first. But from the learner’s perspective, these 
cases could even be misleading for force: if children use negation to infer force and 
expect the same scope behavior for must and can, they should conclude that they 
express the same force, since from a pure truth conditional point of view, “you mustn’t 
go” and “you can’t go” are equivalent (given the logical equivalence between necessary 
> not and not > possible). For these necessity modals, using a learning strategy based 
on negation might thus even add to the learning problem. And the same issue will arise 
for learners of other languages as well, since the tendency of necessity modals to 
outscope negation and yield ‘strong’ interpretations is found across several languages 
(e.g., Dutch moeten, German müssen).14  
In the second type of case—namely, when necessity modals do scope below 
negation, such as don't have to and don't need to/needn’t, which mean ‘not 
necessary’—the rationale proposed by Gualmini and Schwarz at least can apply: 
negation could in principle be useful. The question is then how frequently these 
necessity modals occur in Downward-Entailing environments in the actual input, and 
whether those are clearly used to convey non-necessity rather than impossibility.  
It seems that for negation to be helpful in figuring out force, learners would 
need to have already figured out how the modal scopes relative to negation, and expect 
negation to scope differently depending on force, flavor and modal idiosyncrasies. But 
                                               
 
14 This is also reported in languages where “variable force” modals are analyzed as underlying necessity 
modals, such as St’´at’imcets and Washo (Rullmann et al., 2008; Bochnak, 2015): in those languages, 
the fact that modals cannot occur under negation is discussed as one of the things that makes the force 





how would they figure out the right scope relations between modals and negation 
without knowing the force of the modals? Children might need to figure out force 
first—and then use it to learn scope and potential polarity restrictions.15 
The consequence for us is that using Downward-Entailing environments cannot 
be the solution to the Subset Problem with modals: at least, not a general one. 
  
1.3.3 Using cues from the conversational context 
Given the irregularity of scope of necessity modals and negation, using Downward-
Entailing environments cannot be a general solution to the Subset Problem. The 
rationale proposed by Gualmini & Schwarz can in principle apply for cases like have 
to, but cannot for cases like must. Then, how do children “solve” the Subset Problem?  
Let’s consider another kind of solution: Learners may be able to learn modal 
force using contextual information, rather than pure logic (Dieuleveut et al., 2019; for 
a similar proposal for the acquisition of every, see Rasin & Aravind, 2021). Children 
would use pragmatic cues, information from the situational context in which modals 
are used. This, in a way, dissolves the Subset Problem: if these kinds of cues are 
available, and if children are able to use them, they do not need to rely on negative 
environments, and they do not need a necessity bias.  
                                               
 
15 According to Iatridou and Zeijlstra (2013), only necessity modals, but not possibility modals, are 
subject to polarity restrictions. This type of polarity-type analysis has interesting consequences for the 
learner: it suggests that children may need figure out force before polarity restrictions. How are these 
two properties, force and polarity restrictions, learnt in tandem? This is an open question (for work and 
discussion of the role of the input on the acquisition of the NPI any, see Tieu, 2010, 2015; Tieu & Lidz, 






As we saw in section 1.2.3, we can expect some aspects of the pragmatics of 
modals to help English learners. If, following Gricean maxims, speakers systematically 
refrain from using possibility modals in necessity situations (because necessity modals 
would be more informative), situations in which they use possibility modals might 
never overlap with those in which they use necessity modals. This could help learners 
distinguish possibility from necessity modals. However, as we then saw in section 
1.2.5, the extent to which adults always choose to use necessity modals over possibility 
modals in necessity situations is not entirely clear: the same sentence, “you can go”, 
can depending on the context, be used (or interpreted) in opposite ways: either as ‘you 
don’t have to’ (scalar implicature), or as ‘you really should’ (‘polite’ use). These 
politeness considerations (which are peculiar to modal scales, and do not arise, for 
instance, with quantifiers like some/all) could be misleading for learners: if frequent, 
they might blur the distinction between possibility and necessity modals.16 
Do speakers use possibility and necessity modals in clearly distinct situations, 
and in ways that can be informative to the child? Conversational contexts include 
diverse components children might be sensitive to: the social status of participants (the 
                                               
 
16Again, one crucial question is what aspects of a situation children are sensitive to. Xu & Tenenbaum 
(2007) have convincingly shown that a Bayesian learning model better captures the learning of content 
words (Labrador/dog), than traditional approaches to modeling word learning, based on deductive 
hypothesis elimination and associative learning. They show that learners can generalize from just a few 
positive examples of a novel word’s referents, by making rational inductive inferences (see Tenenbaum’s 
1999 size principle; see also Piantadosi, 2011; Piantadosi et al., 2013 for a Bayesian model of the 
acquisition of quantifiers like every). However, one of the prerequisites for these Bayesian models to 
work is that speakers systematically use logically stronger sentences when they are true (and that learners 
expect them to). This assumption might not be problematic in the case of quantifiers, but with modals, 
the situation might be more complex, given potential ‘polite’ uses of possibility modals described in 
section 1.2.5. Learners might thus have to deal with a potentially more noisy input than when learning 





child herself, her parents, maybe other people around them), the activity they are 
involved in (for instance, playing with toys), the goals of the speaker when she utters a 
specific sentence (the speech act performed: asking a question, giving a suggestion, 
giving an order or a prohibition), etc. But what aspects correlate with the distinction in 
force? Are children sensitive to them, and able to use them when learning meanings?  
One example of such a cue, which I will explore in the dissertation, is the 
desirability of the possible events described. Let’s picture our crossing differently: now 
the road through the mountains looks threatening, but the road through the forest is 
enticing. Compare (15)a) and (15)b). What would you infer about the meaning of sig 
and gleeb?  
(15) a. You sig take this lovely road through the enchanted forest.  
b. You gleeb take this treacherous road through the mountains.  
If children expect permissions/possibilities to be more often associated to 
desirable predicates, and obligations/necessities to be more often associated to 
undesirable predicates, children could use cues based on the desirability of the event 
described: whether they are positive or negative.17  
Take a child who would have to learn two new modals, sig and gorp; sig means 
‘possible’, gorp means ‘necessary’, but she does not know this. If she hears sig often 
used with desirable prejacents (e.g., “You sig have a candy”, “You sig play in the 
garden”, “You sig not eat the cookie”), she might infer that it means ‘possible’, because 
                                               
 





permissions and possibilities are usually associated to desirable events. Conversely, if 
she hears gorp often used with undesirable prejacents (e.g., “You gorp brush your 
teeth”, "You gorp do your homework”, “You gorp not help with the dishes”), she might 
infer that it means ‘necessary’, because obligations and necessities are usually 
associated with undesirable events.18 
Can children learn the contrast in force just on the basis of these kinds of 
conversational cues? Is the conversational context rich enough for learners to infer their 
force, without having to rely on either negation or a necessity bias? To answer these 
questions, and see what strategies are available for children to learn force, we need to 
look at their input.  
 
1.3.4 Summary  
We saw that what makes the mapping of modal form to force particularly challenging 
is that necessity entails possibility. This creates a Subset Problem for necessity modals, 
which have a logically stronger meaning than possibility modals. How can children 
solve this problem with modals? We consider three solutions. The first is for them to 
have a bias towards strong (necessity) meanings, in the spirit of Berwick (1985). The 
second is for them to rely on downward-entailing environments, which reverse patterns 
of entailment (Gualmini & Schwarz, 2009). The third is that they exploit cues from the 
                                               
 





conversational context, if speakers use possibility and necessity modals in clearly 
distinct situations in ways that are informative as to their force for children.  
This dissertation assesses each of these solutions, to better understand how and 
when children eventually figure out the force of modals. To do so, I conduct a series of 
corpus and experiments to examine how modals are used in speech to and by children. 
By looking at children’s modal input, we can assess the viability of each of these 
solutions: Do modals regularly occur in DE-environments, like in the scope of 
negation? Are cues from the conversational context like desirability available and 
exploitable? If neither is available or reliable in the input, a necessity bias might be 
necessary for learners to solve the Subset Problem. By looking at children’s early 
modals, we can assess when they appear to master the force of each, and whether we 
find evidence for a necessity bias in their modal uses.  
In a nutshell, results from these studies will show that the conversational context 
in which modals are used is highly informative about both forces. This means that if 
children are sensitive to the same conversational cues as adults, they can in principle 
use them to figure out modal force, and therefore don’t need to rely on a necessity bias 
or on downward-entailing contexts. The nature of these conversational cues could be 
quite diverse, and might vary with modal flavor. In particular, I show that children 
might be able to use desirability to figure out the force of deontic modals.  
Looking at young children’s own spontaneous productions of modals, we find 
an asymmetry between their early mastery of possibility and necessity modals, which 
I’ll call a ‘Necessity Gap’. Children seem to master possibility modals early: at age 2, 





seem to struggle with necessity modals: they produce these much less frequently, 
hardly ever with negation, and often in a non adult-like way. These results cast a new 
light on prior results from comprehension experiments: as we will see, if this difficulty 
with necessity modals persists into the preschool years, it could explain children’s 
tendency to both accept possibility modals in necessity contexts (if they lack a relevant 
stronger alternative), and necessity modals in possibility contexts (if are unsure that 
these modals express necessity). It remains unclear, however, whether children’s 
difficulties with necessity modals stem from not knowing their underlying force, or 
whether children have successfully learned their force, but have either conceptual or 
pragmatic difficulty deploying them in ways that adults would.  
 
1.4 Outline of the dissertation 
To answer our question of how children figure out modal force, and to test the viability 
of each of these three solutions, we need to study children’s input: how modals are used 
by their parents. How often do children hear possibility and necessity modals? Are they 
often used with negation? And how informative is the conversational context about 
force?  
Chapter 2 presents a corpus study of the input to 2- to 3-year-old English 
children, based on the Manchester corpus (Theakston et al., 2001; CHILDES database, 
MacWhinney 2000). Its main goal is to evaluate the viability of each of the three 
solutions we have for the Subset Problem: to determine how, in principle, children can 





their parents. It gives both quantitative data about parents’ modal productions, and 
insights from three experiments that assess the general informativity of context about 
force, based on the Human Simulation Paradigm (Gillette et al. 1999). They show that 
the conversational context is highly informative, about both forces, which suggests that 
learners, at least in principle, needn't rely either on a necessity bias or on downward-
entailing environments.  
Chapter 3 focuses on the when question, and assesses children’s own 
productions of modals, using the same corpus. It first reviews what we currently know 
about children’s understanding of modal force, which is mostly based on 
comprehension experiments, and typically targets older children (from age 4). It then 
assesses more directly the question of when children figure out force, by providing a 
detailed corpus study of 2- to 3-year-old children’s spontaneous productions of 
possibility and necessity modals, as compared to their parents’. The study is novel in 
three ways. First, it targets very young children, between 2 and 3: much younger than 
children tested in experiments. Moreover, it focuses on children’s spontaneous 
productions: it is thus complementary to comprehension experiments. Last, besides 
quantitative measures about children’s productions (i.e., how frequently they use 
possibility and necessity modals), it uses a novel method to test whether children use 
their modals in an adult-like way: the experiment is based on the HSP paradigm used 
for adults’ productions, but evaluates children’s productions. Results from the corpus 
study suggest that children master possibility modals early, but struggle with necessity 





Chapter 2 shows that conversational context informative, and thus that in 
principle, children do not need to rely on negation or a necessity bias. But do children 
actually make use of this information? To start addressing this question, and how 
children eventually master necessity modals, Chapter 4 presents a study that relates 
the input study (Chapter 2) and the output study (Chapter 3). It aims at identifying what 
factors in the speech of parents influence children’s mastery of force in practice, by 
focusing on variation between children in their mastery. Its results point out two factors 
that seem to play a crucial role in the learning process: first, children who hear have to 
with negation more frequently in their input seem to master it earlier. Second, while we 
don’t find that the mere frequency of exposure to have to has an effect, we find that 
children more exposed to modal talk in general seem to master have to earlier.  
Chapter 5 summarizes our main findings and discusses their implications for 









Chapter 2. Children’s input: How can children figure out force? 
This chapter focuses on children’s input. Its aim is to determine how, in principle, 
children can figure out modal force, by closely examining how modals are used in the 
speech of their parents. I do so via a corpus study, based on the Manchester corpus 
(Theakston et al., 2001; CHILDES database, MacWhinney, 2000), which provides a 
quantitative assessment of the modals children hear (which modals parents use, how 
frequently, and how frequently they use them with negation), and three experiments, 
that assess the informativity of natural conversational contexts about modal force, using 
a variant of the Human Simulation Paradigm (HSP) (Gillette et al., 1999).  
Remember our thought experiment from Chapter 1: You arrive at a crossing, 
ask for directions, and your informant tells you: “You sig go through the forest.” How 
do you determine whether this new modal, sig, expresses necessity (there is no other 
way you can go), or possibility (you can go this way, but there may also be other ways 
you can take)? Cues from the physical context are bound to be limited, since modals 
express non-actual states of affairs, with no physical correlates (Landau & Gleitman, 
1985). Syntactic cues will be limited as well, since possibility and necessity modals 
belong to the same syntactic category: the syntactic position of sig might help you 
narrow candidate meanings as expressing some kind of modal meaning (in the spirit of 
Landau and Gleitman’s 1985 syntactic bootstrapping hypothesis), but it does not help 
distinguish force.  
The goal of this chapter is to clarify what kind of information children can, in 





speech to children. If physical and syntactic cues are limited, what kind of cues can 
they use? What strategies are available to them, given their input? How can children 
map {can/could/might} to possibility meanings, and {must/should/have to} to 
necessity meanings? 
As we saw in Chapter 1, what might make this learning problem particularly 
challenging for children is that necessity entails possibility, which creates a Subset 
Problem. What is necessary is also possible: this means that whenever adults use 
necessity modals in declarative affirmative sentences (e.g., “The dog must go 
outside”), a possibility modal statement (e.g., “The dog can go outside”) is also 
logically true—even if potentially inappropriate. Then, what prevents children from 
thinking that necessity modals like must mean possible? There is no such issue for 
possibility modals, since children can in principle observe them used in situations of 
mere possibility, where a necessity modal is logically false, and therefore, cannot be 
used (e.g., “The dog can/#must go outside, but she is also allowed to stay inside”).  
How can children learn that necessity modals have a stronger meaning than 
possibility modals? In Chapter 1, we considered three possible “solutions” to this 
Subset Problem, which I now briefly reintroduce.  
According to the first solution, children have a bias towards ‘strong’ (here, 
necessity) meanings (in the spirit of Berwick, 1985).19 They would by default assume 
necessity meanings, and then revise their hypothesis only for possibility modals, when 
                                               
 
19 As discussed in Chapter 1, many variants of this idea, which was originally proposed for the acquisition 





hearing them used in situations of non-necessity (for instance above, by being told 
explicitly that the dog is also allowed to stay inside).  
According to the second solution, such a bias is not necessary, because children 
have a logical way to solve the problem: they can figure out the force of necessity 
modals just by observing them in downward-entailing (DE) environments, for instance 
under negation (Gualmini & Schwarz, 2009).20 Children should be able to infer that 
necessity modals cannot express possibility, by hearing them used with negation 
in situations of possibility: for instance, by hearing “The dog doesn’t have to go 
outside” used in a situation where it is clear that the dog can either stay inside or go 
outside. If have to meant possible, its negation would mean ‘not possible’, and it could 
not be used in such a situation (it is possible for the dog to go outside). Therefore, have 
to has to mean necessary.  
According to the third solution, children do not need to have a bias, nor to rely 
on negation: they can figure out force relying on pragmatic situational cues, from the 
context in which modals are used. Such information could involve the goals of the 
speaker in the context of her utterance (e.g., if they are performing orders, prohibitions, 
or granting permission), or properties associated with the types of events described in 
the prejacent (e.g., desirable events with permissions; undesirable ones with 
obligations).  
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Do children need to have a bias towards necessity meanings? Can they rely on 
downward-entailing environments? Or is the conversational context informative 
enough about force for them to learn without such a bias or without relying on 
downward-entailing environments? To assess the viability of each of these three 
possible learning strategies, we need to look at children’s input, to see if children are 
exposed to right kind of information (negation or pragmatic cues), or if a necessity bias 
is necessary. In this chapter, we will answer the following questions: How are 
possibility and necessity modals used by adults in conversations with children? How 
frequently are they used with negation? Then, how informative is the conversational 
context about force? Do adults use possibility and necessity modals in clearly distinct 
situations? And last, can we identify aspects of their conversations that are crucial to 
distinguish force?  
We will start with a study of parent’s productions, which is based on the 
Manchester corpus (Theakston et al., 2001; CHILDES database, MacWhinney, 2000). 
In section 2.1, I provide a descriptive quantitative assessment of the modals children 
hear: which modals parents use, how often, and in particular, how frequently they occur 
in downward-entailing environments. In sections 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4, I then present three 
experiments that allow us to assess the informativity of natural conversational contexts 
about modal force. The goal of the first two experiments (section 2.2: Input Experiment 
1 and section 2.3: Input Experiment 2) is to assess the general informativity of 
conversational contexts, by asking adult participants to guess a modal blanked 





Human Simulation Paradigm (HSP) (Gillette et al., 1999).21 In the first experiment, the 
blanked modal statement is presented in context (i.e., with the preceding dialogue); in 
the second experiment, it is presented without context. Our results show that the 
conversational context in which modals are used is highly informative, about both 
forces. The last experiment (section 2.4: Input Experiment 3) explores further one 
specific situational cue for root modals, the desirability of the event described by the 
prejacent. The results show that this cue is available in the input: root necessity modals 
are more often used with undesirable prejacents than their possibility counterparts. 
Last, in section 2.5, I discuss implications of our findings for how children might 
acquire modal force and solve the Subset Problem.  
To preview, I will show that: 
(i) Our experimental results show that the conversational context is highly 
informative, about both forces. This means that learners don’t need to rely 
on either a necessity bias or on negative environments to solve the Subset 
Problem: they can in principle use conversational cues to figure out force.  
(ii) The nature of these conversational cues might vary with modal flavor. In 
particular, children might rely on cues from desirability to figure out the 
force of root deontic modals. We show that this cue is available in the input: 
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adults use (root) necessity modals more frequently with undesirable events, 
and (root) possibility modals more often with desirable events.  
(iii) Using evidence from negative environments might not be sufficient to solve 
the Subset Problem for necessity modals. Depending on the modal, cases 
for necessity modals are either informative but extremely rare (e.g., don’t 
have to), or potentially misleading because of the scope irregularities 
between necessity modals and negation (e.g. mustn’t), as discussed in 
Chapter 1. However, using evidence from negative environments might be 
more helpful for children to figure out the force of possibility modals: our 
results show that negated possibility modals (e.g., can’t) are frequent in the 
input, and that context is highly informative about their force.  
 
2.1 Corpus study22 
2.1.1 Methods  
We used the Manchester Corpus (Theakston et al., 2001) of UK English (CHILDES 
database, MacWhinney, 2000), which consists of 12 child-mother pairs (6 females; age 
range: 1;09-3;00) recorded in unstructured play sessions. This corpus was chosen for 
its relative density and uniformity of sampling, as well as its early age range. We 
focused on the period between ages 2;00 and 3;00. All utterances containing modal 
                                               
 






auxiliaries and semi-auxiliaries (26,598 of 564,625 total utterances; adult: 20,755; 
child: 5,842; excluding repetitions (6.6%): adult: 19,986; child: 4,844) were coded for 
force (possibility vs. necessity) (16), presence of negation (17), flavor (epistemic vs. 
root) (18), subject (first/second/third person) (19), clause type (declarative/ 
interrogative/tag question) (20), and whether they occur in the antecedent of if-clauses 
(21). We did not include will, would, shall and going to, as they primarily express 
future, for which force is a matter of debate (Stalnaker, 1968; Cariani & Santorio, 2018, 
a.o.).  
(16) Modal lemmas by force: 
Possibility: can, could, might, may; able to 
Necessity: must, should, need; have to, got to, be supposed to, need to 
(17) Negation: 
No negation: ‘I can go to the pub now.’ 
Negation:  
on main verb: ‘I can't get it’/ ‘I must not forget Whispy.’  
on higher auxiliary: ‘we don't have to play with your toys.’  
on embedding verb: ‘I don't think you have to look for it.’ 
other negative quantifier: ‘nobody can reach it.’ 
(18) Flavor: 
Root: 
MOTHER: we won't do that. 
CHILD: I want her. 
CHILD: I want her. 
MOTHER: well you must treat her nicely then. (Aran, 2;07.14) 
Epistemic: 
MOTHER: oh. 
MOTHER: somebody's done a neat pattern, haven't they? 
MOTHER: goodness me. 






1st person: ‘I can see a bucket.’/ ‘We can fit a cow through there.’ 
2nd person: ‘You can do it.’ 
3rd person: ‘He can go in the cart.’ / ‘The cat can go in the house.’ 
(20) Clause type: 
Declarative clause: ‘I can see a bucket.’ 
Interrogative clause: ‘What can you see?’; ‘Can you see any chickens?’  
Tag question (excluded): ‘You can wash it later, can't you?’ 
(21) Conditionals: 
No if-conditional: ‘He can go in that one.’; ‘see if you can balance it on 
your head.’ 
Modal in antecedent: ‘they drink milk if they can get milk.’; ‘if you can 
open that you'll find a dog.’ 
Modal in consequent: ‘you can make it big if you want to.’; ‘if I really 
want to get it I can.’ 
2.1.2 Results 
Modal utterances (i.e., utterances containing a modal auxiliary or semi-auxiliary) 
represent 5.9% of all mothers’ utterances (possibility modals: 4.2%, necessity modals: 
1.7%). Overall, parents use possibility modals more frequently than necessity modals: 
possibility modals represent 72.5% of all their modal utterances (Table 2.1). Can is 
their most common modal (57.3% of all modal utterances), and have to their most 
frequent necessity modal (12.0%).  
Downward-entailing environments. We find that negated possibility modals are quite 
frequent in adult speech, but negated necessity modals are rarer (possibility: 20.9% 
negated; necessity: 10.1% negated). Moreover, most of the cases where we find 
necessity modals with negation correspond to modals that outscope negation (must, 





negated have to/got to (i.e., where using negation could in principle be useful to infer 
force) are thus rare (4.5% of adults’ have to utterances are negated; got to: 1.1%). 
Modals occur rarely with other negative quantifiers (e.g., nobody/nothing/never), with 
no difference between possibility and necessity (necessity: 0.1% of adults’ modal 
utterances; possibility: 0.2%), neither do they occur under negated embedding verbs 
(e.g. don’t think), again with no difference between possibility and necessity (necessity: 
2.1%; possibility: 1.5%).  
Both possibility and necessity modals occur rarely in other downward-entailing 
environments such as the antecedents of if-conditionals (overall: 0.6%) (Table 2.2). 
Necessity modals hardly ever occur in such environments: we find only 15 occurrences 
in the whole corpus (with 7 of them corresponding to ‘if you must’) (vs. 106 possibility 
modals). (As a point of comparison, we find 135 necessity modals occurring in the if-


















Table 2.1 Counts and percentages of modal uses by force for adults, ordered by lemma 
frequency, with and without negation (repetitions excluded: 3.7% of the data).23 * 
indicates necessity modals that outscope negation.  
 
 ADULT (n=19,986) ADULT (n=18,853) 24 
 all no negation negation 
POSSIBILITY 14,491 72.5% 10,672 79.1% 2,828 20.9% 
can 11,472 57.4% 8,383 77.7% 2,396 22.2% 
could 1,449 7.3% 1,116 96.6% 39 3.3% 
might 1,216 6.1% 1,005 82.8% 208 17.1% 
able 315 1.6% 134 42.5% 181 57.4% 
may 39 0.2% 34 89.5% 4 10.5% 
NECESSITY 5,495 27.5% 4,814 89.9% 539 10.1% 
have to 2,398 12.0% 2,290 95.5% 108 4.5% 
got to 940 4.7% 926 98.8% 11 1.1% 
should* 793 4.0% 537 77.1% 159 22.8% 
need (to)25 493 2.5% 409 82.9% 84 17.0% 
must* 452 2.3% 346 84.1% 65 15.8% 
supposed to 335 1.7% 230 68.6% 105 31.3% 
ought to* 84 0.4% 76 91.5% 7 8.4% 
 
Table 2.2 Counts and percentages of modal uses by force in if-conditionals, for adults 
(excluding tags and repetitions). 
 
ADULT (n=18,853) 
 no if-clause modal in antecedent modal in consequent 
POSSIBILITY 12,962 96% 106 0.8% 432 3.2% 
NECESSITY 5,201 97.2% 15 0.3% 135 2.5% 
 
Flavor. We find that epistemic uses of modals are rare in parents’ speech: they 
represent only 8.8% of all their modal utterances (Table 2.3) (a breakdown by modal 
is provided in Appendix A; see van Dooren et al., 2017, for details and discussion). 
Note that negation is considerably less frequent with epistemic than with root modals: 
epistemics are rarely negated (epistemic: 4.6% negated, vs. root: 19.1%).  
                                               
 
23 Are considered as repetitions cases where the speaker repeats a sentence uttered right before by herself 
or by another speaker with no significant change.  
24 Excluding tags and repetitions. Tag questions (e.g. “you can wash it later, can't you?”) are very 
frequent in this corpus (4.7% of all modal utterances). We exclude modals in the tags, as they do not 
matter for our purposes.  





Table 2.3 Counts and percentages of modal uses, by force, flavor and negation (adults, 
excluding tags and repetitions). 
 
ADULT (n=18,853) 
 all no negation negation 
root 17,190 91.2% 13,896 80.9% 3,293 19.1% 
possibility 12,175 64.6% 9,414 77.3% 2,761 22.6% 
necessity 5,015 26.6% 4,482 89.4% 533 10.5% 
epistemic 1,662 8.8% 1,590 95.4% 73 4.6% 
possibility 1,324 7.0% 1,257 94.9% 67 5.0% 
necessity 341 1.8% 332 97.3% 6 2.6% 
 
Sentence type. To get a sense of the kind of speech acts modals tended to be used for, 
we looked at clause type and subject person. They are included here, but I leave further 
analysis for future research. Figures 2.1a and 2.1b summarize the distribution of 
possibility and necessity modals with and without negation per sentence type and 
subject, for root (2.1a) and epistemic (2.1b) modals. Necessity modals are rare in 
questions, especially epistemic ones, but parents use many possibility modals in 
interrogative sentences (e.g., “can you see it?”).  
Figure 2.1a Distribution of possibility and necessity modals with and without negation, 







Figure 2.1b Distribution of possibility and necessity modals with and without 





2.1.3 Interim summary  
Overall, we find that possibility modals are significantly more frequent than necessity 
modals in children’s input. Note that this difference in frequency between possibility 
and necessity modals could be specific to English: in other languages, we might 
encounter different proportions. However, it might also be a more general 
phenomenon, due to alternative ways speakers can express necessity instead of using 
necessity modals: using imperatives for deontic necessity (e.g. “Be careful!” for “You 
must be careful”), or directly asserting the prejacent for epistemic necessity (e.g., “You 
have left a piece” for “You must have left a piece.”).  
Necessity modals are not frequent with negation, let alone in other downward-





with negation (vs. 20.9% of possibility modals). Moreover, most of these cases 
correspond to necessity modals that outscope negation (must, should, ought to: 19.4%, 
vs. have to, got to, need to, be supposed to: 7.4%). Cases of negated have to/got to, 
where using negation could in principle be useful to infer force, following Gualmini & 
Schwarz’s rationale, are quite rare (have to: 4.5%; got to: 1.1%).  
 
2.2 Input Experiment 1: adults’ modal productions 
In order to assess the general informativity of natural conversational contexts about 
force, we implemented a variant of the Human Simulation Paradigm (Gillette et al. 
1998). One of the goals of the original Human Simulation Paradigm (Gillette et al., 
1999; see also (Snedeker et al., 1999; Snedeker, 2000; White et al., 2017) was to 
compare the effect of different kinds of contextual information on the ability to recover 
a word’s meaning: extralinguistic scenes, associated words and morphemes, or 
syntactic-frame information. The accuracy with which participants can recover the 
actual word given the context is taken as a general measure of the informativity of that 
context. We used a variant of the original paradigm, with two main modifications: first, 
following Orita et al. (2013), all participants were given written conversation 
transcripts from the corpus, with a blanked-out word (they had no visual or acoustic 
information). Second, they were asked to make a forced choice, between a possibility 





of conversational context (as in the original paradigm), and to test the force contrast in 
a more controlled way.26  
How easy is it for adults to guess the force of blanked-out modals based solely 
on excerpts of conversations in which they appear? Are there differences between root 
and epistemic modals? Is the conversational context equally informative for necessity 
and possibility modals? Last, how informative are negative uses of modals?  
2.2.1 Methods 
Procedure. The experiment was run online on Alex Drummond’s IBEX Farm.27 
Participants recruited via Amazon MechanicalTurk were asked to guess a redacted 
modal in a dialogue between a child and mother by choosing between two options, 
corresponding either to a possibility (e.g. might) or a necessity modal (e.g. must), as 
illustrated in Figure 2.2a. All dialogue contexts consisted of the modal sentence with 
a blank and the 7 preceding utterances, with the two options displayed at the bottom of 
the screen. There first was a short training where participants had to choose between 
the definite vs. indefinite article (the vs. a) (3 examples with feedback), followed by 
the test phase without feedback. Overall, each participant had to judge 40 different 
dialogues (20 trials: 10 possibility, 10 necessity; 20 controls using tense: 10 past, 10 
                                               
 
26 A previous version of the experiment, where instead of making a choice between forces, participants 
had to ‘fill in the blank’, is reported in (Dieuleveut et al., 2019). In this experiment, we also tested the 
effect of sentence type (declarative/negative/interrogative sentence/tag), Results show that adults were 
overall quite good at guessing modal force from natural contexts, with no significant difference between 
necessity and possibility (overall accuracy for necessity modal contexts: 68.6% vs. for possibility modal 
contexts: 63.6%). Negation and interrogative sentences were both found to decrease accuracy.  






future), presented in random order. The 20 trials were randomly selected for each 
participant from a list of 40 contexts originally extracted from the corpus; the 20 
controls were the same for all participants. Further details about the instructions and 
material are provided in Appendix B.  
 








Conditions. We tested force (possibility vs. necessity) within participants, and flavor 





was tested only for root flavor, because negated epistemics were too rare in the corpus 
to sample (Table 2.2). Table 2.4 summarizes the experimental design. 
Table 2.4 Summary of experimental conditions (Input Experiment 1): 
 
 
Test condition (between participants) 
Modal lemmas 
possibility necessity 
EPI-AFF (epistemic affirmative) might must 
ROOT-AFF (root affirmative) 28 ROOT-AFF-1 can must 
 ROOT-AFF-2 can/able have to 
ROOT-NEG (root negative) can’t/not able not have to 
 
Material. Extraction procedure – 160 contexts (2*20 per condition) were randomly 
extracted from the corpus for the different modals (can, able, might, must, have to). 
Exclusion criteria – We excluded contexts where the adult or the child used the target 
modal in preceding utterances. Contexts were not excluded when the adult or the child 
used another non-target modal. Briticisms, such as willn’t, were removed from the 
dialogue and replaced with American English equivalent (e.g. won’t). We didn’t 
exclude contexts where there were tag questions (e.g., ‘..., mustn't she?’), but removed 
the tags when they occurred in the target sentence. Controls – Participants had to 
choose between past and future (e.g. [saw] vs. [will see], see Figure 2.2b). Importantly, 
the correct answer was not always guessable based on the target sentence alone: it 
                                               
 
28 We implemented two versions of the ROOT-AFF condition. ROOT-AFF-1 (can vs. must) allowed us to 
keep syntactic category of both options identical, while ROOT-AFF-2 (can/able to vs. have to) allowed 
us to avoid concerns related to the formality of must for US English speakers. As in Experiment 1, in 
cases where have to was tensed, we used able to as the alternative to avoid losing tense information: for 
example, participants had to choose between [will have to] and [will be able to]. We extracted the same 
number of contexts from able to, to avoid having the able to option always be the wrong answer. Same 
principles applied for ROOT-NEG condition: participants had to choose between [didn’t have to] and 





required participants to read the entire dialogue. Extraction procedure and data cleaning 
were the same as for targets.  
2.2.2 Results 
Participants. 289 participants were recruited on Amazon Mechanical Turk (4 groups 
(between participants): ROOT-AFF-1: 73, ROOT-AFF-2: 72; ROOT-NEG: 73; EPI-AFF: 71; 
language: US English; 156 females, mean age=40.6-years-old). We removed from 
analysis 8 participants (2.8%) who were less than 75% accurate on controls. We thus 
present results for 281 participants (ROOT-AFF-1: 71, ROOT-AFF-2: 69; ROOT-NEG: 70; 
EPI-AFF: 71).  
Analysis. Overall, participants were highly accurate at guessing modal force (general 
mean accuracy: 79.9%). We first ran binomial tests to see whether they differ from 
chance for each condition (Table 2.5). Participants’ accuracy significantly differs from 
chance in each condition. Their lowest performance is found for ROOT-NEG necessity 
modals (e.g. not have to) (61.3%). Figure 2.3 summarizes the mean accuracy for each 
condition.29 Force. To test whether there was an effect of Force, we used binomial 
linear mixed effects models, built with a maximal random effect structure, testing 
Accuracy with Subject and Item as random factors (following Barr et al., 2013),30 first 
overall and then for each condition. We find a general effect of Force, in the direction 
of a higher accuracy for possibility contexts (χ2(1)=20.49, p=5.9e-6***). Restricting 
                                               
 
29 Accuracy for controls was very high (94.6%). There was no difference between groups in accuracy. 
(Controls were the same across all groups).  
30 We sometimes had to step back to random-intercepts-only models when the model failed to converge 





to each comparison group, we find a significant effect in ROOT-AFF-1 (χ2(1)=61.1, 
p=5.5e-15***) and ROOT-NEG (χ2(1)=15.6, p=7.8e-05***), again in the direction of a 
higher accuracy for possibility contexts, but not for ROOT-AFF-2 (χ2(1)=6e-04, p=0.98 
(NS)) and EPI-AFF (χ2(1)=3.73, p=.053 (NS)). Negation. We compared ROOT-AFF-2 and 
ROOT-NEG, as these conditions included the same lemmas. We find a significant effect 
of negation on necessity modals, which leads to lower accuracy (have to vs. not-have 
to: χ2(1) =6.45, p=0.011*). On possibility modals, negation leads to higher accuracy, 
but the effect is not significant (can vs. can’t: χ2(1) =2.29, p=0.13 (NS)). We find a 
strong interaction effect between Force and Negation (Interaction Force*Neg: 
χ2(1)=7.9, p=0.0047**). Flavor. There was no general effect of flavor (χ2(1)=0.11, 
p=0.74 (NS)). 
 
Table 2.5 Accuracy rates and significance tests by condition (Input Experiment 1: 
adults’ productions) (n=281, 10 observations per cell): 
 
 Mean accuracy (se) 31 Exact binomial tests (two-sided) 
 possibility necessity possibility necessity 
ROOT-AFF-1 91.7% (0.027) 71.7% (0.054) 
p <.001*** 
95% CI [0.90, 0.94] 
p <.001*** 
95% CI [0.68, 0.75] 
ROOT-AFF-2 81.5% (0.053) 82.0% (0.052) 
p <.001*** 
95% CI [0.79, 0.85] 
p <.001*** 
95% CI [0.79, 0.84] 
ROOT-NEG 89.5% (0.031) 61.3% (0.065) 
p <.001*** 
95% CI [0.88, 0.92]  
p=8.9e-08 *** 
95% CI [0.56, 0.64] 
EPI-AFF 87.2% (0.028) 74.3% (0.049) 
p <.001*** 
95% CI [0.84, 0.90] 
p <.001*** 
95% CI [0.71, 0.77] 
Total 87.5% (0.018) 72.3% (0.028)  
ALL 79.9% (0.018) 
 
                                               
 
31 Accuracy corresponds to the mean accuracy (how good participants were to guess correctly the force 
of the modal, e.g. to answer can in a possibility context) across 20 contexts initially extracted from the 
corpus for each condition of force and flavor. Each participant saw only 10 out of the 20 contexts (10 
for possibility, 10 for necessity). On average, each context was thus seen by 34.7 participants (ranging 









Analysis by contexts (post-hoc). To get a sense of the kinds of contextual cues that 
were particularly helpful, we looked at the contexts that led to lowest and highest 
accuracy, both for root and epistemic flavors. We focused on necessity modals as there 
was more variability in accuracy for them, as shown in Figure 2.4 (distribution of 
accuracy for possibility and necessity modals in each condition). This informal analysis 
revealed two factors, depending on flavor. For root modals, cases where the proposition 
expressed by the prejacent seemed clearly undesirable (e.g., going to the hospital) or 
effortful (e.g., lifting a heavy object) seemed to lead to high accuracy for necessity 
modals (see (22)). For epistemic modals, we found high accuracy for necessity modals 
in contexts that made salient strong evidence for the prejacent (see (23)). 
Our post-hoc analysis also pointed out a particularly high accuracy for 
possibility root modals interrogative sentences (e.g. ___ you see?) (mean accuracy for 
root possibility modals in interrogative: 98.0%). Note that in this case, accuracy may 
not reflect pure informativity, as participants may rely on idiomatic turns of phrases. 





However, further analyses show that they are still accurate restricting to contexts that 
do not involve interrogatives: the mean accuracy for root possibility, restricted to 
declarative sentences, is 76.3%.32  
(22) CHILD:  Mummy.  
CHILD:  Mummy.  
MOTHER:  Mummy?  
CHILD:  that Mummy.  
MOTHER:  what... what happened to Mummy?  
CHILD:  poorly.  
MOTHER:  she’s poorly, is she?  
MOTHER:  she... she _______ go to the hospital.   
(has to, ‘undesirable’; HSP mean accuracy: 96.6%) 
(23) MOTHER:  ...  
CHILD:  yeah.  
MOTHER:  but Bertie was very close behind, wasn’t he?  
MOTHER:  it was a near thing I think.  
CHILD:  he’s lost his hat.  
MOTHER:  he has.  
MOTHER:  yeah.  
MOTHER:  it _______ have been windy eh?  












                                               
 
32 Note that contexts involving interrogative sentences appeared almost exclusively in ROOT-AFF-1 and 
ROOT-AFF-2, as epistemic and negated modals are rare in interrogatives (see Figure 1a and 1b). Out of 
80 contexts for root-AFF, there were 21 interrogative sentences (19 involving possibility modals; 2 










Results from this first experiment show that the conversational context is informative 
about force: participants were able to guess the force of the modal accurately with a 
single exposure, just from short conversation transcripts, for both forces (general mean 
accuracy: 79.9%; possibility modals: 87.5%; necessity modals: 72.3%). This means 
that it is possible, at least in principle, for learners to figure out the force of modals 
based on conversational context alone. If children are sensitive to the same cues as 
adults, they at minimum don’t need to rely on a bias towards necessity meanings, nor 
on negation, to figure out the force of modals.  
Of course, some of the cues available to adults in this experiment might not be 
usable by children: for instance, children might lack some world knowledge. This 





(adults are asked to guess a word they already know, whereas children have to guess 
the meaning of a new word from the context in which it is used) (see White et al., 2017; 
Orita et al., 2013, for discussion). That said, children also have access to a substantially 
richer context than participants in our experiment, who had no visual nor prosodic 
information, and no common ground with the child and the mother.  
We find a general effect of force, with participants being more accurate on 
possibility modals. This could be interpreted as possibility contexts being more 
informative than necessity contexts. However, this effect should be taken with caution, 
as it is carried by only 2 sub-conditions (ROOT-AFF-1 and ROOT-NEG; it is not significant 
in EPI-AFF (χ 2 (1)=3.73, p =.053), and in ROOT-AFF-2), and it is not significant once we 
take into account the effect of interrogative sentences, which lead to a very high 
accuracy for root possibility modals: if we restrict to declarative contexts only, 
participants don’t perform significantly better on possibility contexts. This higher 
accuracy in possibility contexts might in principle also reflect a general tendency to 
answer with possibility modals by default, maybe because of the higher frequency of 
possibility modals as compared to necessity modals. To see whether this could explain 
our results, we compared accuracy for can and able (used in ROOT-POS-2 and ROOT-
NEG), which are both root possibility modals but strongly differ in frequency (3 able 
per 100 can in the Manchester corpus). We find no significant difference in accuracy 
between able and can (overall: able: 80.8% vs. can: 89.8%; vs. have to: 71.7%); 
moreover, participants are still more accurate for able than for have to. This suggests 





What are the cues making the conversational context useful for guessing the 
right modal force? Multiple factors may play a role: situational cues (e.g., who the 
interlocutors are), cues from world knowledge (e.g., what is culturally allowed or 
prohibited; or physical laws), or pragmatic cues (conversational goals, what the speaker 
is trying to achieve; for instance, performing orders, permissions or prohibitions). Our 
post-hoc exploration suggests that the nature of these cues may vary depending on 
modal flavor. It appears that the (un)desirability and effortfulness of the prejacent could 
be particularly useful with roots, and some explicit supporting evidence for epistemics. 
Note that this finding echoes Mandelkern (2019) who independently argues that 
epistemic necessity ‘must’ claims require Support: some argument in support of the 
claim that needs to be accessible to all interlocutors. He takes this constraint to explain 
the generalization that epistemic necessity claims are felicitous only if the speaker’s 
evidence for them is in some sense indirect. We probe the effect of desirability more 
directly in the last experiment presented in this chapter (Input Experiment 3), and leave 
the case of epistemics for future research.  
Finally, we find opposite effects of negation on (root) possibility and necessity 
modals: while negation leads to a slightly higher accuracy for possibility modals (can’t: 
89.5% vs. can: 81.5% (NS)), it leads to lower accuracy for necessity modals (don’t 
have to: 61.3% vs. have to: 82.0%, p=0.011*) (significant interaction effect 
Force*Negation: p=0.0047**). Further exploration of the contexts that led to highest 
and lowest accuracy shows that in our corpus, mothers often use don’t have to in 
‘polite’ ways to perform prohibitions (orders to not do something), as in (23) or (24), 





fully explain their lower performance in the experiment: participants were actually 
extremely good at guessing these polite uses (100% accuracy for the dialogue in (25)). 
There might remain a few cases where don’t have to is used in contexts that make it 
clear that the impossibility interpretation does not hold, which would be ‘logically’ 
informative for a learner following Gualmini & Schwarz’s rationale, but among the 20 
contexts that were tested in the experiment, it is hard to find any example of context 
with high accuracy not involving polite uses. 2- to 3-year-old children would need to 
already know about these conventional polite uses to use these contexts to learn force.  
(24) CHILD: break. 
MOTHER: you want me to break it? 
CHILD: yeah. 
MOTHER: no. 
MOTHER: we don't have to break these things. 
MOTHER: oh. 
MOTHER: you've broken it. 
CHILD: yeah.    (Aran, 2;0.28) 
 
(25) CHILD:  knock off again.  
MOTHER:  that's gonna fall.  
 CHILD:  no.  
 MOTHER:  yes.  
CHILD:  no.  
MOTHER:  oh.  
MOTHER:  we are noisy, aren't we?  
MOTHER: _______shout. (don’t have to) 
(HSP accuracy: 100%) 
Our findings however suggest that negative environments could be more 
helpful to figure out the force of possibility modals: negated possibility modals are 





shows that impossibility contexts are particularly informative (mean accuracy for can’t: 
89.5%). Children may make use of these occurrences to infer the force of possibility 
modals, if they expect negation to scope over modals. I will come back to this point in 
more detail in the general discussion (section 2.5).  
 
2.3 Input Experiment 2: Isolating the role of context  
Our first input experiment shows high accuracy for both possibility and necessity. We 
take these results to mean that the context is informative as to force. But could it be that 
participants succeed at the task not by relying on the context, but through biases, which 
could also be at play in children’s modal learning? In particular, could their high 
accuracy be due to a necessity bias that allows them to correctly guess necessity 
meanings?33 To isolate the contribution of the dialogue context, we ran a second 
experiment, presenting only the target sentence without its discourse context. We 
expect that participants’ performance should decrease in this new experiment, if their 
successes in our first experiment are due to a reliance on context, rather than a bias. 
2.3.1 Methods 
Procedure. Input Experiment 2 was identical to Input Experiment 1, except that 
participants only saw the target sentence, and not the preceding dialogue (see Figure 
2.5).34 As the task was shorter, they judged all 40 contexts (60 trials: 20 possibility; 20 
                                               
 
33 For possibility modals, participants would have enough cues indicating that the necessity interpretation 
does not hold, but their accuracy with necessity modals would not come from the context being 
informative. 





necessity; 20 controls using tense). We removed from target sentences any repetitions 
(e.g. ‘dolly... dolly _______ use her pottie’ was corrected to ‘dolly _______ use her 
pottie’), as well as phatic words (e.g. oh, yeah, well). We did not remove logical words 
(e.g. so, but, then, now, because, if-clauses). In order to make sure that participants kept 
paying attention, we also had 8 attention checks (simple additions and subtractions, e.g. 
1+3=__). Conditions were the same as in Input Experiment 1. Instructions are provided 
in Appendix B.  
 





Participants. 123 participants were recruited on Amazon Mechanical Turk (ROOT-AFF-
1: 31, ROOT-AFF-2: 33; ROOT-NEG: 30; EPI-AFF: 29; language: US English; 66 females, 
mean age: 44.0 years-old). We removed from the analysis 1 participant who was less 
than 75% accurate on attention checks and 6 participants who were less than 75% 







accurate on tense controls (5.7%).35 We thus present results for 116 participants (ROOT-
AFF-1: 30, ROOT-AFF-2: 28; ROOT-NEG: 30; EPI-AFF: 28).  
Analysis. Overall, participants were still good at guessing force (Table 2.6), but their 
overall accuracy is lower without dialogue than when they saw the entire dialogue 
(binomial linear mixed effects models comparing general accuracy in Experiment 1 vs. 
Experiment 3: χ2(1)=48.2, p=3.9e-12 ***). Looking at the 8 subcomparison groups, 
we see decreased performance for necessity contexts in ROOT-AFF-1, ROOT-AFF-2 and 
EPI-AFF, and for possibility contexts in ROOT-AFF-2 and ROOT-NEG. We find no 
difference for possibility ROOT-AFF-1 and EPI-AFF and necessity ROOT-NEG. Results are 
summarized in Table 2.7. We ran interaction tests to see whether the effect of the 
dialogue differed for possibility and necessity modals. The general interaction 
Experiment*Force is not significant (χ2(1)=1.1, p=0.29), but when restricted to 
affirmative conditions (i.e., excluding ROOT-NEG) (post-hoc), we find a significant effect, 
dialogues being more helpful for necessity modals (χ2(1)=4.0.4, p=0.044*). Looking 
at the 4 groups, the interaction effect is significant for EPI-AFF (χ 2(1)=5.08, p=0.024*), 
but not ROOT-AFF-2 (χ 2(1)=0.015, p=0.90). Problems with the model do not allow us 
to conclude for ROOT-AFF-1 and ROOT-NEG.36 
 
                                               
 
35 Accuracy on attention checks and tense controls was very high (attention checks: 99.4%; tense 
controls: 95.8%), with no difference between groups. To compute accuracy on tense controls, we only 
included sentences that could not lead to an ambiguity (e.g. because of containing a temporal adverb) 
(10 out of 20 cases).  
36 The problem (singular fit) appears to be due to variances of one linear combination of effects being 
close to zero. This is a relatively common problem with complex mixed effect modals used here, but it 





Table 2.6 Accuracy rates and significance tests by condition (Input Experiment 2) 
(n=116, 20 observations per cell): 
 
 Mean accuracy (se)  Exact binomial tests (two-sided) 
 possibility necessity possibility necessity 
ROOT-AFF-1 90.2% (0.030) 62.0% (0.062) 
p <.001*** 
95% CI [0.88, 0.92] 
p <.001*** 
95% CI [0.59, 0.65] 
ROOT-AFF-2 71.8% (0.052) 73.0% (0.054) 
p <.001*** 
95% CI [0.68, 0.74] 
p <.001*** 
95% CI [0.70, 0.76] 
ROOT-NEG 84.8% (0.036) 57.3% (0.061) 
p <.001*** 
95% CI [0.82, 0.87]  
p=.00019 
95% CI [0.54, 0.61] 
EPI-AFF 88.6% (0.021) 64.6% (0.054) 
p <.001*** 
95% CI [0.86, 0.90] 
p <.001*** 
95% CI [0.61, 0.68] 
 
 





This control experiment allows us to isolate the contribution of the preceding dialogue, 
and shows that context is informative beyond potential biases. Note that we did not 
expect participants to be at chance for this version of the experiment, as the information 
conveyed by the prejacent contributes to the context. Furthermore, it is sometimes 
possible to recover the modal from the clause type (e.g. interrogative sentences with 
can: mean accuracy in Experiment 1: 97.8%; in Experiment 2: 96.4%). Despite that, 
 possibility necessity 
ROOT-AFF-1 χ2(1)=0.903, p=0.34 (NS) χ2(1)=14.9, p=0.00012 *** 
ROOT-AFF-2 χ2(1)=15.5, p=8.0e-05 *** χ2(1)=11.7, p=0.00064 *** 
ROOT-NEG χ2(1)=6.4, p=0.011 * χ2(1)=1.81, p=0.18 (NS) 
EPI-AFF χ2(1)=0.31, p=0.57 (NS) χ2(1)=9.25, p=0.0023** 
all χ2(1)=11.5, p=0.0007*** χ2(1)=32.6, p= 1.1e-08 *** 





we find that participants are overall better at identifying force when presented with the 
dialogue, for both forces (overall accuracy in Experiment 1: 79.9%; in Experiment 2: 
74.0%; effect of the dialogue: overall +5.9%; necessity: +8.1%; possibility +3.7%).  
Interestingly, we find that having the dialogue context is more helpful for 
necessity modals than for possibility modals. In all affirmative conditions, the effect of 
having the dialogue is significant for necessity modals, but only for one of the 
possibility conditions. The overall interaction Force*Experiment is not significant, but 
the interaction Force*Experiment is significant when we restrict the analysis to the 
affirmative conditions. In the negated condition (ROOT-NEG), the effect of the dialogue 
seems to go in the opposite direction: having the dialogue is slightly more helpful for 
can’t than for don’t have to (NS). But if participants’ high accuracy in the first 
experiment was due to a necessity bias, we would expect their performance to remain 
the same in this follow-up (participants should guess necessity meanings, unless 
presented with direct evidence against it). Altogether, participants’ high accuracy on 
possibility modals, even with context reduced only to what is in the prejacent, suggests 
that if they bring a force bias to the task, it is more likely to be a possibility bias, rather 
than a necessity one.  
The results from these two experiments show that the conversational context in 
which modals are used is informative about their force, and might be even more 
informative for necessity modals. But what is it about the context that is particularly 
informative? As discussed in section 2.2.3, several factors could be at play. Our post-
hoc analysis of the contexts that lead to higher and lower accuracy suggested that the 





undesirable and effortful events; for epistemics, necessity modals seem to occur in 
contexts that highlight strong evidence that supports the proposition expressed by the 
prejacent. I now turn to an experiment that directly tests the hypothesis that 
(un)desirability matters for root modals, as an initial proof of concept, and leave a more 
systematic probing of additional features of the context for future research.  
 
2.4 Input Experiment 3: Desirability  
Desirability is a feature likely to be conceptually accessible to young children: the 
cognitive developmental literature suggests that children can reason about desires quite 
early on, and understand that people can have incompatible desires (Wellman & 
Woolley, 1990; Repacholi & Gopnik, 1997; Rakoczy et al., 2007; Ruffman et al., 2018, 
a.o.). Moreover, the link between desirability and force seems quite intuitive, at least 
for adults, though it is an open question whether children also have such associations: 
desirable activities or events are usually associated to permissions, whereas undesirable 
activities are associated with orders and prohibitions. The goal of this last experiment 
is first to assess the availability of this cue in the input: do adults actually use necessity 
modals more frequently with undesirable events (e.g., ‘You must/#can clean your 
room’), and possibility modals with desirable events (e.g., ‘You can/#must go play in 
the garden’)? Second, does this contribute to participants’ performance in Input 






Procedure. Participants were asked to indicate whether various activities (e.g. ‘doing 
a puzzle’) sounded fun or not (see Figure 2.6). They were told that the activities 
involved two-year-old children and their mothers. The different activities corresponded 
to the prejacents37 of the modals tested in Input Experiment 1 and 2.38 We used the 
prejacents, rather than the full modal sentences to avoid biases towards positive 
responses for possibility modals, and negative responses for necessity modals. For 
example, for ‘Can the dolly ride on Aran the horse?’, participants were asked whether 
‘riding on Aran the horse’ sounded fun (‘yes’) or not (‘no’). Referential pronouns (e.g. 
it) were replaced with the full nominal whenever they could be recovered from the 
context (e.g. ‘Finding the green marker’ for ‘Can you find it?’). In each group, 
participants judged all 40 prejacents (42 trials: 20 possibility, 20 necessity; 2 initial 
practice items, which were removed from the analysis). To make sure participants kept 
paying attention, we had 10 attention checks (e.g. 1+3=__). Instructions are given in 
Appendix B. As our hypothesis concerns root modals, we ran the experiment only on 
ROOT-AFF-1 (can vs. must) and ROOT-AFF-2 (can/able vs. have to). Rationale. This 
experiment allows us first to assess the desirability of the different events in an 
objective way, to see if there is a relation between desirability (measured by the 
proportion of yes answers to ‘being fun’, a child-friendly way of assessing what is 
desirable) and force usage in the corpus. We can then probe whether adults used this 
                                               
 
37 This is not true stricto sensu, as participants also lose the information about the subject (e.g. 
I/you/Caroline). 






cue to infer force in Experiment 1 by looking at the correlation between the desirability 
score in Experiment 3 and accuracy in Experiment 1. We expect a negative correlation 
for necessity modals (fewer ‘yes’ responses for accurate guesses of necessity uses) and 
a positive correlation for possibility modals (more ‘yes’ responses for accurate guesses 
of possibility uses). 





Participants. We recruited 70 participants on Amazon Mechanical Turk (ROOT-AFF-1: 
35, ROOT-AFF-2: 35; language: US English; 35 females, mean age: 40.4-years-old). 
Accuracy on attention checks was very high (99.6%), and we did not have to remove 
any participant from the analysis based on attention checks.  
Analysis. We find a general effect of force: participants judged prejacents extracted 
from possibility statements overall more ‘desirable’ than those extracted from necessity 
statements (overall mean of ‘yes’ answers: 40.7%; possibility: 52.9%; necessity: 
28.6%) (Table 2.8). Figure 2.7 shows the distribution of ratings for possibility and 





between groups (comparing ROOT-AFF-1 (must vs. can) and ROOT-AFF-2 (have to vs 
can/able): overall: χ2(1)=0.22, p=0.64; possibility: χ2(1)=0.126, p=0.72; necessity: 
χ2(1)=0.16, p=0.69). We find a general effect of Force, with predicates extracted from 
necessity statements rated as less desirable than their possibility counterparts 
(χ2(1)=15.5, p=8.2e-05 ***). The effect is significant for both groups (ROOT-AFF-1: 
χ2(1)=8.2, p=0.0041** ; ROOT-AFF-2: χ2(1)=6.2, p=0.012*). Last, we computed 
correlations between the desirability score (Input Experiment 3) and accuracy in Input 
Experiment 1 (see Figure 2.8). For possibility, we find a weak positive correlation 
(Pearson’s r=0.12) (t(1398)=4.42, p < 0 .001; 95%-CI: [0.065; 0.168]); for necessity, 
a weak negative correlation (Pearson’s r=-0.073) (t(1398)=-2.74, p= 0.0063; 95%-CI: 
[-0.125; -0.021]).  
Figure 2.7 Distribution of ‘desirable’ answers for possibility and necessity contexts for 
each group (ROOT-AFF-1 (must vs. can) and ROOT-AFF-2 (have to vs. can/able): 
 
 
Table 2.8 Desirability scores and significance tests (binomial linear mixed effects 
models comparing possibility/necessity) for possibility and necessity modals: 
 
 Mean of desirable (‘yes’) answers (se)  
Effect of Force  
 possibility necessity 
ROOT-AFF-1 56.0% (0.063) 31.4% (0.060) χ2(1)=8.22, p=0.0041 ** 
ROOT-AFF-2 49.7% (0.067) 25.7% (0.057) χ2(1)=6.2562, p=0.012 * 
ALL 52.9% (0.045) 28.6% (0.041) χ2(1)=15.5, p=8.2e-05 *** 





Figure 2.8 Relation between accuracy in Input Experiment 1 (y-axis) and desirability 
score in Input Experiment 3 (x-axis) by force. Black lines correspond to Pearson’s r. 
Dashed lines correspond to the mean accuracy in Experiment 1, for possibility and 




Our results confirm our initial observations for Input Experiment 1, and show that there 
is a relation between the desirability of the prejacent (evaluated by participants that 
were blind to the force of the modal originally used) and force in adults’ speech. Adults 
use root possibility modals more frequently with desirable events, and root necessity 
modals with undesirable events (mean desirability score for possibility modals 
(can/able): 52.9%; for necessity modals (must/have to): 28.6%). Furthermore, the 
lower accuracy in Experiment 1 for possibility modals with undesirable prejacents and 
for necessity modals with desirable prejacents suggests that adult participants made use 
of desirability in their force judgments. Together, this suggests that children can 
conceivably use this cue: it is available in the input, the cognitive developmental 





however that, to be able to use this relation, children would further need to expect a 
link between, on the one hand, orders and undesirable events, and on the other hand, 
permissions and desirable events: the relation seems quite intuitive for adults, but this 
might be something children have to learn.  
 
2.5 Summary and general discussion: children’s modal input 
Let’s come back to our problem: how can children figure out force, and in particular, 
how can they solve the Subset Problem for necessity modals? In this last section, I’ll 
summarize the results from our study of the input, and discuss the conclusions we can 
draw for each of the solutions we considered at the beginning.  
The first solution we considered is that children have a bias towards strong 
necessity meanings, in the spirit of Berwick (1985): they would, by default, assume 
necessity meanings for modals. What this study of the input shows is children might 
not need such a bias. Indeed, children have other strategies available given the way 
modals are used in their input: we find that speakers use possibility and necessity 
modals in clearly distinct situations, that are reflective of force, for both root and 
epistemic modality. If the conversational context is highly informative about both 
forces, and if children are able to use those situational cues when learning, they don’t 
need to have a necessity bias.  
Of course, from this does not follow that they lack such a bias. However, as we 
saw in Chapter 1, the justification for this kind of proposals is often that it is the only 





need such a bias, the justification for it becomes less compelling. We will come back 
to this question in the next chapter, where focusing on children’s own modal 
productions, we will see that we don’t find evidence for such a bias in their early uses 
of modals. On the contrary, children already seem to have mastered possibility modals 
by age two, but they do not use necessity modals appropriately. 
The second solution we wanted to assess is that children can use evidence from 
downward-entailing environments, following Gualmini & Schwarz (2009). From 
hearing necessity modals under negation, which is by far the most prevalent DE context 
in this corpus, for instance “She doesn’t have to go” used in clear situations of non-
necessity (‘she can go, and she can also stay’), children might be able to infer that have 
to cannot mean possible, since if it did, its negation would mean impossible, and 
therefore it could not be used in a situation where it is possible for her to go. Assuming 
that children are able to apply such a reasoning, the question was whether they get 
exposed to such informative cases.  
Even before looking at input, we saw that relying on negation to learn necessity 
modals could be confusing given that some, but not all, necessity modals scope above 
negation. As we saw in section 1.2.3 of Chapter 1, while English have to scopes under 
negation, must or should do not (Iatridou & Zeijlstra, 2013).  
We can thus separate two types of cases, depending on the scope interpretation 
that necessity modals receive with negation. First, for necessity modals that outscope 
negation, like must (“she mustn’t go”: necessary > not), the reasoning proposed by 
Gualmini & Schwarz (2009) cannot be applied by children. Learners will never hear 





adult. And as explained in Chapter 1, these cases could even be misleading, since “she 
mustn’t go” and “she can’t go” are truth-conditionally equivalent: if children expect 
the same scope behavior for must and can, uses of mustn’t for impossibility should lead 
them to infer that must expresses the same force as can. If children already know that 
must expresses necessity, they might infer its scope relation (and maybe, its polarity 
restrictions) from negative environments; but then, they need to have figured out force 
first: We get into a vicious circle here, where learners would need force to figure out 
the scope, but need the scope to figure out the force.  
Turning to the second type of case, necessity modals that do scope below 
negation like have to (“she doesn’t have to go”: not > necessary), negation could in 
principle be ‘logically’ useful: the rationale proposed by Gualmini and Schwarz at least 
can apply. Looking at the actual input, we find that they don’t often occur with negation 
or in other Downward-Entailing environments: on the aggregate, they are found in 
those environments 7.4% of the time (vs. 19.4% for potentially ‘problematic’ modals 
scoping over negation like must). They could still be useful, if children are able to use 
them. But more problematically, our experimental results show that the rare cases they 
hear might not always be so informative: even when adults use don’t have to, they do 
not systematically convey non-necessity. We find that the context is the least clear 
about force for negated necessity modals (the accuracy for don’t have to in our 
Experiment 1 is 61.3%). And most instances involve ‘polite’ uses, where don’t have to 
is used to perform a prohibition (e.g., “you don’t have to break those things”), the 
meaning of which may seem closer to impossibility. Do children have the pragmatic 





expect speakers to be ‘polite’? These are open questions, but these uses question the 
applicability of Gualmini and Schwarz’s solution, even in the cases where it is in 
principle usable, since overall, it seems that children are hardly ever exposed to cases 
where don’t have to is clearly used to express non-necessity, and at least, not in a 
systematic way.  
Why is negation rare with those necessity modals? There could be a principled 
reason for this. It may be due, in part, to a competition with the use of a bare possibility 
modal, which can convey non-necessity via a scalar implicature (“She can go, but she 
doesn’t have to”) (see Horn, 1972): speakers have another potentially simpler way to 
convey ‘non-necessity’ meanings.39 From alogical point of view, there is only one case 
where can and don’t have to take opposite truth-values (i.e., where speakers could use 
don’t have to, but not can): cases of impossibility (not > possible entails not > 
necessary). But then, speakers should prefer to use can’t, as it is logically stronger 
(more informative). Don’t have to thus pragmatically competes with either can 
(simpler) or can’t (more informative). Coming back to our learner, this is important to 
keep in mind: indeed, if this is the reason negated necessity modals are rare, we can 
expect the same problem to arise for learners of other languages, who won’t get 
exposed to many occurrences of negated necessity modals either.  
                                               
 
39 Horn focuses on a different but related problem, namely the fact that cross-linguistically, the ‘O’ corner 
of the Aristotelian square of opposition (corresponding to negated universals, here, non-necessity 
meanings) seems to never be lexicalized, whereas the other three corners (corresponding to possibility, 
necessity and impossibility) can be. Horn argues that this follows from the fact that there is no functional 
pressure to lexicalize non-necessity meanings: speakers already have a way to express non necessity, 





Note that the few other corpus studies that report data on the distribution of 
possibility and necessity modals with respect to negation also suggest that negated 
necessity modals are infrequent. However, these studies are quite rare, and very few 
focus on child-directed speech. De Haan (2011) reports that negation is rare with must: 
2.5% in the Brown corpus (written English), and 1.4% in the Switchboard corpus 
(spoken English). Thornton & Tesan (2013) report the frequencies of some negative 
auxiliary verbs in the input to children in the Providence corpus, but don’t specify their 
frequency relative to the positive forms. Last, Jeretič (2018) also reports that negation 
on necessity modals is not frequent in the input to French and Spanish children 
(necessity modals in French: 15.5% with negation; in Spanish: 6.2%). 
Those results thus suggest that negation may not be sufficient to solve the 
Subset Problem. First, for a number of necessity modals like must/should, children 
cannot observe them in negative environments, as they systematically scope above 
negation; in those cases, negation might even be potentially misleading as to their force 
(mustn’t is truth-conditionally equivalent to can’t, which might drive children to infer 
that they express possibility, if children assume that negation scopes over (root) modals 
by default). In principle, children could still use negation to figure out force for these 
cases, but they would have to have figured out their polarity restrictions first—which 
they might not be able to do if they haven’t figured out force yet. Second, for the 
necessity modals that can scope under negation (e.g. have to, got to), where negation 
could in principle be helpful, we find that they rarely occur with negation, and that it is 
unclear how explicit context is as to their force: their uses seem potentially misleading 





negation to learn force: in principle, they could still use these rare cases to figure out 
the force of necessity modals like have to.  
Negation could be quite useful for honing in on the force of possibility modals, 
at least root ones. Here again, we need to separate two types of cases, depending on the 
scope interpretation that they receive with negation. First, for possibility modals that 
scope under negation, like can (“she can’t go”: not > possible), negation could be quite 
useful. Our corpus results show that negated possibility modals like can’t are frequent 
in the input (22.6% of root possibility modals are negated), and our experimental results 
show that they are used in contexts particularly informative with respect to force (mean 
accuracy for can’t: 89.5%). In the second type of case, possibility modals that outscope 
negation like might (and may in its epistemic uses) (“she might not go”: possible > 
not), again, negation could in principle be misleading as to force if children expect the 
same scope behavior for might and can: occurrences of mightn’t to convey non-
necessity should lead them to infer that might and can express different forces (children 
would then be misled into thinking that might means necessary). However, looking at 
the input, we find that these potentially misleading cases are extremely rare, maybe too 
rare to be a serious issue: out of the 67 epistemic possibility modals with negation we 
found, only 42 correspond to potentially misleading cases such as might/may not (e.g., 
“might not be in there”), and 25 correspond to can’t/couldn’t, which are not misleading 
since the possibility modal scopes under negation (e.g., “can't have been Anne”: not > 





is informative about force—which we didn’t test experimentally, precisely because of 
how infrequent they are.40 
Our third solution to the Subset Problem was that children use cues from the 
conversational context. Our study supports this last possibility: we show that the 
conversational context in which modals are used is informative about force. If children 
are sensitive to these conversational cues, and able to use them when learning, they 
don’t need to have a necessity bias, nor to rely solely on negative environments. 
What exactly, in the conversational context, signals modal force? We saw that 
these conversational cues may vary with flavor: for epistemic modality, our post-hoc 
analysis suggests that contexts that explicitly highlight salient evidence in favor of the 
prejacent may bias interpretations towards necessity; for root modals, that the perceived 
(un)desirability of the prejacent could be particularly helpful. Input Experiment 3 
confirms the potential usefulness of such a cue. It shows that it is available in the input: 
necessity modals tend to occur with undesirable prejacents (e.g., ‘you must/have to 
clean your room’), and possibility modals with desirable prejacents (e.g., ‘you can go 
play in the garden’). Moreover, participants in our Input Experiment 1 seem to make 
use of this cue to determine force: they were better at guessing necessity modals when 
they occur with undesirable prejacents, and possibility modals when they occur with 
desirable prejacents. Other aspects of the context could also prove useful, including 
situational cues (e.g., who the interlocutors are), cues from world knowledge (e.g., what 
                                               
 
40 Moreover, if learners expect negation to scope over root modals but under epistemic modals given 
some more general assumptions about flavor and scope (and if they have already figured out flavor for 





is allowed or prohibited), pragmatic cues (what the speaker is trying to achieve, in 
particular performing orders, permissions or prohibitions), and prosody. This is an 
avenue for future research.  
Before we conclude, let’s briefly discuss potential implications of these 
findings for how children acquire modal force in languages beyond English, and in 
particular, in languages with ‘variable force’ modals. As discussed in section 1.2.3 of 
Chapter 1, in a language like English where modals come in both forces, we can expect 
speakers to use possibility and necessity modals in fairly distinct situations, and 
notably, to avoid using possibility modals in necessity situations (modulo politeness 
considerations). And indeed, our input results show that speakers use possibility and 
necessity modals in distinct situations that are highly reflective of force. But in a 
language that lacks modal duals, speakers are more likely to use particular modals in 
both possibility and necessity situations. For variable force modals that are underlying 
possibility modals, like Nez Perce o’qa, it seems that negation would thus be crucial 
for learners to hone in on its underlying force—just as it was for Deal (2011) to argue 
for a possibility analysis. For variable force modals that are underlying necessity 
modals as in St’át’imcets or Washo, the challenge may be much greater. Not only might 
speakers use the same modals in possibility and necessity situations, but learners may 
not be able to rely on negation, given that—similarly to what happens with must—
those modals can’t scope over negation in these languages. Yet, speakers seem to have 
converged on necessity meanings for those modals, as evidenced by their preferred 
translations using English necessity modals (Rullmann & Matthewson, 2008; Bochnak, 





modals’ underlying force, but this strategy is obviously inaccessible to the child. How 
do learners figure out their underlying force? At first blush, this situation might argue 
for a necessity bias. However, it could also be that while these modals can in principle 
be used in possibility situations, in practice, variable force modals are mostly used in 
contexts where English speakers use necessity modals, in which case, their acquisition 
could involve the same reliance on contextual cues that we’ve proposed for the 
acquisition of English modals.  
To conclude, we saw that in principle, a strong necessity bias may not be 
necessary, that negation may not be that helpful, but that aspects of the context, like 
properties of the prejacent such as desirability, could provide useful cues to the force 
of a modal. But even if some cues are extremely helpful, children could be oblivious to 
them—unable to perceive them, or unable to see their utility. In Chapter 3, we will 
focus on young children’s own modal productions, to assess their early mastery of 
possibility and necessity modals. Then, in Chapter 4, we will probe directly how helpful 
different aspects of children’s input are in practice, by relating this input study to young 
children’s modal mastery, to see whether variation in mother’s speech can predict 






Chapter 3. Children’s modal productions: A necessity gap? 
This chapter focuses on children’s modals. What modals do 2- to 3-year-old children 
spontaneously produce? How early and how frequently do they use possibility and 
necessity modals with and without negation? And do they use them in an adult-like 
way?  
Traditionally, studies of young children’s modal productions focus on their 
acquisition of flavor (e.g., how early they start producing ability, deontic, or epistemic 
modal flavors). What we know about the acquisition of modal force mostly draws on 
behavioral experiments, which typically target children from at least age 4. Existing 
comprehension studies show that children struggle with both forces: they tend to both 
accept possibility modals (e.g. can/might) in necessity situations, and necessity modals 
(e.g. have to/must) in possibility situations, for both epistemic and root modality (e.g., 
Noveck, 2001; Öztürk & Papafragou, 2015; Cournane et al. in prep.). Typically, these 
errors have been attributed to reasoning difficulties: children over-accept possibility 
modals in necessity situations because of difficulties reasoning about when a stronger 
modal is more appropriate (i.e., they have trouble with scalar implicatures, the 
inference from ‘”it might” that ‘it doesn’t have to’ see section 1.2.3); they over-accept 
necessity modals in possibility situations because of difficulties reasoning about open 
possibilities (so-called Premature Closure, Acredolo & Horobin, 1987; Öztürk & 
Papafragou, 2015).  
In the present study, I focus on younger (2 to 3-year old) children’s naturalistic 





complements existing studies and results from the literature. When do children start 
using possibility and necessity modals? And do they use them appropriately? In 
addition to standard quantitative corpus measures about children’s frequency of 
productions (how frequently they use root and epistemic possibility and necessity 
modals, and in which syntactic environments), I assess experimentally whether 
children use their modals in an adult-like way, using a novel method which I call the 
Guess the Force (GF) paradigm.41 The experiment borrows the HSP paradigm used to 
assess the informativity of context for adults’ productions in Chapter 2 (Input 
Experiment 1, section 2.2) in order to assess children’s own productions: adult 
participants have to guess the force of modals uttered by children, blanked out from 
corpus dialogues. The adult HSP experiment is used as a baseline, showing that force 
is guessable from context. This allows us to measure children’s modal mastery: given 
that adults can guess the force of other adults’ modals based on context, if children also 
know the force and use them in the same situations as adults, adults should be able to 
guess force from their utterances. If they cannot, that suggests that children are non 
adult-like in some way. I use it to test how adult-like young children’s modal uses are 
for root and epistemic flavors, with and without negation.  
 Results from the study will show an asymmetry in English children’s early 
mastery of possibility and necessity modals. We will see that children seem to master 
possibility modals early: at age 2, they use them frequently and productively, both with 
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in section 2.1 of Chapter 2 essentially for ease of presentation. The paradigm is the same: the only 






and without negation, and in an adult-like way (they do not use them in situations adults 
treat as necessity). However, they seem to have more difficulties with necessity modals: 
they tend to produce them later on, less frequently, rarely with negation, and often in a 
non adult-like way: they use them in situations where adults would prefer using 
possibility modals, and with negation, in situations where adults would prefer negated 
possibility modals.  
What is the nature of children's struggle with necessity modals? One possibility 
that is tacitly assumed in the existing literature is that they know the force, but have 
trouble dealing with open possibilities for conceptual reasons. Another possibility is 
that they know the force, but have trouble figuring out when to use necessity modals. 
Finally, another possibility is that they have lexicalized the wrong force, or they are 
uncertain about their force. If this were the case, and if the difficulty persists in the 
preschool years, it could explain why children tend to both over accept necessity 
modals in possibility situations (they wouldn't know their force), and possibility modals 
in necessity situations (they wouldn't have a reliable stronger alternative to make scalar 
implicature).  
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. In section 3.1, I review the 
existing literature on modal acquisition, both in terms of flavor and force. Then, in 
sections 3.2 and 3.3, I turn to the study of children’s productions, using the Manchester 
corpus (Theakston et al., 2001; CHILDES database, MacWhinney, 2000). As for the 
input study presented in Chapter 2, I break it down into two parts: first in section 3.2, 
I provide quantitative results about how frequently children use possibility and 





I present the GF (Guess the Force) experiment on their productions, which assesses 
how adult-like their uses of possibility and necessity modals are. Finally, in section 
3.4, I discuss possible explanations for the ‘Necessity Gap’ we seem to find—whether 
it might reflect conceptual, semantic, or pragmatic issues, or a combination of these, 
and relate these new results to the previous literature.  
 
3.1 Background: What we know about children’s understanding of modals42 
In this section, I first review what we know about children’s understanding of flavor, 
which mostly draws on corpus studies of their spontaneous productions. Then, I review 
what we know about their mastery of force, with comprehension experiments initially 
motivated by work on scalar implicatures, as well as work on their interpretation of 
negated modal sentences.  
3.1.1 Modal flavor in child productions  
The literature on modal acquisition initially explored flavor, to see if there could be 
conceptual asymmetries reflected in children’s modal productions. Initial corpus 
studies reveal a strong asymmetry in children’s modal productions: children tend to 
produce roots (e.g. ability, deontic, teleological) about a year before epistemics (e.g. 
Kuczaj & Maratsos, 1975; Wells, 1979; Stephany, 1983; Cournane, 2015a,b; Van 
Dooren et al., 2017; for overviews, see Papafragou, 1998; Hickmann & Bassano, 2016; 
Cournane, 2021). This ‘delay’ with epistemics has been reported in several languages, 
                                               
 





and was called the “Epistemic Gap” (Cournane, 2015) (for Dutch: van Dooren et al., 
2019; for Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian: Veselinović & Cournane, 2020; for French: 
Cournane & Tailleur, 2020).  
The Epistemic Gap was first blamed on children’s conceptual development 
(Sweetser, 1990; Perkins, 1983; Shatz & Wilcox, 1991; Astington, 1993; Papafragou, 
1998). Epistemic reasoning (i.e., having to do with inferences and knowledge) would 
be delayed, as compared to reasoning involved for root modality (i.e., having to do with 
goals, rules, desires, or physical abilities) (Shatz et al., 1983; Bartsch & Wellman, 1995; 
Asplin, 2002; de Villiers, 2005; Papafragou et al., 2007, a.o.).43 However, research has 
shown since that this cannot be the entire explanation. First, already by age 2, children 
produce lexical epistemics like maybe in an adult-like way: this epistemic ‘delay’ is 
specific to functional modals (auxiliaries and semi auxiliaries that can express variable 
flavors; see Cournane, 2021). Moreover, studies using denser corpus show that children 
already produce some epistemics before age 3, even though they are rare (see van 
Dooren et al., 2017). This suggests that the problem is not conceptual: an alternative 
explanation is that the Epistemic Gap relates to children’s grammatical development 
(Heizmann, 2006; Cournane, 2015a,b; Veselinović & Cournane, 2020), since epistemic 
                                               
 
43 Similar explanations were proposed to capture the asymmetry in acquisition between attitude verbs 
think and want (for overviews, see Harrigan et al., 2018a; Hacquard & Lidz, 2019). Likewise, there is 
an asymmetry in how early children seem to master verbs like think, that express notions related to belief 
(~ epistemic), and verbs like want, that express notions related to goals or desires (~ root): think seems 
to be acquired later than want. Children’s failures with think were first attributed to problems with 
Theory of Mind, in particular to ascribing (false) beliefs to others (see e.g. Wellman et al., 2001). 
However, research has since shown that children might not have such difficulty with Theory of Mind 
(see e.g. Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005; Southgate et al., 2007), and suggested that this asymmetry is better 
explained by other factors (for a summary and alternative explanations for the asymmetry, see Hacquard 





modals have more complex grammatical representations than root modals (Cournane, 
2015a,b; see also Heizmann, 2006; de Villiers, 2007). Children’s ability to produce 
epistemic modals would depend on their mastery of propositional embedding: then, 
they are not expected to start producing them before age 3, since the first markers of 
propositional embedding are found a little before age 3 (see Cournane (2015a,b); de 
Villiers & Roeper, 2016). This would also explain that the duration of the Epistemic 
Gap is found to differ from one language to the other: while first epistemic uses are 
found around age 3 or earlier in English, they remain absent until age 4 in 
Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian, where modal verbs require CP embedding (see Veselinović 
& Cournane, 2020; Cournane, 2020, for discussion).  
Early studies focused on children’s productions. They didn’t look at their input: 
what modals children hear in their parents’ speech. Importantly, later work focusing on 
the input shows that modals are used much more frequently to express root modality 
than epistemic in parents’ productions as well: in English for instance, 90.7% of 
parents’ modal uses involve root meanings, vs. only 9.3% epistemic (see van Dooren 
et al., 2017). Similar input asymmetries are reported in Dutch and 
Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian. The Epistemic Gap might thus also just reflect the 
asymmetry found in parents’ speech: the ‘delay’ might be a matter of exposure and 
clarity of the input, rather than a real “gap” related to conceptual development.  
As discussed in Chapter 1 (section 1.2.2), the fact that modals can express 
different flavors could in principle make it easier to figure out force: if children expect 
a modal like must always to express the same force, having figured out that it expresses 





necessity when used for another flavor. What the acquisition literature on flavor shows 
is that there is an asymmetry in children’s production—and maybe comprehension—
of root and epistemic modals: they use root modals productively by age 2, but 
epistemics are much rarer. The fact that children don’t produce epistemic modals 
doesn’t show that they don’t understand them,44 but it suggests that young children may 
not have a robust mastery of epistemic modals, and may not systematically realize 
when a modal like must is used to express epistemic flavor. This may have some 
repercussions on what we can conclude from comprehension experiments on children’s 
understanding of force.  
3.1.2 The acquisition of force  
Most of what we know about children’s mastery of force comes from behavioral 
comprehension experiments, which typically target older children, from age 4. These 
studies are generally embedded in other research questions, in particular, work about 
children’s acquisition of scalar implicatures (the inference from “it might p” that ‘it 
doesn’t have to p’) or focusing on their understanding of the difference between the 
bare and the modal statement (“it might/must be” vs “it is”). A number of other 
experiments, which I will also review but more briefly, focus on children’s acquisition 
of scope interpretations of sentences that contain modals and other logical operators, in 
particular negation or disjunction.  
                                               
 
44 here I don’t review the behavioral experiments that focus on older children’s comprehension of flavor, 





Initial studies (e.g., Noveck, 2001) stemmed from work on scalar implicatures: 
modals were used to see whether children could compute scalar implicatures (see 
Noveck, 2018; Horowitz et al., 2018 for recent overviews). Typically, these 
experiments focus on epistemic modals, and involve felicity judgment tasks, where 
children have to judge whether a possibility or a necessity modal statement is 
appropriate or not (e.g. “The cow might/must be in the blue box”), in scenarios where 
the speaker is more or less certain about the location of a toy (see e.g. Byrnes & Duff, 
1989; Noveck, 2001; Bascelli & Barbieri, 2002; Öztürk & Papafragou, 2015; Moscati 
et al., 2017, a.o.).45 Results of these experiments show that children struggle with both 
forces: they don’t behave in an adult-like way, neither for possibility nor for necessity 
modal sentences.  
First, children tend to over-accept possibility modals when necessity modals are 
more appropriate. For instance, they over-accept sentences such as “The cow might be 
in the blue box” when the speaker can be certain that it is (the blue box is the only 
option) (e.g. Noveck, 2001; Öztürk & Papafragou, 2015). This first result has been 
discussed in the context of children’s (more general) issues with scalar implicatures, 
also found with other scalar terms—for instance, children also over-accept under-
informative sentences such as “Some of the horses jumped over the fence” when the 
stronger alternative sentence (“All of the horses jumped over the fence”) is true (e.g., 
Papafragou & Musolino, 2003; Noveck, 2001). It has been shown that this non adult-
                                               
 
45 The reason why experiments tend to focus on epistemic modality may be that a large part of this 
literature originates in work on logical inferences. Others have tested force in deontic (rules) root 
modality (e.g., Hirst & Weil, 1982; Bascelli & Barbieri, 2002), using contrasting statements (must vs. 





like behavior is, for the most part, due to issues in accessing the relevant scalar 
alternatives (necessary to make the implicature), and holding them in memory 
(Chierchia et al., 2001; Barner & Bachrach, 2010; Barner et al., 2011; Skordos & 
Papafragou, 2014, a.o.).46 Importantly, children’s performance improves (i.e. they 
accept under-informative statements less often when the contrast between alternatives 
is made salient by the experimental design, and when they are explicitly given the 
alternatives and have to choose between two statements (for modals, see in particular 
Hirst & Weil, 1982; Noveck et al., 1996).  
The second result is more puzzling, and specific to modal scales. Children tend 
to accept necessity modals in possibility situations: for instance, they accept “The cow 
has to be in the blue box” when the speaker cannot be certain about the location of the 
cow (e.g. for English, see Öztürk & Papafragou 2015; Noveck, 2001; Leahy, 2021; for 
Dutch, Koring et al., 2018). But, while possibility modals are logically true in necessity 
situations, and rejected by adults for pragmatic reasons, necessity modals are not true 
in possibility situations, and always rejected by adults. And this is not reported with 
other scalar terms: children don’t accept “All dogs have spots”, even if it is true that 
some of them do (see e.g. Noveck, 2001).  
                                               
 
46 Note that as discussed by Öztürk and Papafragou (2015), children’s behavior with possibility modal 
sentences could come from the polite uses of modals we discussed in Chapter 1 (section 1.2.5) (“A 
possible explanation for this pattern comes from the fact that weak epistemic modals are sometimes used 
when the speaker believes a stronger statement to be true but wants to hedge or be polite (Brown & 
Levinson, 1987, among others). For instance, even if a speaker has definitive evidence that it is raining 
outside, he/she might say to a stranger, “It may be raining so you may need to bring an umbrella.” The 
role of politeness might make it more difficult for children (and, occasionally, adults) to compute scalar 





Why do children over-accept necessity modals in possibility situations? A first 
explanation, proposed by Öztürk and Papafragou (2015) to explain their finding (47% 
acceptance of have to statements in possibility situations) is that this reflects conceptual 
difficulties, namely, trouble dealing with open possibilities (see also Moscati et al., 
2017). The developmental cognitive literature shows that young children have issues 
with situations that involve alternative possible outcomes, and tend to commit to a 
conclusion before evidence is available and arbitrarily select one possibility over the 
other. This tendency is known as Premature Closure (see Acredolo & Horobin, 1987; 
Bindra et al., 1980; Piéraut-Le Bonniec, 1980, a.o.). When asked to judge necessity 
modal statements in possibility situations, children would perfectly understand the 
modal statement, but they would have trouble considering simultaneously various 
possibilities: they would toss one out at random, and as a consequence judge the 
statement as true 50% of the time, when tossing out the unmentioned location.  
Leahy & Carey (2020) propose that infants and toddlers have difficulties 
representing possibilities; they start with only ‘minimal representations’ of possibility 
and therefore struggle when having to consider multiple possibilities simultaneously 
(for critics, see e.g. Cesana-Arlotti et al., 2018). Leahy & Carey (2020) focus on 
younger children, and want to identify developmental milestones in reasoning ability. 
They propose that under 4, children cheat on modal reasoning: it is ‘minimal’, i.e., 





incompatible possibilities in mind simultaneously); however, after 4, children would 
be able to do the modal reasoning.47 
However, another possible explanation for children’s non adult-like behavior 
with necessity modals is that they would have issues with their meaning, in particular, 
they would fail to interpret correctly the flavor intended by the adult. Initial studies tend 
to focus on epistemic modals. In these experiments testing epistemic modality, children 
may over-accept necessity modals because they assume a deontic interpretation: they 
would interpret “The cow has to be in the blue box” as ‘the rules are such that the cow 
has to be in the blue box’, instead of ‘it is certain that the cow is in the blue box’ 
intended by the experimenter. Then, they might accept the sentence, if they think the 
deontic necessity statement is true, or if they don’t know the rules and are assuming 
that the speaker is speaking truthfully (Crain & Thornton, 1998). And as we saw in the 
preceding section, young children may have a less robust mastery of epistemic modals 
than roots, the latter representing 90% of their modal input between 2- and 3-year-old.  
Even if conceptual difficulties or difficulties with flavor may partly explain 
children’s behavior, recent work suggests that this still cannot be the whole story. 
Children’s tendency to accept necessity modals like must or have to in possibility 
situations was replicated with teleological root modals (goal‐oriented) (Cournane, 
Repetti‐Ludlow, Dieuleveut, & Hacquard, in prep.): 3- to 4-year-olds also tend to 
                                               
 
47 Premature closure concerns older children, above age 4, and works on the assumption that these 
children are able to entertain more that one possibility at once (outcome for future, or current epistemic 
possibility), but not very well (e.g., not as many as adults, not as easily and/or not for that long): 
difficulties are in maintaining the different options. The question addressed by Leahy and Carey is 





accept “Cat has to go down the yellow road” in intended possibility situations, where 
two roads are open. This result may still in principle be explained by a problem with 
flavor: children would interpret have to as deontic (rule-based) instead of teleological 
(goal-based). But the justifications provided by some children (when asked why they 
accepted have to in possibility scenarios) seem to suggest that they understand that 
there are two open possibilities, and might suggest that they treat have to as expressing 
possibility, rather than interpret it as deontic (e.g., one child said “because they're both 
the same and they're both not blocked so we don't know which one”). Last, the 
acceptance rate reported by Cournane et al. for root have to in possibility situations is 
significantly higher (87%) than the one reported for (5-year-old) children tested in 
epistemic modality, who are at chance (47% of acceptance, in both experiments by 
Öztürk and Papafragou 2015 and Noveck 2001): Cournane et al. find no evidence that 
children treat can and have to differently. This difference may come from the difference 
in that age group (they test younger children: mean age 4;1, vs. 5;1 for both Öztürk & 
Papafragou 2015 and Noveck 2001), but does not seem to come from the difference in 
the flavor they test.  
Leahy (2021) shows that children aged 4-year-old also perform below chance 
when answering to have to epistemic statements. Leahy uses an experiment involving 
both a behavioral and a linguistic measure (in the behavioral task, children are asked to 
place a wagon to catch a marble, in different situations of necessity and possibility; in 
the linguistic task, they are asked a modal question of the form, “If I drop a marble in 
here, {can/will/does it have to} it come out here?” Regardless of the age group, children 





to questions when tested in situations of possibility (4-year-old: app. 65%; 5-year-old: 
app. 47%).  
Taken together, those results suggest that there must be some other sources than 
Premature closure or difficulties with flavor for children’s difficulties. This raises the 
question of whether young children even know the underlying force of necessity 
modals. Children’s behavior could also stem from not knowing that necessity modals 
like must or have to encode necessity: such difficulties with force would capture both 
their over-acceptance of necessity modals in possibility situations, and their tendency 
to accept their possibility counterparts in necessity situations: if they don’t know that 
there is a stronger modal expressing necessity, they cannot access the stronger 
alternative necessary to make the scalar implicature (i.e., they don’t know the scale). 
This may also explain the differences between age groups: by 5, children may have 
learned that have to is a necessity modal, and be more likely to correctly reject it.  
Experiments testing children’s productions are rare. One exception is an elicited 
production study by Hirzel et al. (in prep.), which shows, using a sentence repair task, 
that 3- to 4-year-old children have a general preference for using possibility modals 
such as can, even in (intended) necessity scenarios. They also report that the few 
children who use necessity modals tend to use them both in necessity and possibility 
scenarios, instead of using them only in necessity scenarios. These results are 
compatible with a lexicalization problem, but this opens a last possibility to explain 
children’s behavior: that children fail to use and comprehend necessity modals 
correctly because of difficulties quantifying over the right domain, as has been argued 





deploying them in the right situation.48 In comprehension experiments, children’s over-
acceptance of necessity modals in possibility contexts could be due to their assuming a 
different (smaller) domain of quantification: in the box scenarios, they might assume 
that the speaker has reasons to rule out certain possibilities and thus accept the necessity 
statement.49  
Table 3.1 summarizes these different possible explanations for children’s 
difficulties with force, which I will discuss further in section 3.4. Note that these 
explanations are not mutually exclusive: they most likely combine to explain the full 
acquisition picture. 
 
Table 3.1 Summary of possible explanations for children’s difficulties with force 
reported in the existing literature. These explanations are not mutually exclusive.  
 
 
Nature of the difficulties Explanation 
Conceptual difficulties 
with Premature Closure  
(4-year-old) 
(Öztürk and Papafragou, 2015) 
When having to deal with several open possibilities, children 
arbitrarily toss one out, in order to reduce cognitive load. 
Specific to epistemic modality? 
Conceptual difficulties 
with modal reasoning 
(infants) 
(Leahy and Carey, 2020) 
Infants have difficulties representing possibilities: they start 
with only ‘minimal representations’ of possibility, and 
therefore struggle when having to consider multiple 
possibilities simultaneously. 
Difficulties are not specific to necessity modals. 
                                               
 
48 In the case of the definite article, for instance for sentences such as “Put the doll in the suitcase”, a 
unique referent is required in the context (there should only be one doll; if there were two dolls, the 
indefinite article should be used). Children seem to be over-permissive of using and accepting definites 
in contexts where their uniqueness presupposition is not satisfied (Karmiloff-Smith, 1979; Schaeffer & 
Matthewson, 2005; Van Hout et al., 2010, a.o.) 
49 Note that outside experimental settings, adults would probably accommodate those kind of necessity 
statements: for instance, even when being at first certain that the speaker has no reliable source of 
information whatsoever, they might accept “It must be raining” and understand that the speaker probably 
in fact has a reliable source of information, since the necessity modal statement conveys that the speaker 





Semantic difficulties  
with modals’ flavor  
Children fail to interpret the flavor intended by the adult: for 
instance, they would interpret “The cow has to be in the blue 
box” as ‘the rules require that the cow be in the blue box’, 
instead of ‘it is certain that the cow is in the blue box’.  
Semantic difficulties  
with the force of 
necessity modals  
Children don’t know the underlying force of necessity modals. 
Weak version: Children are unsure about the force.  
Strong version: Children think that necessity modals like have 
to mean ‘possible’. 
Pragmatic difficulties 
(determining the domain 
of quantification) 
Children have issues deploying modals in the right situations 
(in the same situations as adults do); children and adults differ 
in how they interpret possibility/necessity situations. 
Epistemic difficulties 
(knowing what is 
necessary or possible) 
Children don’t know what is possible and necessary (for 
instance, they might not know the rules) 
 
3.1.3 The acquisition of modals and negation  
A number of experimental studies focus on children’s interpretation of sentences 
containing negated modals. Here again, these studies usually take for granted that 
children already know the underlying force of their modals, and that they have no deep 
conceptual or pragmatic issues, to focus on what they know of their scope relative to 
negation (i.e., whether children choose strong inverse scope interpretations rather than 
weak surface scope interpretations). I will focus on the literature on children’s 
acquisition of negated modal sentences, and leave aside the literature on Free Choice 
(how modals interact with disjunction, e.g., “You may have sushi or pasta”), as well as 
the literature on Polar Sensitive Items (which asks, for example, how children learn the 
licensing restrictions on NPIs).50  
                                               
 
50 For work on Free Choice: see e.g., Tieu et al., 2016; Jasbi, 2018; for work on the acquisition of modal 
Polar Sensitive Items: see e.g. van der Wal, 1996; Lin et al., 2015, 2018). Note that the English NPI 
needn’t is extremely rare in English (5 occurrences in the whole Manchester corpus, 0 by children), 





As we saw in section 1.2.3 of Chapter 1, possibility and necessity modals vary 
with respect to whether they scope over or under negation. For instance, necessity 
modals like must and should take wide scope with respect to negation; necessity modals 
like have to and need to take narrow scope. This means that depending on the force of 
the modal (possibility vs. necessity) and its scope with respect to negation (over vs. 
below), we have four possible interpretations. But given the logical equivalence 
between not > possible and necessary > not, we need to distinguish only two: a 
necessity modal scoping over negation (e.g., “you mustn’t p”) is logically equivalent 
to a possibility modal scoping under negation (e.g., “you can’t p”), and a possibility 
modal scoping over negation (e.g., “you might not p”) is logically equivalent to a 
necessity modal scoping under negation (e.g., “you don’t have to p/you needn’t p”). 
We have therefore two logical interpretations, a ‘strong’ one (necessary > not or not > 
possible), and a ‘weak’ one (not > necessary or possible > not).  
Results of experiments testing children’s understanding of negated modal 
sentences show that children systematically tend to prefer strong interpretations (not > 
possible/necessary > not), even when adults prefer weak ones (possible not/not 
necessary). For instance, children tend to reject “There might not be a horse in the 
box” (possible > not) when it is possible that there is no horse in the box (see e.g., 
Moscati & Crain, 2014, for Italian potere ‘can’), or, when tested with teleological 
modality, they reject “Cat doesn’t have to go down the yellow road” (not > necessary) 
when both ways are open (Cournane et al, in prep., Experiment 2) (see also Noveck, 
2001 for not have to; Moscati & Gualmini, 2007 for epistemic cannot and Italian non 





for Dutch niet hoeven ‘needn’t’). The main proposal for this preference for strong 
interpretations is the Semantic Subset Principle (SSP), a variant of the Subset Principle 
(see Chapter 1, section 1.3.1). According to this principle, children acquire scope 
ambiguities by first assuming stronger meanings, regardless of their availability in the 
adult grammar (Crain et al., 1994; Crain & Thornton, 1998; Crain, 2012; Moscati et 
al., 2016; for critiques, see Musolino, 2006; Musolino et al., 2019).  
However, it is not straightforward what to conclude as to the nature of children’s 
difficulties just based on these experiments’ results. First, negated necessity epistemic 
claims (e.g. “It might not be in drawer”) are extremely unnatural, even for adults; as 
we saw in Chapter 2, when looking at children’s input, we find that only 4.6% of 
epistemic modal statements are negated, and only 2.6% of necessity epistemic modal 
statements (i.e., 6 examples in the whole corpus). Root negated necessity modal 
statements are also quite rare (e.g., “You don’t have to do it”), and often used in ‘polite 
ways’, rather than to clearly convey ‘non necessity.’ Second, here too, these findings 
could be explained by children being uncertain about the underlying force of modals. 
For instance, if children think have to expresses possibility, they might accept it in the 
same situations as can’t, as they will understand not have to as meaning ‘not possible’. 
Or if they think might expresses necessity, they might accept it in the same situations 





Corpus studies assess children’s production of modals with negation are rare.51 
I’ll come back to these debates, and the consequences they may have for learners 
figuring out force, in the discussion.  
3.1.4 Summary and motivation for the study 
Our current understanding of children’s early mastery of modal force is limited. 
Comprehension studies on force tend to focus on older children. Corpus studies tend to 
focus on flavor, and while they note when particular lexemes first appear in children’s 
spontaneous speech, to date, there hasn’t so far been any systematic corpus 
investigation of force in English.  
What can we learn from looking at very young children’s spontaneous 
productions about when and how children master the force of modals? The study I turn 
to provides the first large-scale investigation of the development of modal force, by 
examining the modal production of twelve children between the ages of 2 and 3. 
 
3.2 Corpus study: Modal force in child productions  
The purpose of this corpus study is to provide a thorough description of the modals 
children produce between 2- and 3-year-old, focusing on the force dimension. What do 
young children’s spontaneous productions of possibility and necessity modals look 
                                               
 
51 See Jeretič, 2018, for work on the acquisition of (root) modal force in French and Spanish and their 





like, as compared to their parents’? How frequently do they use possibility and 
necessity modals? And do they use them in an adult-like way? 
To study children’s modal productions, we used the same methods as in the 
input study (Chapter 2). Similarly, I first present the results from our corpus analysis, 
now comparing children’s early productions to those of adults’: how frequently 
children use possibility and necessity modals, in which environments, and how they 
interact with flavor and negation. Then, I present results from an experiment based on 
the same paradigm as the Input Experiment 1 (see section 2.3, Chapter 2), that tests 
how adult-like children’s uses of modals are, by asking (adult) participants to guess the 
force of modals uttered by children in dialogues extracted from the corpus, given the 
conversational context in which they use it.  
3.2.1. Methods 
As in our study of the input in Chapter 2, we use the Manchester Corpus (Theakston et 
al., 2001) of UK English (CHILDES database, MacWhinney, 2000). It consists of 12 
child-mother pairs (6 females; age range: 1;09-3;00), recorded in unstructured play 
sessions. Our analysis focuses on the period between ages 2;00 and 3;00. Children’s 
utterances containing modal auxiliaries and semi-auxiliaries (5,842; excluding 
repetitions (17%): 4,844) were coded for force (possibility vs. necessity) (26), negation 
(present vs. absent) (27), flavor (epistemic vs. root) (28), subject (first/second/third 
person) (29) and clause type (declarative/interrogative/tag question) (30). We applied 
the exact same coding scheme for children and adults; here, I present it again for ease 





primarily express futurity, which force is debatable (Stalnaker, 1968; Cariani & 
Santorio, 2018). We do not differentiate amongst various subtypes of root flavors (e.g. 
ability, teleological, deontic).  
(26) Modal lemmas by force: 
Possibility: can, could, might, may; able to 
Necessity: must, should, need; have to, got to, be supposed to, need to 
(27) Negation: 
No negation: ‘I can play with you.’ 
Negation: ‘You can't eat it.’  
(28) Flavor: 
Root:   
CHILD:  I got crane out my box.  
MOTHER:  oh you've got your box as well yeah.  
CHILD:  I must get crane.    (Aran, 2;02) 
Epistemic:  
MOTHER:  oh we’ve got a bit of hair stuck, haven’t we?  
CHILD:  look.  
CHILD:  it must be some of dolly’s hair. (Aran, 2;09) 
(29) Subject: 
1st person: ‘I can see a bucket.’/ ‘We can fit a cow through there.’ 
2nd person: ‘You can do it. 
3rd person: ‘He can go in the cart.’ / ‘The cat can go in the house.’ 
(30) Clause type: 
Declarative clause: ‘I can see a bucket.’ 
Interrogative clause: ‘What can you see?’; ‘Can you see any chickens?’  






Overall, modal utterances represent 1.6% of all children’s utterances (vs. 5.8% for 
adults). Like adults, children produce more possibility modals than necessity modals, 
and the asymmetry is even stronger: possibility modals represent 79.3% of their modal 
productions (vs. 72.5% of adults’ modal productions) (Table 3.2). As for adults, can is 
by far their most common modal (75.6% of their modal productions, vs. adults: 57.3%), 
and have to their most frequent necessity modal (7.3% of their modal productions, vs. 
adults: 12.0%).  
Negation. Negated possibility modals (e.g. can’t) are extremely frequent in children’s 
productions: more than half of their possibility modal utterances are negated (vs. adults’ 
negated possibility modals: 20.9%). Conversely, necessity modals are particularly rare 
with negation in children’s productions: only 5.1% (vs. adults: 10.1%). Looking at the 
evolution of their productions between 2- and 3-year-old, we see that children tend to 
use necessity modals more frequently over time (relatively to possibility modals): as 
summarized in Figure 3.1a, while necessity modals represent only 12% of children’s 
modal productions between 2;0 and 2;3-year-old, they represent 24.5% between 2;9 
and 3-year-old, almost the same as in adults productions. Figure 3.1b confirms that for 
adults, the relative proportion of possibility and necessity modals does not significantly 







Table 3.2 Counts and percentages of modal uses by force, ordered by lemma 
frequency, with and without negation, for children (repetitions excluded:52 17.0%) (X2 
(1, N=24830)=92.6, p < 2.2e-16).53  
 
 
 CHILD (n=4844) CHILD (n=4800) 54 
 all no negation negation 
POSSIBILITY 3841  79.3% 1861 49.0% 1937 51.0% 
can 3663 75.6% 1739 48.0% 1881 51.9% 
might 86 1.8% 78 97.5% 2 2.5% 
could 80 1.6% 34 39.5% 52 60.4% 
able 3 0.1% 1 33.3% 2 66.6% 
may 9 0.2% 9 100% 0 0% 
NECESSITY 1003  20.7% 950 94.8% 52 5.2% 
have to 352 7.3% 345 98.0% 7 1.9% 
got to 288 5.9% 283 98.3% 5 1.7% 
should 22 0.5% 17 80.9% 4 19.0% 
need to 217 4.5% 204 94.0% 13 5.9% 
must 114 2.4% 94 82.5% 20 17.5% 
supposed 9 0.2% 6 66.7% 3 33.3% 













                                               
 
52 Were considered as repetitions cases where the speaker repeated a sentence uttered right before by 
herself or by another speaker with no significant change.  
53 Note that the chi-square assumption of independence of observations is violated by corpus samples, 
as the same speaker supplies multiple uses per cell. However, this test metric is commonly used in corpus 
linguistics for simple distributional comparisons, and is not straightforwardly a violation as we are 
comparing spontaneous utterances, not individuals (each spontaneous production is taken as a proxy for 
independence).  
54 Excluding tag questions and repetitions. Tag questions (e.g. ‘you can wash it later, can't you?’) are 
more frequent in adults’ speech (0.9% of all children’s modal productions; 5.7% of adults’). We exclude 





Figure 3.1 Evolution of children’s modal productions from 2- to 3-year-old by force 
and negation, binned in 3-months periods: 
 





Flavor. As reported earlier in the literature (see in particular, van Dooren et al., 2017 
for results on the Manchester corpus), epistemic uses are overall very rare in child 
productions: they represent only 2.4% of all their modal utterances (114 cases, 
possibility: 93, necessity: 21) (vs. adults: 8.8%).  
Sentence type. Most of children modals occur in declarative sentences, with first 
person subjects; they rarely use modals in interrogative sentences. Figures 3.2a and 
3.2b summarize the overall distribution of possibility and necessity modals in 
children’s speech, with and without negation, per sentence type and subject, for root 






Figure 3.2a Distribution of possibility and necessity modals with and without negation, 




Figure 3.2b Distribution of possibility and necessity modals with and without 




                                               
 








Our results show that children use (root) possibility modals frequently, both with and 
without negation, which we can take as initial evidence of productivity (Stromswold, 
1990). They use them both in declarative and in interrogative sentences. However, they 
use fewer necessity modals, rarely with negation, and almost never in interrogative 
sentences. Necessity modals also tend to be produced later on: while all 12 children in 
the corpus already produce possibility modals by age 2 (can/can’t), 6 of them don’t 
produce any necessity modal before 2:03 year of age. We will come back to this point 
in Chapter 4, when looking at individual variation between children.  
The lower frequency of necessity modals might come from a combination of 
factors. First, recall that it is also found in parent’s speech. Even though the asymmetry 
is more pronounced when looking at children’s productions, adults as well use 
necessity modals relatively less frequently than possibility modals. If children tend to 
acquire more frequent words first, this might explain why they use them earlier on, and 
more frequently, at a younger age. Second, the difference between children and adults 
might come from social differences in status and topics of conversations: children may 
be less prone to giving orders than adults (therefore, less prone to using deontic 
necessity modals), or less in a position to express certainty (therefore, less prone to 
using epistemic necessity modals) (Hickmann & Bassano, 2016).  
As discussed earlier, the link between production and comprehension is not 
straightforward: children may prefer alternative strategies, such as using imperatives to 
express orders, or bare sentences to express epistemic certainty. These production data 





produce modals correctly. To assess whether they use them in an adult-like way, we 
ran an experiment on children’s modals, using the Guess the Force (GF) paradigm. 
 
3.3 Guess The Force Experiment 1: Children’s modal productions56 
The goal of this experiment is to investigate children’s early modal productions to see 
whether they use modals in an adult-like way, for different flavors, with and without 
negation. Can adults guess the force of a modal used by a child, given the 
conversational context in which they use it, the way they’re able to when the modals 
are used by adults? 
The paradigm is identical to the one presented in section 2.2 of Chapter 2 (HSP 
Input Experiment 1), used with parents’ productions. Here, we use the experiment on 
adult productions as a control, which shows that force is in principle guessable from 
conversational context, for both possibility and necessity modals.  
3.3.1 Methods  
Procedure. GF Experiment 1 is identical to HSP Input Experiment 1, except that we 
tested children’s utterances instead of adults’, and made small changes in the 
instructions (see Appendix B).57 The experiment was run online on Alex Drummond’s 
IBEX Farm. Adult participants recruited via Amazon MechanicalTurk were asked to 
                                               
 
56 In Chapter 4, I’ll present results from a second GF experiment (GF Experiment 2), which uses the same 
paradigm as here (ROOT-P2 condition: can vs. have to), but focuses on differences between children of 
the Manchester corpus. 






guess a redacted modal in a dialogue between a child and mother by choosing between 
two options, corresponding either to a possibility (e.g. can) or a necessity modal (e.g. 
have to). An example of the display is given in Figure 3.3. We implemented the same 
conditions: ROOT-AFF-1; ROOT-AFF-2; ROOT-NEG; EPI-AFF, as summarized in Table 3.3 
We tested force (possibility vs. necessity) within participants, and flavor (root vs. 
epistemic) and negation (present vs. absent) between participants. Negation was tested 
only for root flavor, because negated epistemics were too rare in the corpus. Controls 
were based on tense (past vs. future).  
 
Table 3.3 Summary of experimental conditions (GF Experiment 1): 
 
 
Test condition (between participants) 
Modal lemmas 
possibility necessity 
EPI-AFF (epistemic affirmative) might must 
ROOT-AFF (root affirmative) 58 ROOT-AFF-1 can must 
 ROOT-AFF-2 can/able have to 
ROOT-NEG (root negative) can’t/not able not have to 
 
Material. Extraction procedure. Given the low frequency of negated necessity modals 
and epistemic necessity modals in child productions, we could test only 10 different 
contexts for ROOT-NEG necessity and 12 contexts for EPI-AFF necessity conditions (see 
Table 3.2).59 This did not make a difference for the participants, who always had 10 
                                               
 
58 We implemented two versions of the ROOT-AFF condition. ROOT-AFF-1 (can vs. must) allowed us to 
keep syntactic category of both options identical, while ROOT-AFF-2 (can/able to vs. have to) allowed 
us to avoid concerns related to the formality of must for US English speakers. As in Experiment 1, in 
cases where have to was tensed, we used able to as the alternative to avoid losing tense information: for 
example, participants had to choose between [will have to] and [will be able to]. We extracted the same 
number of contexts from able to, to avoid having the able to option always be the wrong answer. Same 
principles applied for ROOT-NEG condition: participants had to choose between [didn’t have to] and 
[wasn’t able to] when have to was tensed. 
59 Because some of the negated have to in child productions were particularly unclear (e.g. ‘I can't have 





contexts to judge per condition (40 dialogues in the whole experiment: 20 trials: 10 
possibility, 10 necessity; 20 controls: 10 past, 10 future). In all other conditions, the 10 
contexts were selected randomly out of a list of 20 contexts initially extracted from the 
corpus, in the same way as for the adult experiment. Exclusion criteria. Given the low 
frequency of negated necessity and epistemic modals, we didn’t remove cases where 
the modal already appeared in the preceding dialogue.60 We made sure to include 
examples in the training (the/a) and control items (past/future) where it was also the 
case that the right (or wrong) answer appeared in the preceding dialogue. Briticisms, 
such as willn’t, were removed from the dialogue and replaced with American English 
equivalent (e.g. won’t), but we did not correct children’s ungrammatical utterances (e.g. 
comed for came), except in the case of have to when children omitted to (so participants 
would not reject the answer because of its ungrammaticality). We didn’t exclude 
contexts where there were tag questions (e.g., ‘..., mustn't she?’), but removed the tags 
when they occurred in the target sentence. Controls. Participants had to choose between 
future and past (e.g. [saw] vs. [will see], see Figure 3.4). Rationale. We make the 
assumption that adults rely on their own competence to judge usage, and that the 
dialogues preceding the modal sentence are equally informative for adults’ and 
children’s utterances. If children use their modals in an adult-like way, we expect no 
difference in accuracy between the experiment on children’s productions and the 
experiment on adults’ productions. If they do not (e.g. they use can in a necessity 
                                               
 
60 Out of 148 contexts, 36 of them had the modal appear in the preceding dialogue (24.3%) (uttered by 





situation, when adults would use must, or they use must in a possibility situation, when 
adults would use can), we expect a lower accuracy for children’s utterances. Note that 
any observed differences could be explained either by issues with force or by issues 
with the pragmatics of using modals with those forces. 
 
Figure 3.3 GF Experiment 1 stimuli (child productions): example trials for ROOT-P2 







Correct answer: can 
 











Correct answer: will go 
 








Participants. 291 participants were recruited on Amazon Mechanical Turk (EPI-AFF: 
74, ROOT-AFF-1: 72, ROOT-AFF-2: 73; ROOT-NEG: 72; language: US English; 173 
females, mean age=40.2-year-old). We removed 18 participants (6.2%) who were less 
than 75% accurate on controls.61 We thus present results for 273 participants (EPI-AFF: 
68; ROOT-AFF-1: 70; ROOT-AFF-2: 70; ROOT-NEG: 65).  
Analysis. Data analyses were conducted using R (R Core Team, 2013), using the 
package lme4 (Bates et al. 2014a, 2014b). We first run the same tests as for the adult 
experiment, then we compare between adult and child usage. Table 3.4 reports mean 
accuracy in each condition (summarized in Figure 3.5). The overall accuracy on 
possibility modals is 82.1%; on necessity modals, 50.1%. We first run binomial tests 
to see whether performance differs from chance for each condition. Participants 
performed better than chance in all conditions involving possibility modals, but not for 
necessity modals. For ROOT-AFF-1 (must) (mean accuracy: 42.6%) and ROOT-NEG 
necessity (not have to) (mean accuracy: 32.3%), they performed lower than chance 
(Table 3.4).  
Force. To test whether there was an effect of Force, we used binomial linear mixed 
effects models (built with a maximal random effect structure testing Accuracy with 
                                               
 
61 For the adult version, the proportion of errors on controls was very low (5.4%), with no difference 
between groups. For the child version however, the initial proportion of errors on controls was quite high 
(21.6%): post-hoc analysis revealed that this came from 5 control contexts for which the accuracy was 
particularly low, thus not reliable controls. We decided to remove these 5 controls from our exclusion 
criteria, as they were particularly difficult, and probably do not indicate that subjects were not doing the 
task correctly. After restricting to the 15 remaining controls, mean accuracy on controls was 90.0%, 





Subject and Item as random factors). We find an effect in all conditions, always with 
higher accuracy for possibility modals (all: χ2(1)=20.4, p=5e-6***; ROOT-AFF-1: 
χ2(1)=60.4 p=7.7e-15***; ROOT-AFF-2: χ2(1)=7.37 p=0.0066**; ROOT-NEG: 
χ2(1)=38.1, p=6.6e-10***; EPI-AFF: χ2(1)=7.93 p=0.0048**).  
Negation. We compare ROOT-AFF-2 and ROOT-NEG, as these conditions included the 
same lemmas. We find an effect for both possibility and necessity conditions: higher 
accuracy with negation for possibility modals, and lower accuracy with negation for 
necessity modals (can vs. can’t: χ2(1)=3.7, p=0.056 *; have to vs. not-have to: 
χ2(1)=6.7, p=0.0093**; Interaction Force*Neg: χ2(1)=9.2, p=0.0024**).  
Flavor. There was no effect of flavor (χ2(1)=0.14, p=0.71).  
 
Table 3.4 Accuracy rates and significance tests by condition (GF Experiment 1: 
children’s productions) (n = 273, 10 observations per cell): 
 
 Mean accuracy62 (se) Exact binomial tests (two-sided) 
 possibility necessity possibility necessity 
ROOT-AFF-1 85.1% (0.026) 42.6% (0.039) 
p <.001*** 
95% CI [0.82, 0.88] 
p=5.1e-05 *** 
95% CI [0.39, 0.46] 
ROOT-AFF-2 79.6% (0.041) 60.2% (0.060) 
p <.001*** 
95% CI [0.77, 0.83] 
p=2.0e-07 *** 
95% CI [0.56, 0.63] 
ROOT-NEG 88.2% (0.027) 32.3% (0.050) 
p <.001*** 
95% CI [0.86, 0.91] 
p <.001*** 
95% CI [0.29, 0.36] 
EPI-AFF 75.6% (0.050) 56.8% (0.047) 
p <.001*** 
95% CI [0.73, 0.80] 
p=0.00019 *** 
95% CI [0.53, 0.61] 
Total 82.1% (0.019) 50.1% (0.028)  








                                               
 
62 Accuracy corresponds to the mean accuracy across the 20 contexts initially extracted for each 









Age (adult vs. child productions). We then compared results for children’s production 
to results on adults’ usage (as reported in Chapter 2), which showed that force is 
guessable from context (we assume that conversational context should be equally 
informative in both cases). Figure 3.4 summarizes the comparison. We find a general 
effect of Age, with lower accuracy for child usage (χ2(1)=260.5, p <.001***) (general 
mean accuracy for children’s productions: 67.4%; vs. for adults’ productions: 79.9%). 
Among possibility conditions, we find a significant difference only for ROOT-AFF-2; 
among necessity conditions, all comparisons are significant, except EPI-AFF (Table 
3.5). We find a strong interaction Force*Age: the difference in accuracy between 
possibility and necessity modals for child productions is larger than for adult 











Table 3.5 Results of the model testing the effect of Age (adult usage vs. child usage): 
 
 possibility necessity 
ROOT-AFF-1 χ 2 (1)=3.12, p=0.078 (NS) χ 2 (1)=35.8, p=2.1e-09 *** 
ROOT-AFF-2 χ 2 (1)=5.80, p=0.016 * χ 2 (1)=51.8, p=6.3e-13 *** 
ROOT-NEG χ 2 (1)=2.78, p=0.096 (NS) χ 2 (1)=21.1, p=4.4e-06 *** 
EPI-AFF χ 2 (1)=3.76, p=0.053 (NS) χ 2 (1)=0.22, p=0.64 (NS) 
all χ 2 (1)=15.9, p=6.7e-05 ***  χ 2 (1)=175.7, p <.001*** 
ALL χ 2 (1)=231.4, p < 2.2e-16 *** 
 
 
Figure 3.6 Accuracy by condition, comparison between GF Experiment 1 (children’s 





Even if participants are overall slightly less accurate than when judging adults’ modals, 
they are good at identifying possibility modals used by children, for both flavors (mean 
accuracy on all possibility modal contexts: 82.1%, vs. when guessing adults’ modals: 
87.5%; for root: affirmative: 82.4% (vs. 86.9%); negative: 88.2% (vs 89.5%); for 





is the difference between child and adult usage significant. However, for necessity 
modal contexts, participants’ performance is much lower: only 50.1% (vs. when 
guessing adults’ modals: 72.3%), especially for negated ones (32.3%, vs. 61.3%), with 
a significant difference between child and adult usage for the three root conditions. The 
necessity contexts given in (31) to (34) illustrate some of children’s non adult-like uses. 
(They led to the lowest accuracy for each condition).  
(31) ROOT-AFF-1:  
CHILD: Daddy repaired it.  
CHILD: it off.  
MOTHER: Daddy repaired it but he’ll have to do it again I think, won’t 
he?  
MOTHER: come on.  
MOTHER: you come and show Mummy.  
MOTHER: show Mummy the truck.  
MOTHER: oh.  
CHILD: I {can/must} get a tractor.   
(Aran, 2;03.02; HSP accuracy: 15.8%) 
 
(32) ROOT-AFF-2: 
CHILD: oh.  
CHILD: just here.  
CHILD: ...  
CHILD: what shall I put first?  
CHILD: that.  
CHILD: what’s that?  
MOTHER: pardon?  
CHILD: I {can/have to} see a cat.   
(Becky, 2;08.16; HSP accuracy: 2.9%)  
(33) ROOT-NEG: 
CHILD: I am stuck now.  
CHILD: no... no.  





CHILD: get the petrol in.  
CHILD: get the petrol.  
CHILD: petrol.  
CHILD: get some in.  
CHILD: the hippos {can’t/don't have to} go in.  
(Carl, 2;08.01; HSP accuracy: 9.2%)  
 
(34) EPI-AFF: 
FATHER: that’s a digger, is it?  
CHILD: yes.  
FATHER: is there another digger?  
CHILD: yes.  
FATHER: where’s the other digger?  
CHILD: don’t know.  
FATHER: you don’t know?  
CHILD: {might/must} be upstairs.   
(Domin, 2;04.25; HSP accuracy: 23.5%) 
 
 
3.4 General discussion  
In this chapter, we focused on the question of when children figure out the force of their 
modals, by studying their early spontaneous productions. I’ll first summarize our 
results, to then see how they shed new light on the studies of children’s mastery of force 
reviewed at the beginning, and discuss how we can explain children’s difficulties.  
The previous literature shows potential struggles with both forces. Results from 
this corpus study show that children master possibility modals like can or might very 
early. Already by age 2, they use them productively, with and without negation, and 
our GF experiment suggests that they use them in an adult-like way: participants were 
able to guess the right force, both for root and epistemic uses, and both for non negated 





to and must. They use them later on, less often, hardly ever with negation, and crucially, 
they don’t use them in an adult-like way: our GF experiment shows that they produce 
them in situations where adults prefer possibility modals. Their difficulties with 
necessity modals are even more salient when they use them with negation: participants’ 
performance on negated modals like have to is particularly low, which suggests that 
children use them to convey impossibility.  
This casts a new light on the results from both comprehension and production 
experiments reviewed in section 3.1.2. If the difficulty with necessity modals we 
observe for 2- to 3-year-olds persists into the preschool years, this could also explain 
results from comprehension experiments: why, both when tested with root and 
epistemic modals, 4-year-old children tend to over-accept possibility modals in 
contexts where adults prefer necessity modals (since they cannot make scalar 
implicatures if they lack a stronger alternative), and necessity modals in possibility 
contexts (since they treat them as possibility modals). And recall that the few 
production experiments that use more controlled experimental settings to test (older) 
children’s productions draw similar conclusions: 3- to 4-year-old seem to have a 
general preference for using possibility modals (even in necessity situations), and the 
ones who use necessity modals tend to use them both in necessity and possibility 
situations (Hirzel et al., in prep.).63 This aligns with our findings on younger children’s 
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spontaneous productions: overall, 2- to 3-year-olds use possibility modals more 
frequently, and they tend to use necessity modals in possibility situations.  
There seems to be a period during which children do not use (and maybe 
comprehend) necessity modals in the same way as adults, which I’ll call the Necessity 
Gap.64 However, this does not tell us the nature of children’s difficulties. The reason 
for children’s non adult-like behavior with necessity modals, found both in 
comprehension and production studies, is compatible with various possibilities.  
Let’s come back to the different explanations we considered at the beginning 
(summarized in Table 3.1). A first possibility is that children’s difficulties are 
conceptual in nature, and have to do either with Premature Closure (young children 
would have difficulty reasoning in situations that involve alternative possible 
outcomes, and tend to commit to a conclusion before evidence is available; see 
Acredolo & Horobin, 1987; Ozturk & Papafragou, 2015), or representing possibilities 
(children would start with only ‘minimal representations’ of possibility, and therefore 
struggle when having to consider multiple possibilities simultaneously; Leahy & 
Carey, 2020).  
A second possibility is that children’s difficulties are semantic in nature, and 
arise from issues with the underlying force of necessity modals like must and have to. 
There are two versions of this hypothesis: the weak version is that they are unsure about 
                                               
 
64 The expression should be taken with caution, as it is not clear yet whether results about children’s 
production generalizes to other languages than English. Moreover, as in the case of the ‘Epistemic Gap’, 
it might not be a real “gap”, but just a natural consequence of a difference in frequency of exposure, 






the underlying force of necessity modals; the strong version, that they are mistaken 
about their force, and maybe think that they mean possible.65 Either version would 
capture results from both productions and comprehension experiments: children’s 
tendency to produce necessity modals in situations where adults use possibility modals, 
and as already explained, their tendency to accept possibility modals in necessity 
situations, as they cannot reason that there is a more appropriate sentence to use with a 
necessity modal.  
Why would children struggle figuring out the meaning of necessity modals (and 
not of possibility modals)? Given the conclusion from the previous chapter that the 
information they need is available in the input, what would explain this late acquisition? 
Is it that they don’t perceive the information in the input? Do they perceive it, but don’t 
see its relevance? Or are they just not enough exposed to these informative cases? 
A number of factors might combine to make the meaning of necessity modals 
more challenging to figure out for learners—and conversely, could help explain the 
early advantage for possibility modals. First, the Subset Problem—if it is a real one for 
the learner—holds for necessity modals, but not for possibility modals. Children might 
have many opportunities to realize that possibility modals like can cannot mean 
necessary—much more than to see that modals like must cannot mean possible. But 
even though children have strategies to obviate the Subset Problem (i.e., if they are able 
to use pragmatic situational cues), difficulties figuring out the meaning of necessity 
                                               
 
65 Another possibility is that children have a weaker meaning than strong necessity, that could still differ 
from possibility (e.g. weak necessity or a some kind of definite modal, as has been proposed for the 
future). In future research, we intend to run a similar experiment on children productions including other 





modals could also come from other aspects of their input. First, it might be a matter of 
frequency of exposure: maybe even though the situational context is informative, 
children are not exposed to a sufficient number of the relevant cases. Our input study 
shows that necessity modals are quite rare in parents’ productions: They represent 
27.5% of adults’ modal utterances, which means that children hear can (the most 
frequent possibility modal used by their parents) four times more frequently than have 
to (the most frequent necessity modal). This could be a reason for the asymmetry: If 
children grasp the meaning of most frequent words first, they will just need more time 
to figure out their meaning, and use them appropriately.  
In some cases, children might also face conflicting cues. In particular, if as 
considered in Chapter 2, they use negative environments to figure out force, this might 
contribute to their difficulties—at least for necessity modals which outscope negation 
like must. As discussed, if children assume the same scope relations for can and must, 
uses of mustn’t could suggest to them that it expresses possibility. And interestingly, 
when we compare ROOT-AFF-1 (can vs. must) and ROOT-AFF-2 conditions (can/able vs. 
have to) in our GF experiment, we find a lower performance for children’s must than 
for have to (must: 42.6% vs. have to: 60.2%). The difference could come from 
differences in their input frequency (have to represents 12% of all parents’ modal 
utterances; vs. only 2.3% for must), or from the different way they interact with 
negation.66 The interaction with negation could also explain why conversely, 
                                               
 
66 Recall that following the idea from Gualmini and Schwarz (2009) (see section 1.3.2 of Chapter 1), 
negation may be particularly helpful to figure out the force of modals like have to (but it is extremely 





possibility modals are mastered so early by children: our study of the input showed that 
negated possibility modals are quite frequent, and used in particularly informative 
contexts (e.g. to talk about prohibitions or physical impossibilities).  
A last possibility is that children know the meaning of necessity modals, and 
have the right underlying concepts, but fail to use them in appropriate contexts because 
of difficulties grasping the intended domain of quantification (as has been argued in the 
case of definite descriptions, see Brockmann et al., 2018). The difficulty would be 
about not knowing what information is shared, and how it is shared, amongst 
conversation participants. Here again, this would capture results from both production 
and comprehension experiments. In comprehension, children would assume that the 
speaker must have additional information that is not part of the common ground: for 
instance, hearing “the toy must/has to be in the blue box”, they might understand that 
the speaker has a different source of information. In production, they would make 
claims on the basis of private information, or information that adults wouldn’t deem 
under consideration: for instance, they might say “the toy must/has to be in the blue 
box” when two boxes are closed and therefore should be equally possible choices, 
because they have eliminated the one whose color they don’t like.  
To summarize, the nature of children’s difficulties with necessity modals could 
be conceptual (if children know the force, but have trouble dealing with open 
possibilities), semantic (if children don't know the underlying force of modals), 
                                               
 
section 1.3.3 and 2.5, negation could turn out to be misleading in the case of must (and is not as rare: 





pragmatic (if children know the force, but have trouble determining the domain of 
quantification in the same ways as adults), and maybe even epistemic (if children don’t 
know what counts as possible or necessary, or have a different assessment of what 
counts as necessary than adults).  
Coming back finally to the Subset Problem, it is important to note that we find 
no evidence in favor of a necessity bias. Children’s highly adult-like uses of possibility 
modals might even suggest a bias towards possibility. Of course, this lack of evidence 
doesn’t necessarily entail that children don’t rely on a necessity bias when acquiring 
modals: It is conceivable that children use the bias to acquire necessity modals, but fail 
to use them in an adult-like way for independent reasons, as discussed above. However, 
the lack of evidence for a necessity bias in our results, together with its superfluity 
given our input results, suggests that a bias towards strong meanings is dispensable, 
even for modals. Our results are thus in line with recent discussions of other Subset 
Problems, which argue that strong meaning biases may have no place in acquisition 







Chapter 4. Input/output study: How do children figure out the 
force of necessity modals? 
In Chapter 2, we focused on children’s modal input, to probe the viability of various 
strategies that could help children figure out modal force, and in particular solve the 
Subset Problem. In this chapter, we want to get a better sense of how children actually 
figure out modal force. Which of the cues that are in principle available in the input do 
children actually rely on?  
This study addresses this question by looking more closely at individual 
variation between children, to test what aspects of the input are most predictive of 
children’s mastery of necessity modals, as measured by the Guess the Force (GF) 
paradigm introduced in Chapter 3, our study of children’s early modal productions. In 
Chapter 3, we saw that there is an asymmetry in children’s early mastery of possibility 
and necessity modals. Children seem to master possibility modals such as can and 
might very early on: they produce them early (already by age 2), frequently and 
productively (with and without negation), and use them in an adult-like way. However, 
they seem to have more difficulties with necessity modals such as have to and must: 
they produce them later on, less often, hardly ever with negation, and they do not use 
them in an adult-like way: results from our Guess The Force (GF) experiment show 
that they tend to use them where adults would prefer possibility modals. And they seem 
to struggle using necessity modals for quite a long time: results from comprehension 
experiments with older children show that four year-old children tend to both over-





situations (e.g., Noveck, 2001; Öztürk & Papafragou 2015; Cournane et al. in prep.; 
Leahy, 2020).  
As discussed in Chapter 3, there are several possible explanations for children’s 
struggles with necessity modals: conceptual, semantic, pragmatic, or epistemic. And 
this ‘Necessity Gap’ might be expected, given the lower frequency of necessity modals 
in their input described in Chapter 2. The goal of this study is not to tease apart these 
different possible explanations, but to address more directly the question of how 
children actually figure out modal force in practice, in a way that might also help us 
better understand the nature of their difficulties. Can we identify the aspects of their 
linguistic input that affect children’s early mastery of modals, and in particular of 
necessity modals? 
The present study addresses this question by focusing on the root modals can 
and have to, as they are the first modals children produce, and the most frequent in this 
corpus. We will thus leave aside the question of how children figure out the force of 
epistemic modals, for which as discussed in Chapter 2, the relevant cues to force might 
be different, but for which children might figure out force via their root meanings. As 
we saw in Chapter 3, children between 2- and 3-year-old produce extremely few 
epistemic modals (the so-called Epistemic Gap, Cournane, 2015), too few for them to 
be tested using this corpus. 
We will compare different aspects of children’s input, to assess whether and 
how they affect children’s mastery of modal force. Building on the acquisition literature 





in the learning process. 67 First, we will look at how some general aspects of mothers’ 
speech, known to potentially affect children’s language skills, affect children’s mastery 
of modals: mothers’ talkativeness and complexity of speech, as indexed by their Mean 
Length of Utterance (MLU, Brown, 1973). Second, we will look at quantitative aspects 
of their input: first, the mere frequency of exposure of children to can and have to (i.e., 
how frequently their mothers use these modals), since we might expect that more 
exposure might lead to earlier mastery; second, the proportion of modal talk in general 
in mothers’ speech (i.e., how frequently mothers use modals in general, including all 
their modal utterances), since we might expect children exposed to more modal talk to 
grasp modal force earlier. Last, we will look at two specific linguistic environments, 
the candidates we singled out as potentially helpful to learn root necessity modals such 
as have to in Chapter 2: how frequently they are used with negation (e.g., “you 
can’t/don’t have to go outside”); and how frequently they are used with undesirable 
prejacents (e.g., “you ?can/have to brush your teeth” vs. “you can/?have to eat 
dessert”).68  
We use three indicators of children’s modal mastery: their frequency of use of 
can and have to, the age at which they start using them, and, whether they use them in 
an appropriate (adult-like) way, which we measure using the GF (Guess the Force) 
                                               
 
67 Given our methods, we don’t directly test whether children know the meaning of necessity modals, 
but whether they know how to use them. As made clear in Chapter 3, children might know the meaning 
of modals and fail to use them in the same ways as adults because of pragmatic issues determining the 
domain of quantification. But if they don’t know the meaning, they will fail to use them in the right 
situations.  
68 We focus on variation in their mastery of necessity modals (have to), even though the question of how 
children figure out force is in principle relevant for possibility modals as well. However, given results 
from Chapter 3, we do not expect to find much variation in possibility modals’ mastery (children seem 





paradigm from Chapter 3. This study thus also provides us with the opportunity to 
replicate the results from this first GF experiment. 
Our results will point out two factors that influence children’s mastery of have 
to more particularly and seem to play a role in the learning process. First, we find that 
children who hear have to with negation more frequently seem to master it earlier. This 
is an important result, given our discussion of how children might solve the Subset 
Problem using downward-entailing environments, which I will revisit in the first 
section of this chapter. However, this result does not tell us why negation has an effect, 
i.e., how children actually use it. Second, while we don’t find that hearing more have 
to has an effect on its mastery, we find that general exposure to modals matters: children 
exposed to more modal talk in general seem to master have to earlier. This may relate 
to how knowing a dual might facilitate learning. We find no evidence that other general 
language factors, such as mother talkativeness and MLU, matter. Our preliminary 
findings also fail to find an effect of ‘(un)desirability’, though further testing will be 
required to confirm this finding.  
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. In section 4.1, I review the 
motivation behind the choice of the input factors: what aspects of the input we expect 
to matter, and why. I then turn to the study itself. In section 4.2, I provide some general 
metadata, focusing on individual variation between children in the Manchester corpus, 
and describe all our input measures. In sections 4.3 and 4.4, I present results about how 
these factors affect children’s modal mastery, starting with children’s frequency of use 
of modals and age of first utterances (section 4.3), and then results from the GF 





section 4.5, I discuss conclusions we can draw from these results, and open questions 
to address next.  
 
4.1 Background and goals  
How do children figure out that can expresses possibility, and have to expresses 
necessity? What aspects of their linguistic input do we expect to matter, and why, given 
what we know about the literature on word learning and modal acquisition, and our 
conclusions from Chapter 2? 
Linguistic input is typically described in terms of both its quantitative and its 
qualitative aspects.69 Studies on other cases of word learning tend to show that 
qualitative aspects of the input matter more than quantitative aspects (see in particular, 
Hart & Risley, 1995; Hoff, 2003; Hoff & Naigles, 2002; Hsu et al., 2017; Rowe, 2008, 
2012; for a recent meta-analysis of studies of how quality vs. quantity of input impact 
child language skills, see Anderson et al., 2021). In particular, it appears that mothers’ 
talkativeness, or the syntactic complexity of their speech, matter in developing 
language skills. Do these general factors affect children’s early mastery of modals as 
well?70 
                                               
 
69 Quantity of input is generally defined in terms of the number of words (/tokens) (Rowe, 2012) or 
number of utterances (Laks et al., 1990) spoken to the child. I will use the number of utterances here. In 
contrast, quality of input has been used to refer to a number of aspects of language (see Rowe & 
Weisleder, 2020, for a review).  
70 In this study, I restrict our focus to general indicators of syntactic complexity (as evaluated by mother’s 
MLU) and their ‘talkativeness’ (in number of utterances per minute), leaving aside for instance, 
vocabulary diversity and general interactive features that may prove relevant (e.g. responsiveness or joint 





One of the initial motivations for this study was to see whether difference in 
frequency of exposure might be in part responsible for the asymmetry between 
necessity and possibility modals, since we saw in Chapter 2 that necessity modals are 
overall quite rare in children’s input, as compared to possibility modals. All else being 
equal, the more exposure, the better children should perform. Moreover, quantitative 
aspects of the input have also been shown to matter in other cases of language learning 
(see for instance Hart & Risley, 1995). Do children who hear more have to/can overall 
master them earlier, and do they use them in a more appropriate way?  
Another aspect of their input that might matter is how much exposure children 
have to modal talk in general: how frequently their mothers use modals in the input. 
Indeed, we might expect children more exposed to modals in general to master modals’ 
meaning earlier, as it might raise the salience of possibilities and necessities as notions 
that can be talked about; the contrast with other modals that express different forces, 
might help them as well. Do children who hear more modal talk in their input master 
necessity modals earlier?  
Finally, more subtle properties of the input have also been shown to affect 
children’s word learning. For instance, in the case of the acquisition of the difference 
in meaning between attitude verbs like think and know, it has been shown that hearing 
know with first person subjects leads to worse performance on behavioral tasks, while 
hearing it used in questions predicts higher accuracy (e.g., see Howard et al., 2008; 
Dudley, 2017). In the case of modals as well, we might expect those ‘qualitative’ 





its meaning if these cases are not informative; conversely, children who hear fewer uses 
of have to might still learn its meaning, if they are exposed to highly informative cases.  
In Chapter 2, we identified two factors that could in principle help children 
figure out force, for root necessity modals like have to, given their input: how 
frequently have to is used with negation, and how frequently it is used with undesirable 
predicates. I will briefly review our three “solutions” to the Subset Problem (i.e., how 
children figure out the force of necessity modals, given that necessity entails 
possibility), and what we concluded for each of them, to remind us of why we expect 
these two factors to matter more particularly.  
The first “solution” we considered—which I will put aside in this chapter—was 
that child learners have a bias towards ‘strong’ necessity meanings (in the spirit of 
Berwick, 1985): by default, they would assume necessity meanings for modals, and 
revise their hypothesis only for possibility modals, when encountering them used in 
situations of non-necessity. Our study of the input suggests that such a bias is not 
necessary, since children may have other strategies available; moreover, we found no 
evidence for such a bias in Chapter 3, when looking at children’s early productions.  
The second “solution” was that children use evidence from Downward-
Entailing environments, following Gualmini & Schwarz (2009). By hearing negated 
necessity modals used in situations of possibility (for instance, “The dog doesn’t have 
to go outside” when it is clear that the dog can either go outside or stay inside), children 
might be able to infer that have to cannot have a possibility meaning: if have to meant 
possible, not have to would mean not possible; but then, it could not be used in a 





informative cases for have to are extremely rare in children’s actual input: for instance, 
only 4.1% of mother’s utterances involving have to are negated (and 1.1% for got to, 
the second most frequent necessity modal).71 Moreover, Input Experiment 1 shows that 
these rare cases of negated have to might not always be informative about force: in 
particular, they are often used in ‘polite’ ways, to soften prohibitions (e.g., “you don’t 
have to shout”), the meaning of which seems closer to impossibility. But even though 
extremely rare, the remaining negated uses of necessity modals could be useful, if 
children can make use of them. Moreover, negation might be hard to exploit with a 
single exposure, but it could be more useful over time—an aspect we didn’t test in 
Input Experiment 1. 
The third “solution” to the Subset Problem was that children rely on pragmatic 
cues, from the conversational context in which modals are used. In particular, we 
explored the idea that for root modals, cues from the perceived ‘(un)desirability’ of the 
event described might be especially useful: hearing necessity modals used with 
prejacents describing an undesirable event (e.g., ‘You have to/?can clean your room’, 
vs. ‘You can/?have to go eat dessert’) might help children figure out that have to 
expresses necessity. In Input Experiment 3, we showed that this cue is available in the 
input: adults do use necessity modals more frequently with undesirable events, and 
possibility modals with desirable events. Moreover, adults seem to make use of it to 
figure out modal force: it contributes to participants’ performance in our Input 
                                               
 
71 In Chapter 1 and 2, we also discussed problems that arise from scope irregularities for necessity modals 
such as must: must systematically outscopes negation. In these cases, the strategy just cannot be applied. 
In this chapter, I leave these issues aside, as we focus on have to (must could not be tested because this 





Experiment 1. But while these cues are in principle available, children might not make 
use of them in practice.  
In this study, we thus focus on these two aspects of the input—how frequently 
have to is used with negation, and the strength of the ‘desirability’ signal (how 
frequently have to is used with undesirable prejacents by mothers). Of course, other 
aspects of the input could also provide useful cues; I leave their investigation to future 
research. Are these aspects predictive of children’s mastery of modal force for root 
modals? Do children who are exposed to more negated occurrences of have to, or who 
hear it more often with undesirable prejacents, master its force earlier? 
To see how these various aspects of children’s input affect their mastery, we 
will use three complementary indicators: children’s own frequency of production of 
modals (how frequent can and have to are in their own speech); the age at which we 
find their first productions in the corpus; and whether they use them in an appropriate 
way, which I evaluate experimentally using the GF (Guess the Force) paradigm 
introduced in Chapter 3. The main difference with the first GF experiment is that we 
now directly test for differences between children, to see whether we can then identify 
the factors in their input that predict their mastery.  
Investigating potential variation between children, at an individual level, may 
also help better understand the results from our first experiment, and more generally 
children’s difficulties with necessity modals. How general are the difficulties we 
described? Do we find variation between children in their mastery of modals? Do some 
children master necessity modals earlier than others? Do we find that children’s uses 





productions, we did not have enough data to compare children directly. This new study 
also allows us to control for how age and grammatical development might affect 
children’s performance (using the MLU of children’s utterances (Brown, 1973) as a 
measure of general grammatical development).  
The existing acquisition literature does not tell us much about variation that can 
be found at an individual level, even with older children. In general, comprehension 
studies (e.g., Noveck, 2001; Öztürk & Papafragou, 2015) do not report results besides 
aggregates. When reported acceptance rates correspond to chance level (e.g., 47% of 
acceptance of have to in possibility scenarios in Öztürk & Papafragou 2015, 
Experiment 1), we don’t know whether they reflect distinct groups of children (some 
children being adult-like, and some others treating necessity modals as expressing 
possibility), or all children answering randomly.72 Cournane et al. (in prep.) do report 
data about individual variation in their study on teleological modals can/have to (mean 
age: 4;01): out of the 12 children they test in Experiment 1’s necessity condition, 9 
systematically accept have to in possibility situations, and 3 children are more adult-
like (mean: 2.3/5 ‘no’ answers); none of them are perfectly adult-like.73 However, it is 
hard to generalize given the small size of the sample (a problem that will also hold for 
us).  
In short, the goal of this study is to identify what aspects of the input children 
use, in practice, to learn force. We focus on (root) necessity modals, since children 
                                               
 
72 Given that Öztürk & Papafragou (2015) defend a Premature Closure explanation, they probably did 
not have two distinct populations, but since they don’t report individual data, we can’t know for sure. 
73 There were 5 test cases per scenario per child. Force of the modal (can vs. have to) was tested between 





show early mastery of possibility modals, and produce modals with epistemic 
interpretation later on. By looking at individual patterns and variation between children, 
we can assess what factors may explain this variation, by seeing if there is a relation 
between input factors and children’s mastery. Of course, the conclusions we can draw 
from this study are limited by the small number of children included in the corpus and 
the small age window we investigate (from age 2 to 3), but this study lays the ground 
for future research.  
In the next section (section 4.2), I present general metadata and describe all of 
our input measures. In section 4.3, I turn to the assessment of children’s productions, 
looking at their own frequency of use of the modals can and have to, and their age of 
first utterance. In section 4.4, I present results from the GF experiment which assesses 
the adult-likeness of children’s modal uses. Finally, in section 4.5, I discuss 
conclusions we can draw from these results. 
 
4.2 Study 
The goal of this study is to see how different characteristics of the linguistic input 
impact children’s early mastery of modals. I focus on children’s can and have to (in 
their root uses), which are the first modals produced by children, and the most frequent 
modals between age 2- and 3 in this corpus, both in children’s speech and in their 
input.74 We use three indicators to evaluate children’s mastery: (i) children’s own 
                                               
 
74 As mentioned, we could not run the experiment on children’s (root) must (condition ROOT-AFF-1 in 





frequency of production (i.e., how frequent can and have to are in their own speech); 
(ii) the age at which we find their first productions of can and have to; and (iii) whether 
they use them in an appropriate way (adult-like), which I assess experimentally using 
the GF (Guess the Force) paradigm introduced in Chapter 3. We will focus on the third 
one, as it allows a more fine-grained assessment of children’s understanding. Is mastery 
just a matter of quantity of exposure (i.e., do children who hear have to more often 
seem to master it earlier)? Is it helpful to hear (necessity) modals used with negation 
more often? To hear (necessity) modals used with undesirable prejacents? To be 
exposed to more modal talk overall?  
Participants. The Manchester corpus (Theakston et al., 2001; CHILDES database, 
MacWhinney, 2000) consists of 12 children, all monolingual, English-speaking, 
firstborn children, whose mothers are the primary caregivers (see Chapter 2). No 
information about socioeconomic status was collected. Children were recorded with 
their mothers in unstructured playing sessions at home. Ages range from 1;8.22 to 
2;0.25 at the start and 2;8.15 to 3;0.10 at the end of the study: in this study, as in the 
preceding chapters, I only include data starting from 2-year-old. Children’s MLUs 
range between 1.14 at the start of the sample (Nicole) to 3.84 at the end of the sample 
(Warren). One of the interests of using this corpus is thus the relative homogeneity in 
children’s backgrounds, which allows us to test fine-grained properties of their 
linguistic input.  
                                               
 
utterances in children’s own productions: only 4 of them produce more than 10 must utterances. For the 





General input measures: mothers’ talkativeness and MLU. Table 4.1 presents 
general metadata (unspecific to modal talk) about the twelve child/mother dyads in the 
corpus. The “talkativeness” of the mother corresponds to the mean number of 
utterances in one hour of recording time. The MLU is here used as a measure of 
mother’s syntactic complexity.  
 
Table 4.1 General data about the 12 children in the Manchester corpus.75 Children are 





                                               
 
75 Total numbers of morphemes and utterances and MLU were calculated using the MLU function of the 
CLAN program (MacWhinney, 2000). Only transcripts from 2 year-old are included. Note that duration 
of recordings is not systematically reported (e.g., they are for Anne, but not for Warr): to compute 
mother’s talkativeness, I assume that all recordings were 30 minutes long. 
76 The language level of participants was assessed through the MacArthur Communicative Development 
Inventory (CDI, Toddlers; Fenson et al., 1993) at the beginning of the study. 
77 As a point of comparison, the average speaking rate ranges in English from 152 words to 170 








total # of 
morphemes 
(mother) 









(# morph/min) (# utt./min) 
anne F 2.15 3.16 180 134515 30110 30 149.5 33.5 4.47 
aran M 1.75 3.46 153 205161 33238 31 220.6 35.7 6.18 
becky F 1.54 3.04 138 110236 25836 34 108.1 25.3 4.26 
carl M 2.12 3.66 187 61357 13322 22 93.0 20.2 4.60 
domin M 1.61 2.62 153 133082 32016 31 143.1 34.4 4.16 
gail F 1.7 3.26 262 113075 25601 33 114.2 25.9 4.41 
joel M 1.83 3.17 122 107760 24939 31 115.9 26.8 4.33 
john M 2.05 2.81 191 83620 17947 30 92.9 19.9 4.65 
liz F 1.66 3.76 359 81774 18101 32 85.2 18.9 4.51 
nic F 1.14 3.09 102 136288 29208 34 133.6 28.6 4.67 
ruth F 1.46 2.99 44 147277 33777 31 158.4 36.3 4.36 
warr M 2.23 3.84 124 116512 21028 31 125.3 22.6 5.54 





‘Quantitative’ input measures (raw frequencies of can/have to in mother’s speech, 
and frequency of modal talk overall in mother’s speech). Table 4.2 summarizes data 
about modal uses in mother’s speech, for the twelve mothers. It first gives data about 
the frequency of exposure to can and have to, with (i) the bare frequency of can and 
have to (i.e., the proportion relative to the total number of utterances uttered by the 
mother, which I call ‘overall’ frequency for ease of exposure) and (ii) the proportion of 
have to utterances relative to can utterances (which I call ‘relative’ frequency).78 As 
already described in Chapter 3, mothers’ most frequent possibility modal, can, is much 
more frequent than their most frequent necessity modal, have to: on the aggregate, it 
occurs in 3.4% of all mother’s utterances (vs. only 0.75% for have to). Looking at 
variation between mothers, we see that the overall frequency of have to ranges from 
0.4% (Anne’s mother) to 1.2% (Gail’s mother). On the aggregate, the frequency of 
have to relative to can is 18.1% (approximately 4 cans per 1 have to), ranging from 
11.2% (app. 9 can per 1 have to) (Becky’s mother) to 27.4% (app. 3 cans per 1 have 
to) (Liz’s mother). Table 4.2 also reports data on the frequency of modal talk in general 
in mothers’ speech (i.e., the frequency of all their modal utterances, not only can/have 
to utterances) (modals included: possibility: can, could, might, may; able to; necessity: 
must, should, need; have to, got to, be supposed to, need to). 
 
                                               
 
78 In Chapters 2 and 3, we’ve been focusing on the proportion of each modal relative to other modal 





Specific linguistic environments. Table 4.2 also reports data on proportion of uses of 
can/have to in negative sentences, and the strength of the (un)desirability signal in 
mother’s speech (how frequently they are used with undesirable prejacents). I explain 
below how we computed the desirability scores.  
 
Table 4.2 Summary of input ‘quantitative’ and ‘qualitative’ measures (mother’s modal 
talk): ‘overall’ and ‘relative’ frequency of can and have to in mothers’ speech; 
proportion of modal talk (i.e., including other modals: can, could, might, may; able to; 
must, should, need; have to, got to, be supposed to, need to); proportion of modal 
necessity talk (i.e., including only other necessity modals: must, should, need; have to, 
got to, be supposed to, need to); frequency of uses of can and have to in negative 
sentences; desirability scores for have to. For each input measure (in columns), children 
who have the “highest” exposure (i.e., from whom we might expect earlier mastery) 
are highlighted in dark orange (e.g., for ‘overall’ frequency of have to: Gail: 1.2%; Liz: 
1.1%); children who have the “lowest” exposure (i.e., from whom we might expect 
later mastery) are highlighted in light orange (e.g., for ‘overall’ frequency of have to: 
Anne: 0.4%; Becky: 0.5%). In grey are children that are not tested in the experiment, 

















‘Overall’ frequency ‘Relative’ 
frequency 




can have to can have to (i)  
fun 
(ii) notfun 
anne 30110 1461 4.9% 1.4% 766 2.5% 133 0.4% 14.8% 17.8% 1.5% 24% 21% 
aran 33238 2245 6.8% 2.0% 1222 3.7% 220 0.7% 15.3% 24.8% 4.1% 23% 41% 
becky 25836 1488 5.8% 1.4% 926 3.6% 117 0.5% 11.2% 19.4% 5.1% 17% 39% 
carl 13322 660 5.0% 1.5% 405 3.0% 83 0.6% 17.0% 20.7% 8.4% 22% 36% 
domin 32016 1878 5.9% 2.0% 1026 3.2% 278 0.9% 21.3% 26.0% 9.0% 19% 38% 
gail 25601 1560 6.1% 1.9% 803 3.1% 301 1.2% 27.3% 23.4% 2.7% 36% 24% 
joel 24939 1236 5.0% 1.8% 647 2.6% 218 0.9% 25.2% 42.3% 3.2% 17% 43% 
john 17947 1233 6.9% 1.1% 883 4.9% 131 0.7% 12.9% 7.6% 6.1% Nc. Nc.  
liz 18101 1068 5.9% 1.8% 516 2.0% 195 1.1% 27.4% 18.4% 2.1% 28% 37% 
nic 29208 1882 6.4% 1.6% 1269 4.3% 170 0.6% 11.8% 24.5% 3.5% 32% 38% 
ruth 33777 1327 3.9% 1.3% 686 2.0% 219 0.7% 24.2% 20.7% 3.7% Nc.  Nc.  
warr 21028 1811 8.6% 2.0% 1053 5.0% 184 0.9% 14.9% 20.3% 5.4% 26% 42% 





Desirability measures. Methods. To evaluate the strength of the (un)desirability signal 
in mother’s speech, we coded for a sample of 500 have to utterances (50 per mother).79 
All utterances were coded independently by two coders (native speakers of English). 
Similarly to the way we assessed desirability in Input Experiment 3 (section 2.4), 
coders were blind to the modal (it was replaced by a blank before coding). This is to 
avoid their being biased (‘I can X’ might suggest that X is desirable, and ‘I have to X’ 
might suggest that X is undesirable). Coders were asked to code sentences in two ways. 
First, they were asked to indicate whether the activity sounded ‘fun’ or not (yes/no). 
This allows us to keep a direct comparison point with our first ‘desirability’ experiment 
(which would not be the case if we were asking for a scaled judgment). Second, coders 
were asked to indicate whether the activity sounded ‘not fun’ or not (yes/no). The 
reason for this second coding is to avoid merging ‘neutral’ cases (i.e., activities such as 
“grabbing a pen”, that are not necessarily considered as ‘fun’ but not clearly 
undesirable), with clear ‘negative’ cases (e.g., “going to the dentist”), given that our 
hypothesis for necessity modals focuses on undesirability.80 Examples are given in (35) 
and (36). Coders were told that the activities come up in conversations between two-
year-old children and their mothers. They were told that ‘not fun’ could correspond to 
anything annoying, effortful, or painful: anything they would not like to do, if they 
were the child. Cases of mismatch. Coders were told to consider cases of potential 
                                               
 
79 Because of time constraints, we didn’t run an experiment similar to the one presented in Chapter 2, 
section 2.4 (Input Experiment 3), but intend to do so in the future.  
80 This double coding is unnecessary when running an experiment, since averaging across more 
participants allows to differentiate negative cases (~all participants answering “no”) from neutral ones 
(~half of the participants answering “no”) with the question “Does this sound fun?” alone. We didn’t 





mismatch between the child and her mother from the perspective of the child: for 
example, “jumping in a puddle” was coded as fun, but “being quiet” was coded as not 
fun, even though it might be the opposite from the mother’s perspective.  
(35) Does it sound fun to ____? 
- go to the dentist/wait for a long time  0: ‘No, not fun’ 
- grab a pen/say hello    0: ‘No, not particularly fun’ 
- play with a toy/get the sticker    1: ‘Yes, sure, it sounds fun!’ 
(36) Does it sound not fun to ____? 
- go to the dentist/wait for a long time  1: ‘Ugh, I would hate that’ 
- grab a pen/say hello    0: ‘No, that’s fine’ 
- play with a toy/get the sticker   0: ‘No, happy to do that’ 
Table 4.3 reports the details of the desirability scores obtained for each mother 
(also reported together with our other input measures in Table 4.2). For each mother, 
we computed two scores: (i) a desirability score, based on coders’ answers to ‘Does it 
sound fun to [X]’, and (ii), an undesirability score, based on their answers to ‘Does it 
sound not fun to [X]’. Comparison between coders. The rate of agreement between 
coders was 66.2% (cases of direct agreement on ‘fun’: 352/500 (70.4%); cases of direct 
agreement on ‘not fun’: 310/500 (62.0%)). For each activity, the score corresponds to 
the mean of the ratings by the coders (a desirability score of 1 thus corresponds to cases 
when they agree on considering it as ‘fun’, respectively, ‘not fun’, for the undesirability 
score; 0, to when they agree on considering it as not ‘fun’; 0.5, to when they disagree). 
The final score for each mother corresponds to the mean across 50 contexts, excluding 





As expected, activities judged as ‘fun’ were almost always judged as not ‘not fun’, and 
conversely, activities judged as ‘not fun’ judged as not ‘fun’.81  
Overall, the mean desirability score is 24.1%, ranging from 17% (Becky’s 
mother) to 32% (Nicole’s mother); the mean undesirability score was 36%, ranging 
from 21% (Anne’s mother) to 43% (Joel’s mother). As a point of comparison, the mean 
rate of ‘fun’ judgments found in Input Experiment 3 (section 2.4) was 25.7% on have 
to utterances (vs. 49.7% on can utterances). Note that since we focus on how children 
figure out the force of root necessity modals, we did not code for can utterances.  
 




                                               
 
81 There was only one case that was judged both as ‘fun’ and ‘not fun’ by both coders: ‘pay the mother 
some money to go through’. 
  (i) FUN score (ii) NOTFUN score 
mothers excluded 0 0.5 1 score 0 0.5 1 score 
anne 1 28 18 3 24% 32 13 4 21% 
aran  31 15 4 23% 20 19 11 41% 
becky 1 35 11 3 17% 20 20 9 39% 
carl 2 34 7 7 22% 21 19 8 36% 
domin 2 33 12 3 19% 19 22 7 38% 
gail 2 22 17 9 36% 29 15 4 24% 
joel 1 35 11 3 17% 20 16 13 43% 
liz  27 18 5 28% 20 23 7 37% 
nic  24 20 6 32% 21 20 9 38% 
warr  28 18 4 26% 18 22 10 42% 





4.3 Children’s modal productions 
How do these different factors affect children’s mastery of modals? I will start by 
looking at our first two measures of modal mastery: children’s own frequency of 
production of modals and their age of first production.  
4.3.1 Children’s quantitative productions 
Table 4.4 summarizes children’s data. It reports the accuracy found in the GF 
experiment, for ease of future comparison. First, looking at children’s bare frequency 
of production, we find that can is significantly more frequent than have to, as already 
described in Chapter 3: it occurs in 1.8% of all children’s utterances (vs. 3.4% of all 
mother’s utterances), vs. have to, only 0.2% (vs. 0.8% for mothers). Relative frequency 
of can and have to for children is approximately 9 can for 1 have to (vs. 4 can for 1 
have to for mother’s).  
Table 4.4 Measures of children’s modal mastery: ‘overall’ and ‘relative’ frequency; 
age of first productions; mastery as measured by the GF paradigm (see Table 4.6)). In 
grey are children not tested in the experiment, because they produce too few have to.  
 
 Total # 
utt. 






‘Overall’ frequency ‘Relative’ 
frequency 
(have to vs. can) 
Age of prod.  GF experiment 
 can have to can have to can have to 
anne 16405 501 3.1% 374 2.3% 22 0.1% 5.6% 2;00.15 2;00.29 80.2%  39.6%  
aran 16144 729 4.5% 560 3.5% 30 0.2% 5.1% 2;01.00 2;05.03 82.4%  57.0%  
becky 23398 788 3.4% 598 2.6% 84 0.4% 12.3% 2;00.07 2;05.08 78.3%  57.5%  
carl 16998 583 3.4% 438 2.6% 12 0.1% 2.7% 2;00.26 2;06.19 64.9%  57.7%  
domin 19145 322 1.7% 267 1.4% 11 0.1% 4.0% 2;00.28 2;04.11 70.3%  73.8%  
gail 16396 449 2.7% 317 1.9% 93 0.6% 22.7% 2;01.08 2;00.19 87.5%  61.9%  
joel 16410 313 1.9% 214 1.3% 17 0.1% 7.4% 2;01.23 2;0325 69.8%  43.9%  
john 12464 59 0.5% 46 0.4% 1 0.01% 2.1% 2;00.13 2;09.12 Not tested.  
liz 15501 317 2.0% 253 1.6% 20 0.1% 7.3% 2;00.28 2;04.03 82.2%  44.1%  
nic 16937 280 1.7% 221 1.3% 45 0.3% 16.9% 2;01.01 2;08.20 69.3%  45.2%  
ruth 19282 39 0.2% 16 0.1% 3 0.02% 15.8% 2;04.01 2;07.10 Not tested. 
warr 14226 420 3.0% 316 2.2% 14 0.1% 4.2% 2;01.14 2;03.08 67.0%  68.4%  





Is there a relation between children’s own frequency of production and frequency in 
the input?82 Figures 4.1a and 4.1b show the relation between the frequency of use of 
can and have to in children’s input (mothers’ speech) and in their own speech, 
computed either out of the total number of utterances (4.1a) or out of the total number 
of morphemes (4.1b) (both are commonly used in the literature). Correlations are not 
significant, whether we look at overall or relative frequency (overall frequency: can: 
Pearson’s r=0.086 (t(10)=0.27, p=0.79 (NS); 95% CI: [-0.51;0.63]); have to: Pearson’s 
r=0.232 (t(10)=0.75, p=0.47 (NS); 95% CI: [-0.39;0.71]; ‘relative’ frequency: 
Pearson’s r=0.29 (t(10)=0.99, p=0.35 (NS); 95% CI: [-0.33; 0.74]). We also find no 
effect when looking at frequency computed out of the number of morphemes: can: 
Pearson’s r=-0.08 (t(10)=-0.26, p=0.80 (NS); 95% CI: [-0.63;0.52]); have to: Pearson’s 
r=0.19 (t(10)=0.61, p=0.55 (NS); 95% CI: [-0.43;0.69]). However, this absence of 
result should be taken with caution: it is expected given the low sample size (only 12 













                                               
 





Figure 4.1 Relation between overall frequency of use in the input (mother’s speech) 
(x-axis) and frequency of use in children’s productions (y-axis), out of total number of 
utterances (1a) and out of total number of morphemes (1b). Each dot corresponds to 
one child/mother dyad (n=12). Red dots correspond to frequency of can; blue dots 
correspond to frequency of have to.  
 
Figure 4.1a (out of total # of utterances)  Figure 4.1b (out of total # of words) 
     
 
 
4.3.2 Age of first productions 
Looking at our second indicator of children’s mastery, age of first production, we find 
that have to tends to be sampled later than can, with on average a 4-months difference 
(Table 4.4).83 Note that our measure is likely to under-estimate the gap between first 
productions of the two modals, notably because most children start producing can 
before 2-years-old: except for Ruth, the first occurrences of can are found in earlier 
transcripts than the ones included in this study. Focusing on their first production of 
                                               
 
83 These results are for now just indicative, since we only looked at the first have to sampled in the 
corpus. A more conservative measure to use is the First of Repeated Uses (FRU) (Snyder, 2007), that 
allows to avoid the possibility that this first use is just repeating something the child recently heard (a 





have to, we find some variation in how early children start using have to, but it does 
not seem to be predicted by input frequency.  
As argued in Chapter 3, the fact that children don’t produce have to doesn’t 
mean that they don’t understand it. Conversely, the fact that some children produce it 
doesn’t mean that they understand it or use it in a proper way: this assessment does not 
control for children repeating sentences used earlier in the conversation, even though 
direct repetitions were excluded from our analyses. Last, we might easily miss some 
children that use have to earlier, but not during the time of the recording.  
To summarize this section, we don’t find that quantitative aspects of the input 
affect children’s quantity of productions. However, the low sample size might also be 
responsible for this absence of effect.  
 
4.4 Guess The Force Experiment 2 
We now look at how both the quantitative and qualitative aspects of their input we 
described in section 4.2 affect the quality of children’s modals, using the Guess The 
Force (GF) paradigm introduced in Chapter 3 (condition ROOT-AFF-2, testing root can 
vs. have to). If we find variation between children in how adult-like their modal uses 
are, what are the aspects of their input that best predict this variation? In particular, do 
children who hear can/have to more frequently use them in an adult-like way earlier? 
Does it help to hear modals with negation? Does it help to hear them used more 
frequently with (un)desirable events? Does it help to hear more modal talk in general? 





A secondary goal is to control for an effect of age and syntactic development: 
do children tend to become more adult-like with age, as expected?  
4.4.1 Methods 
In the experiment, adult participants are given dialogues extracted from the Manchester 
corpus, and asked to guess the force of a redacted modal that was uttered by a child, as 
illustrated in Figure 4.2.84 They are asked to choose between two options, 
corresponding either to the necessity (have to) or the possibility (can/able to) modal. 
As in GF Experiment 1, each participant had to judge 40 dialogues overall: 20 trials 
(10 possibility; 10 necessity); 20 controls using tense (10 past; 10 future). The 20 trial 
contexts were randomly selected for each participant, out of a list of 200 contexts 
previously extracted from the Manchester corpus. Controls were the same as in 
Experiment 1, except that we changed the 5 problematic cases. Rationale. This allows 
us to evaluate how “adult-like” children’s uses are. We use the experiment on adults’ 
uses (Input Experiment 1, section 2.3, Chapter 2) as a baseline which shows that force 
is guessable from context, and assume that dialogues preceding the modal sentence are 
equally informative for adults’ and children’s uses. We thus take participants’ accuracy 
at guessing children’s modals (as compared to their accuracy at guessing adults’) as a 
measure of how ‘adult-like’ children’s uses are.  
 
 
                                               
 






Figure 4.2 Experiment stimuli: example trial (have to): 
 
Material. 20 contexts per child (10 can, 10 have to) were initially randomly extracted 
from the corpus. Note that because of the low number of have to utterances in John’s 
and Ruth’s productions (John: 1; Ruth: 3; see Table 4.2), we could not include them in 
the experiment. We thus had a list of 200 contexts in total (10 possibility and 10 
necessity for each of the 10 children), and 20 controls. The full list is available at 
[LINK]. Exclusion criteria. As in the first experiment, we didn’t remove contexts 
where the modal already appeared in the preceding dialogue, unless it was a direct 
repetition (e.g., […] ‘CHILD: and you have to go and get a pan. OTHER ADULT: 
pardon? CHILD: you ______ get a pan.’).85 Again, we made sure to include examples 
in the training (the/a) and control items where it was also the case that the right (or 
wrong) answer appeared in the preceding dialogue. Again, we removed Briticisms, but 
did not correct children’s ungrammatical utterances (e.g., comed for came), except in 
                                               
 
85 Out of the final list of 200 contexts, 47 of them have the modal appear in the preceding dialogue 
(23.5%) (necessity contexts: 21; possibility contexts: 26 cases) (uttered by the child: 24, by the mother 
or another adult: 12; by both: 11). A number of contexts have the other (non-target) modal appear in the 
preceding dialogue (necessity contexts: 14 where there is can/can’t before, 7 where there is have to; 





the case of have to when children omitted to or made an agreement mistake (e.g., 
Mummy have to do it was corrected to Mummy has to do it), so that participants would 
not reject the answer because of its ungrammaticality. In cases where have to was 
tensed (had to) or under another modal (e.g., might have to) (7 cases), we again used 
able to as the alternative. However, in this experiment, we could not extract enough 
contexts for be able to, because of the overall low number of able utterances in 
children’s production (3 cases overall, and only 1 in a declarative sentence). This means 
that there was only one case where able was the right answer, vs. 7 for (tensed) have 
to.  
Input measures. Our input measures are based on the data reported in Table 4.1 and 
4.2. For ‘quantitative’ measures, as before, we use two measures (overall frequency, 
i.e., the proportion of can/have to with respect to the total number of utterances uttered 
by the mother, and relative frequency, i.e., the proportion of have to relative to can). 
For ‘qualitative’ measures, we use mothers’ MLU (as an index of syntactic 
complexity); mothers’ talkativeness; proportion of modal talk (i.e., including other 
modals); proportion of modal necessity talk (i.e., including only other necessity 
modals); frequency of uses of can and have to in negative sentences; and desirability 
scores (for have to). Child measures. Finally, we control for the effect of age and 
MLU. Age corresponds to the age of production of the modal by the child, in months. 
Age of production in the extracted contexts was on average 31.8 months for possibility 
modals contexts, and 32.3 months for necessity modals contexts. MLU corresponds to 
the MLU of the child at the time of production of the modal. (37) summarizes the 





(37) Force: {possibility, necessity}      
Child: {anne; aran; becky; carl; domin; gail; joel; john; liz; nic; ruth; 
war} 
Age: from 26-month-old to 36-month-old 
MLU: between 1.2 and 4.1 
Expectations. We expect: 
- Participants to perform better for children’s uses of possibility modals 
(can/able) than for their necessity modals (have to) (i.e., we expect to replicate 
the results from our first GF experiment on children’s productions).  
- Input frequency: all else being equal, children who are exposed to more 
necessity modals in their input should use them in a more adult-like way 
(controlling for age and MLU).  
- Modal talk: All else equal, we expect children who are more exposed to modal 
talk in general (i.e., whose mothers use modals frequently), to use them in a 
more adult-like way.  
- Negation: We expect negation to be helpful for both possibility and necessity 
modals, as the limits of a strategy based on negation for have to might stem 
from their extreme low frequency. Children more exposed to don’t have to 
should master have to earlier, if children are able to use negative environments. 
We expect negation to be useful for can as well, but as mentioned already, we 
might not be able to capture any effect if children’s performances are at ceiling.  
- Desirability: We expect children who have a stronger ‘(un)desirability’ signal 





frequently), to use them in a more adult-like way, if they are sensitive to this 
cue the way adults are.  
- Children’s Age and MLU (control): Performance should improve with 
children’s age and MLU (children’s usage should become more adult-like with 
time).  
4.4.2 Results 
Participants. 351 adult participants were recruited on Amazon Mechanical Turk 
(language: US English; 190 females, mean age=41.9-year-old). The proportion of 
errors on controls was low (8.9%). We removed 19 participants (5.4%) who were less 
than 75% accurate on controls. We thus present results for 332 participants. 
Analysis. All data analyses were conducted using R (R Core Team, 2013), using the 
package lme4 (Bates et al. 2014a, 2014b). First, we replicate the main finding from our 
GF Experiment 1: participants perform significantly better for children’s possibility 
modals than for their necessity modals (mean accuracy for possibility modals: 75.2%; 
for necessity modals: 54.9%; vs. in GF Experiment 1, condition ROOT-AFF-2: 
respectively, 79.6% and 60.2%; and in the adult baseline, condition ROOT-AFF-2: 
respectively, 81.5% and 82.0%). Figure 4.3 shows results on the aggregate, with the 
experiment on adults’ productions and our first experiment on children’s productions 
as comparison points. As for the two previous experiments, we first run binomial tests 
to see if, overall, participants’ performance differs from chance, for each condition of 
force. We find that participants differ from chance for both possibility and necessity 





we compare them to the experiment on adults’ productions (we assume that the 
conversational context should be equally informative in both cases). We use binomial 
linear mixed effects models built with a maximal random effect structure testing 
Accuracy with Subject and Item as random factors testing for the effect of Age group 
(child vs. adult usage). The result is only significant for necessity modals (χ2(1)=47.1, 
p=6.8e-12 ***): we find no difference for possibility modals (χ2(1)=2.17, p=0.14). The 
interaction Force*Age group is significant (χ2(1)=20.9, p=4.9e-06 ***). 
 
Table 4.5 Results and statistical tests for GF Experiment 2, as compared to GF 
Experiment 1 and Input Experiment 1 (condition ROOT-AFF-2, respectively presented 











                                               
 
86 Accuracy corresponds to the mean accuracy (how good participants are at guessing the force of the 
modal based on the context, e.g. to answer can in a possibility context) across the 100 contexts initially 
extracted from the corpus for each condition of force. On average, we have 31.6 observations per context 
(ranging between 27 and 49). The number of participants was determined so that we had approximately 




Exact binomial tests (two-sided) 
Results of the model testing effect 
of Age (adult vs. child usage) 
possibility necessity possibility necessity possibility necessity 







95% CI [0.74, 0.77] 
p=1.3e-09 *** 
95% CI [0.54, 0.56] 
χ 2 (1)=2.17, 
p=.14 (NS) 
χ 2 (1)=47.1, 
p= 6.8e-12 *** 







95% CI [0.77, 0.83] 
p=2.05e-07 *** 
95% CI [0.56, 0.63] 
χ 2 (1)=5.80, 
p=0.016 * 









95% CI [0.79, 0.85] 
p <.001*** 
95% CI [0.79, 0.84] 





Figure 4.3 Mean accuracy by condition of force: Comparison between experiments 
(GF Experiment 2: n=332 participants; 200 contexts in total, 100/force; GF Experiment 
1: n=70 participants; 40 contexts in total, 20/force; Input Experiment 1: n=69 
participants; 40 contexts in total, 20/force).. ‘P’: possibility contexts (can/able). 
‘N’=necessity contexts (have to). Accuracy corresponds to how good participants are 
at correctly guessing the force of the modal based on the context (e.g. to answer can in 




Analysis by individual child. Table 4.6 reports participants’ accuracy in each 
condition of force (possibility vs. necessity), for the 10 children (ordered 
alphabetically) (see Figure 4.4). For each child, we ran both binomial tests to see 
whether participants differ from chance, and binomial linear mixed effects models to 
see whether children’s uses are ‘adult-like’, comparing them to the adult baseline. For 
possibility modals, we find that all children perform significantly better than chance. 
For necessity modals, we find that 5/10 children perform better than chance, 4/10 don’t 
differ from chance, and 1 (Anne) performs lower than chance (39.6%). Comparing their 
uses to the adult baseline, we find that for possibility modals, 4 out of 10 children are 
not adult-like, and for necessity modals, 7 children are not adult-like. The test 





Table 4.6 Accuracy rates (se) and results of binomial tests; models testing effect of 
Age group (adult usage vs. child usage), by child condition (GF Experiment 2: n=332). 
 
 
Figure 4.4 Mean accuracy by condition of force by child. The black dashed line 
corresponds to the adult baseline (participants’ accuracy on adults’ modal productions, 
which is approximately the same for possibility and necessity contexts: respectively, 




Mean accuracy (se) Exact binomial tests (two-sided) 
Results of the model testing 
effect of Age (adult vs. child 
usage) 
possibility necessity possibility necessity possibility necessity 
anne 80.2% (0.074) 39.6% (0.052) 
p < 2.2e-16*** 
95% CI [0.77, 0.85] 
p=1 (NS) 





aran 82.4% (0.043) 57.0% (0.077) 
p < 2.2e-16*** 
95% CI [0.79, 0.87] 
p=0.0049 * 





becky 78.3% (0.088) 57.5% (0.112) 
p < 2.2e-16*** 
95% CI [0.72, 0.79] 
p=0.0038 * 





carl 64.9% (0.071) 57.7% (0.067) 
p=8.8e-09*** 
95% CI [0.61, 0.69] 
p=0.00023*** 





domin 70.3% (0.069) 73.8% (0.067) 
p < 2.2e-16*** 
95% CI [0.67, 0.75] 
p < 2.2e-16*** 





gail 87.5% (0.056) 61.9% (0.047) 
p < 2.2e-16*** 
95% CI [0.84, 0.90] 
p=1.6e-06*** 
95% CI [0.58, 0.66] 
χ2(1)=4.5,  
p= 0.033 * 
χ2(1)=0.044,  
p=0.84 (NS) 
joel 69.8% (0.071) 43.9% (0.076) 
p < 2.2e-16*** 
95% CI [0.67, 0.75] 
p=0.98 (NS) 





liz 82.2% (0.056) 44.1% (0.071) 
p < 2.2e-16*** 
95% CI [0.77, 0.83] 
p=0.99 (NS) 





nic 69.3% (0.060) 45.2% (0.080) 
p=8.5e-13*** 
95% CI [0.65, 0.74] 
p=0.94 (NS) 





warr 67.0% (0.088) 68.4% (0.081) 
p=6.2e-11*** 
95% CI [0.63, 0.71] 
p=1.4e-11 *** 




p= 0.12 (NS) 
ALL 75.2% (0.022) 54.9% (0.025) 
p <.001*** 
95% CI [0.74, 0.77] 
p=1.3e-09 *** 
95% CI [0.54, 0.56] 
χ 2 (1)=2.17, p=.14 
χ 2 (1)=47.1,  





Contexts in (38) to (41) illustrate some examples of worst and best performance 
for have to and can.  
(38) Two necessity contexts with the lowest accuracy: 
Becky, have to (0% accuracy) Carl, have to (7.7% accuracy) 
 MOTHER: yeah.  
 MOTHER: I’m not sure there is another man 
actually.  
 MOTHER: I think it’s you that’s got the other 
man.  
 MOTHER: there is more of the train here 
though, look.  
 CHILD: no.  
 CHILD: not.  
 CHILD: this man can’t go on the grass.  
 CHILD: I ______ go on the grass.  
 MOTHER: it’s not.  
 MOTHER: what color is it?  
 CHILD: its pink.  
 MOTHER: that’s right.  
 MOTHER: its pink.  
 CHILD: you can hold it.  
 MOTHER: thank you.  
 CHILD: you ______ make them.  
 
(39) Two necessity contexts with the highest accuracy: 
Becky, have to (100% accuracy) Domin, have to (100% accuracy) 
 MOTHER: Michael was eating your lunch?  
 CHILD: yeah.  
 MOTHER: oh dear.  
 MOTHER: naughty Michael.  
 CHILD: oh.  
 CHILD: he’s sick now.  
 MOTHER: oh dear.  
 CHILD: he ______ go to hospital.  
 CHILD: choooo.  
 CHILD: that one does.  
 MOTHER: it goes with that one over there.  
 CHILD: mhm.  
 MOTHER: near your red and pink car.  
 MOTHER: can you see it?  
 CHILD: yeah.  
 CHILD: ______ be careful.  
 
(40) Two possibility contexts with lowest accuracy: 
Warr, can (14.7% accuracy) Warr, can (27.3% accuracy) 
 MOTHER: it’s a good little flower, isn’t it?  
 MOTHER: can Mummy have a go at making 
one?  
 CHILD: I have got some more to get in.  
 MOTHER: no.  
 MOTHER: I’ll just use this piece.  
 MOTHER: I’ll just use this piece thank you.  
 CHILD: no.  
 CHILD: ______ find some more. 
 MOTHER: oh no.  
 MOTHER: more work for Mummy.  
 MOTHER: help.  
 CHILD: I’m going to get you.  
 MOTHER: I can’t get you off me.  
 MOTHER: help.  
 MOTHER: oh those slavering jaws.  






(41) Two possibility contexts with the highest accuracy: 
Liz, can (100% accuracy) Gail, can (100% accuracy) 
 MOTHER: yeah.  
 MOTHER: he got his hair cut, didnt he?  
 MOTHER: and there’s his mouth.  
 MOTHER: and he’s got a beard, hasn’t he?  
 MOTHER: like that.  
 CHILD: and I do some eyes, Mummy.  
 MOTHER: okay.  
 CHILD: so he ______ see.  
 CHILD: ...  
 MOTHER: we might go to Run Riot with baby 
James.  
 MOTHER: what do you think?  
 MOTHER: will that be fun?  
 MOTHER: hm?  
 CHILD: bye bye train.  
 CHILD: ...  
 CHILD: ______ move out the way please?  
 
4.4.3 Children’s mastery: Relation with the linguistic input  
Correlation analysis. Table 4.6 summarizes the results of correlation analyses testing 
the relation between the different input factors under consideration (reported in Table 
4.2 and 4.3), and children’s performance, as measured in the experiment (Table 4.4). 
We first run correlations between the input factors and children’s mastery of necessity 
and possibility modals, and second, between the input factors and change in children’s 
mastery over the time period (even though these post-hoc analyses are limited by the 
extremely reduced age range we sample from in this study).  
Quantitative measures. Effect of frequency. We do not find an effect of frequency, 
neither for possibility nor for necessity modals, regardless of whether we look at overall 
frequency or relative frequency (see Figures 4.5a, 4.5b and 4.6). General qualitative 
measures. We find no effect of mothers’ MLU and mother’s talkativeness (see Figures 
4.7a and 4.7b). Targeted qualitative measures. For necessity modals, we find an 
effect of modal talk (r=0.22, t(98)=2.2, p=0.027 **; 95% CI: [0.026 ; 0.40], see Figure 
4.9a), an effect of modal necessity talk (r=0.24, t(98)=2.4, p=0.018**; 95% CI: [0.043; 





p=0.00114***; 95% CI: [0.13; 0.49]; see Figure 4.9b). We find no effect of the 
strength of the (un)desirability signal (see Figures 4.10a (desirability score) and 4.10b 
(undesirability score)). For possibility modals, we find no effect of either of these 
factors (see Figures 4.8a, 4.8b, 4.9a, 4.9b and 4.10a), which could be explained by 
performances being at ceiling.  
 


























s ‘Overall’ frequency 
r=-0.11, t (98)=-1.13, p=0.26 (NS) 
95% CI: [-0.30; 0.09]) 
r=0.12, t (98)=1.20, p=0.23 (NS) 
95% CI: [-0.08; 0.31] 
‘Relative’ 
frequency 
(can vs. have to) 
r=0.12, t (98)=1.16, p=0.25 (NS) 
95% CI: [-0.08; 0.31] 
r=-0.017, t (98) =-0.17, p=0.87 (NS) 


















 Mothers’ MLU 
r=0.017, t (98)=0.17, p=0.87 (NS) 
95% CI: [-0.18; 0.21] 
r=0.071, t (98)=0.71, p=0.48 (NS) 
95% CI: [-0.13; 0.26] 
Mothers’ 
talkativeness 
r=0.067, t (98)=0.67, p=0.51 (NS) 
95% CI: [-0.13; 0.26] 
r= 0.031 , t (98) =0.30 , p=0.76 (NS) 




















r= -0.032, t (98) =-0.32, p= 0.75 (NS) 
95% CI: [-0.23; 0.17]  
r=0.22, t (98)=2.2, p=0.027 ** 
95% CI: [0.026 ; 0.40] 
Mothers’ necessity 
modal talk 
r=0.021, t (98)=0.2, p=0.83 (NS) 
95% CI: [-0.18; 0.22]  
r=0.24, t (98)=2.4, p=0.018** 
95% CI: [0.043; 0.41] 
Negation 
r=-0.089, t (98) =-0.89, p=0.38 (NS) 
95% CI: [-0.28; 0.109] 
r=0.32, t (98)=3.35, p=0.0011*** 
95% CI: [0.13; 0.49] 
Desirability score Not coded. 
r=-0.43, t (98)=-0.43, p=0.67 (NS) 




r=0.089, t (98)=0.88, p=0.38 (NS) 









Figure 4.5 to 4.10 Relation between input factors (x-axis) and accuracy in the GF 
Experiment 2 (y-axis). When possible, can (in red) and have to (in blue) appear on a 
single plot; however, in cases where range of frequencies differ, I use separate plots. 
Red dots correspond to frequency of can; blue dots correspond to frequency of have to. 
 















7 7a Mothers’ MLU (NS): 
 
 







8 8a Mothers’ modal talk: 




8b Mothers’ necessity modal talk: 
(have to: r=0.24) 
 
 









10 10a Desirability score (NS): 




10b Undesirability score (NS): 








Effect of Age and children’s MLU. We find no significant effect of Age and MLU 
(see Table 4.8 and the corresponding Figures 11a and 11b). The effect of age is almost 
significant for possibility modals (r=0.18, t (98)=1.85, p=0.067 (NS)), but for necessity 
modals, if anything, uses tend to become less adult-like. Note that we do find the 
expected relation between children’s Age and MLU: r=0.16, t (198)=2.29, p=0.023**; 
95% CI: [0.02; 0.29]).  
 
Table 4.8 Effect of children’s factors: age of production and MLU at the time of 
production.  
 
 Possibility modals Necessity modals 
Age r=0.18, t (98)=1.85, p=0.067 (NS) 
95% CI: [-0.01; 0.37] 
r=-0.09, t (98)=-0.90, p=0.37 (NS) 
95% CI: [-0.28; 0.11] 
MLU r=0.016, t (98)=0.16, p=0.87 (NS) 
95% CI: [-0.18; 0.21] 
r=0.11, t (98)=1.10, , p=0.27 (NS) 
95% CI: [-0.09; 0.30] 
 
 
Figure 4.11 Relation between output factors (x-axis) and accuracy in the GF 
Experiment 2 (y-axis): 
 
11 11a Relation between MLU and 





11b Relation between Age and accuracy 










We also looked at whether we find a relation between our different measures of 
children’s mastery: their own frequency of production, and performance measured in 
the experiment. We find no relation between frequency in children’s speech and their 
accuracy in the experiment: children who produce more can/have to are not necessarily 
the ones that use them in a more adult-like way.  
 
Figure 4.12 Relation between output frequency (x-axis) and accuracy in GF 
Experiment 2 (y-axis): 
 
12 12a Relation between frequency in 




12b Relation between frequency in 







Measure of change (post-hoc). We then looked at whether the different input factors 
might affect change in children’s mastery of necessity and possibility modals (i.e., 
whether child usage improves over the time period). However, note that these analyses 
are limited in important ways, given the extremely reduced age range we are sampling 





necessity modals almost do not occur between 2 and 2:06 (see also ages of first 
productions reported in Table 4.6), and the fact that we sampled randomly over the 
corpus data, which makes it less easy to compare between children.87  
Figure 4.13 shows learning curves for the 10 children based on age, for possibility and 
necessity modals. To measure children’s improvement, we used Pearson’s r 
coefficients (reported in Table 4.9), which correspond to the slope of the curves for 
each child in Figure 4.13). Results of the correlation tests between the different input 
measures (reported in Table 4.2 and 4.3) and the slope are reported in Table 4.9.88 
There is no significant effect.  
 
Table 4.9 Slope of the learning curves (Pearson’s r) for each child, based on the 
correlation coeffeicients of the relation between Age and Accuracy (mean of 
participants accuracy on the 10 contexts tested for each child). r > 0 indicates an 
improvement with age; r < 0 indicates a decrease in performance. Note that given the 
restricted age range, these measures are not extremely reliable.  
 
 possibility modals necessity modals 
anne 0.35 -0.46 
aran 0.22 0.18 
becky 0.17 -0.12 
carl 0.42 0.15 
domin 0.25 -0.54 
gail 0.18 0.53 
joel 0.14 0.08 
liz -0.18 0.03 
nic 0.24 -0.40 
warr -0.34 0.36 
ALL 0.18 -0.09 
 
                                               
 
87 In typical studies that use such measures of change (see in particular Hoff, 2003; Rowe, 2008, who 
test the effect of various input measures/ on child vocabulary development), the child/mother dyads are 
recorded at two different times points, in a more controlled way. For instance, Hoff (2003) tested 63 
dyads, 10 weeks apart; Rowe (2008) tested 47 dyads, first recorded at age 2:6 and then at age 3:6.  
88 We excluded Nic from the analysis for necessity modals because the slope of her learning curve is 
probably not representative of an actual drop in performance, but more likely due to the reduced age 





Figure 4.13 Relation between age of production of possibility (in red) and necessity 

















Table 4.10 Effect of input measures on change in mastery: Results of correlation 
analysis (Pearson’s r) between input factors and the slopes of the curves, as reported in 
Table 4.9.  
 
 

























r=-0.48, t (8)= -1.5, p=0.16 (NS) 
95% CI: [-0.85; 0.21] 
r=0. 50, t (7)= 1.5, p=0.17 (NS) 
95% CI: [-0.25 ; 0.87] 
‘Relative’ 
frequency 
(can vs. have to) 
r=-0.22, t (8)= -0.62, p=0.55 (NS) 
95% CI: [-0.74; 0.48] 
r=0.25, t (7)= 0.68, p=0.52 (NS) 





















r=-0.29 , t(8)= -0.85, p=0.42 (NS) 
95% CI: [-0.78 ; 0.42] 
r=0.42, t (7)= 1.2, p=0. 25 (NS) 




r=0.47 , t(8)= 1.5 , p=0.17 (NS) 
95% CI: [-0.23; 0.85] 
r=-0.50, t (7)= -1.5, p=0. 17 (NS) 




















r=-0.71 , t(8)= -2.8 , p=0.02  
95% CI: [-0.92;-0.15] 
r=0.46, t (7)= 1.36, p=0.22 (NS) 




r=-0.49 , t(8)=-1.6 , p=0.15 (NS) 
95% CI: [-0.85; 0.20] 
r=0.35, t (7)= 0.98, p=0.36 (NS) 
95% CI: [-0.41; 0.82] 
Negation 
r=0.13 , t(8)=0.38 , p=0.72 (NS) 
95% CI: [-0.54; 0.70] 
r=-0.25, t (7)= -0.67, p=0.52 (NS) 
95% CI: [-0.78;0.50] 
Desirability score 
Not coded. 
r=0.58, t (7)=1.9, p=0.10 (NS) 
95% CI: [-0.14; 0.90] 
Undesirability 
score 
r=0.13, t (7)= 0.34, p=0.74 (NS) 
95% CI: [-0.59 ; 0.73] 
 
 
4.5 General discussion 
The goal of this study is to start addressing the question of how children learn modal 
force in practice, by relating characteristics of their linguistic input to their mastery of 
modals. We focused on root modals (can vs. have to), since they are the first children 
produce and as a consequence, the only ones we could test at such an early age range 





 Let’s summarize our results. First, we replicate our findings from our first GF 
experiment on children’s productions, looking at a larger sample (2*100 contexts). 
Again, we find a clear asymmetry in children’s mastery of modal force: children seem 
to use possibility modals in an adult-like way, but not necessity modals. Looking more 
closely at individual patterns, we find that almost all children start producing have to 
after they produce can, with on average a 4-month difference. The experiment shows 
that for children’s possibility modals, participants perform significantly above chance 
for all of the 10 children we could test, whereas for necessity modals, they are at chance 
for 4 of them, perform significantly above chance for 5, and below chance for 1 (Anne). 
We find that 7 children are not adult-like for necessity modals (vs. 4 for possibility 
modals). It is difficult to draw strong conclusions given the small size of the sample 
(10 children), but these results suggest that children might not all face the same 
difficulties with necessity modals: some (Warren and Dominic) may master them 
before 3-years-old.  
Importantly, these results also show that no child clearly treats have to as a 
possibility modal: participants are at chance, but don’t overguess possibility modals as 
they might do if children were using have to in the same situations as can. If children’s 
struggles with necessity modals are partially semantic in nature, this seems to support 
the ‘weak’ version of the hypothesis (according to which children are just unsure about 
the meaning of necessity modals), rather than its ‘strong’ version (which claims they 
are mistaken, and think necessity modals mean possible). 
We find no clear effect of age, but this might be because of the narrow age 





eventually, since we find a difference between children and adults). Looking at 
variation between older children seems a promising avenue for future research.  
Turning to the main goal of this study—to see what factors, in children’s 
linguistic input, influence their modal mastery—, we find an effect of negation on 
children’s performance for have to: children more exposed to don’t have to in their 
input seem to master its force earlier. This is an important result, but might seem 
puzzling at first, given our discussion from Chapter 2. The fact that these cases are 
extremely rare is not the main problem: if children are able to use these highly 
informative cases, they might be able to learn even with few instances. But the issue is 
that it seems that in most cases, they are not used in a ‘logically’ informative way by 
adults, but rather, to convey prohibitions. How do children interpret these uses, and 
how could they exploit them when learning? The existing acquisition literature suggests 
that children are sensitive to the speech acts speakers performs quite early on (see e.g. 
Bloom, 2002; Clark & Amaral, 2010, a.o.), potentially more than they are able to 
objectively label a situation as possibility or necessity. So, is the effect of negation we 
find here due to children ‘logical’ use of negative environments to infer the force of 
have to, following Gualmini & Schwarz (2009)? Or is negation useful in another way? 
Alternatively, negation could help learners via prosody, or because it allows to put 
focus on necessity modals—i.e., for a very different reason than what Gualmini and 
Schwarz’s (2009) suggest. 
Even if it does not tell the nature of the mechanism at stake, this result suggests 
that children rely on negative environments to learn the force of have to. A question to 





other necessity modals, especially necessity modals that systematically outscope 
negation like must or should. As we discussed in Chapter 2, for these necessity modals, 
using negation could be misleading for children if they are to reason logically: do we 
find that the frequency of use of negation in their input leads to lower performance for 
must? Here, we didn’t run the experiment on children’s must (condition ROOT-AFF-1 in 
our first GF experiment on children’s productions) because of how infrequent they are 
(only 4 children produce more than 10 must utterances in the whole corpus), but this 
could be an interesting follow up, maybe using a different corpus. 
Note that we also proposed that negation could help to figure out possibility 
modals, as uses of can’t are frequent in input, and context is particularly informative 
about their force. Here, we find no effect of negation for can, but this might be because 
children’s performance is almost at ceiling: even if negation was helpful for possibility 
modals, we might not be able to detect it because we are looking at children that are 
already too old.  
Our second main result is that we find that, while mere quantity of exposure to 
particular lexemes does not seem to affect children’s mastery, there is an effect of 
modal talk in their input: children more exposed to modal talk in general seem to master 
have to earlier. This effect could come from modal talk making possibilities and 
necessities more salient, maybe showing that they are notions that can be talked about, 
and deserves to be explored further. It may also relate to the question of how knowing 
a dual might facilitate modal force learning (see Dieuleveut, Cournane and Hacquard, 
2020, for a novel word experiment on modals with adults that tests the effect on 





We find no significant effect of frequency of exposure (i.e., the quantity of 
input) on children’s mastery, be it relative to all mothers’ utterances, or relative to the 
other modals. There is a small trend in the expected direction for necessity modals, 
which would suggest that children who hear them more often master them earlier, but 
it is not significant. This might suggest that what matters most is not quantity of 
exposure so much as quality of exposure, in line with the literature on other cases of 
word learning reviewed at the beginning.  
Last, we find no evidence that the strength of the ‘undesirability’ signal in 
mothers’ speech matters (i.e., how frequently mothers use necessity modals with 
undesirable prejacents). However, this (absence of) result is as yet tentative, as for 
reasons of time, we didn’t run an actual experiment to assess desirability, as in Chapter 
2, and coded desirability for necessity modals.89  
Let’s come back to what consequences these results might have regarding our 
different possible explanations for children’s struggles with force. Why do children 
struggle specifically with necessity modals, and use them (and maybe comprehend 
them) in situations where adults would prefer using possibility modals? As discussed 
in Chapter 3, there might be several explanations for children’s difficulties. Our results 
from this study are still compatible with all of these explanations: children’s use of 
modals could be symptomatic of deployment issues, rather than wrong representations. 
                                               
 
89 Ideally, we would want to test more generally whether children do make use of contextual cues. To 
probe this, we intend to measure whether the general informativity of the situational context is predictive 
of children's modal mastery, by seeing whether children who master necessity modals early have mothers 
who use highly guessable modals from context, using the HSP paradigm but testing directly differences 





An interesting follow-up that might allow us to assess more directly the question of 
whether children know the underlying force of their modals, will be to see whether we 
find a relation between desirability and force in children’s own modal productions: this 
would suggest that children know the underlying meaning, and that their struggles are 
in deploying them in the right situations.  
Even though this study had intrinsic limitations, due to the low sample size (12 
children) and restricted age range (2- to 3-year-old), it also can serve as a proof of 
concept that this methodology allows to identify factors that matter in the learning 
process. In future work, we plan to expand to a wider age range, and explore further 
cues that might matter. A first step in this direction will be to use a measure for each 
parent of how “good” their modal productions were, rather than focusing on the 







Chapter 5. Conclusion 
When, and how, do children figure out the force of modals? How do they learn that 
words like can, may or might express possibility, whereas words like must, should or 
have to have a stronger meaning, and express necessity?  
In Chapter 1, we saw that what might make this mapping particularly 
challenging is that necessity entails possibility, which creates a Subset Problem for 
necessity modals. We considered three “solutions” to this Subset Problem. The first 
one was for learners to have a bias towards strong (necessity) meanings, in the spirit of 
Berwick (1985). The second one was for them to rely on downward-entailing 
environments, which reverse patterns of entailment (Gualmini and Schwarz 2009). The 
third one was that children use cues from the conversational context, if speakers use 
possibility and necessity modals in distinct situations, in ways that can be informative 
to children. Our goal was to assess the viability of each of these solutions, by studying 
in detail the linguistic input of English-learning children. 
In Chapter 2, we thus explored in depth the speech young English-learning 
children get exposed to, on the basis of a detailed corpus study of their linguistic input 
and three experiments based on the corpus. How often do children hear possibility and 
necessity modals? Are they often used with negation? How informative is the 
conversational context about their force? The first two experiments (Input Experiment 
1 and Input Experiment 2) allowed us to assess the general informativity of 
conversational contexts, by asking adult participants to guess a modal blanked out from 





Simulation Paradigm (HSP) (Gillette et al. 1999). In the first experiment, the blanked 
modal statement is presented in context; in the second experiment, it is presented 
without context. The last experiment (Input Experiment 3) explored further one specific 
situational cue for root modals, namely the desirability of the event described by the 
prejacent.  
Our results show that the conversational context is highly informative as to both 
forces: speakers use possibility and necessity modals in distinct situations, and adults 
are able to recover a modal’s force solely on the basis of this conversational context. 
This means that, if children are sensitive to the same conversational cues as adults, they 
can in principle use them to figure out modal force. The nature of these conversational 
cues could be quite diverse, and might vary with modal flavor. In Input Experiment 3, 
we focused on the hypothesis that (un)desirability might matter to figure out root 
necessity modals. The results show that such a cue is indeed available in the input: root 
necessity modals are more often used with predicates that describe events perceived as 
undesirable than their possibility counterparts. If children expect necessities to 
correlate with undesirable events, they might use desirability to figure out the force of 
root modals. 
The second main take-away from our input study is that using evidence from 
negative environments cannot be a general solution to the Subset Problem. Uses of 
negated necessity modals are either, depending on the modal, potentially informative 
but extremely rare (e.g., don’t have to), or potentially misleading because of the scope 
irregularities between necessity modals and negation (e.g. mustn’t ~ can’t): the 





sentences, and the potential polarity restrictions of modals, is an open one. Evidence 
from negative environments might be helpful for children to figure out the force of 
possibility modals: negated possibility modals (e.g., can’t) are frequent in the input, 
and context is highly informative about their force.  
Our input study results show that in principle, the conversational context may 
be sufficient to pick up on modal force, and thus, that learners may not need to rely on 
negative environments, nor on a necessity bias. But how do children actually figure out 
modal force? Are they able to use cues from the conversational context or negation?  
To address this question, we first asked when children figure out modal force, 
and explored in Chapter 3 the spontaneous modal productions of 2- to 3-year-old 
English children, again using a combination of corpus analysis and experimental 
methods. How early do children use possibility and necessity modals? And do they use 
them appropriately?  
We find what seems to be a “Necessity Gap”. Children master possibility 
modals early: at age 2, they use them frequently and productively (both with and 
without negation), and in an adult-like way (they do not use them in necessity 
situations). However, they seem to struggle with necessity modals: they produce these 
later on, much less frequently, hardly ever with negation, and often, in a non adult-like 
way: our GF experiment shows that they use them in situations where adults would 
prefer using possibility modals, and when negated, in situations where adults would 
prefer negated possibility modals. These results cast a new light on prior results from 
comprehension experiments. If this difficulty with necessity modals persists into the 





both forces: both children’s tendency to accept possibility modals in necessity contexts 
(as they may lack a relevant stronger alternative), and necessity modals in possibility 
contexts (as they may not be sure that these modals express necessity).  
There are several possible explanations for the nature of children’s difficulties 
with necessity modals. It remains unclear whether they stem from not knowing their 
underlying force, or whether children have successfully learned their force, but either 
have conceptual difficulty, pragmatic difficulty (deploying them in the right situations), 
or epistemic difficulty (judging what is, or can be said to be, necessary).  
Our input study shows that a number of factors might combine to make the 
underlying force of necessity modals potentially more challenging to learn: first, their 
lower frequency in the input, compared to possibility modals; second, the way these 
modals interact with negation, especially for necessity modals like must which 
outscope negation; and finally, the logical Subset Problem, if it is a real one for learners.  
 How do children eventually figure out the force of necessity modals? In 
Chapter 4, we started addressing this question, by correlating differences in children’s 
input to differences in their mastery of modals. Focusing on root modals can and have 
to, we found that two input factors are linked to children’s mastery, and thus may play 
a role in the learning process. First, children who hear have to with negation more 
frequently appear to master it earlier. This is an interesting result, given our discussion 
of how children might solve the Subset Problem using downward-entailing 
environments. And this finding may at first appear paradoxical: we saw in Chapter 2 
that the informativity of the average context of don’t have to was low, and even more 





prohibitions. How do children exploit negation? Do they reason ‘logically’, by seeing 
it used in non-necessity contexts? Or is a different mechanism at stake, involving for 
instance prosody? This is an open question, to be explored in the future.  
Second, we found that while hearing more have to does not affect its mastery, 
exposure to modal talk in general matters in the learning: children exposed to more 
modal talk in general seem to master have to earlier. This effect deserves further 
exploration as well, and could come from modal talk making possibilities and 
necessities more salient and showing that they are notions that can be talked about, or 
because of the contrast with ‘duals’ helping figuring out the force of a single modal.  
English has a rich modal inventory, where necessity modals are overall less 
frequent than possibility modals. From there, an important question is to see how these 
results generalize to other languages than English. How general are the difficulties we 
find with necessity modals? Can we really speak of a Necessity Gap, or is it just a 
natural consequence of other factors? In the future, I intend to look at other languages 
like French, which has a more restricted modal inventory than English, but where 
necessity modals interact differently with negation, and might be used differently by 
speakers. The small amount of reported corpus data suggests that in French, necessity 
modals might be more frequent in parents’ productions than they are in English (Jeretič, 
2020). This would allow us to assess, in particular, the role of frequency of exposure 
on children’s modal proficiency.  
Another important issue is how children learn the difference between ‘weak’ 
and ‘strong’ necessity modals. As mentioned in Chapter 1, necessity modals are often 





2008); nouns (slight possibility) and adjectives (likely) can even encode finer-grained 
strength distinctions. Here, I focused on the main contrast between possibility and 
necessity modals, but the question of how children learn these finer-grainer contrasts 
needs to be explored.  
 
To conclude, there are several reasons why learning the force of necessity 
modals might be challenging for learners. Some are specific to English—in particular, 
their low frequency. Some are more general, and might arise for all learners: the logical 
Subset Problem, and the way they interact with negation for some modals, since it is 
not only in English that we find necessity modals that outscope negation. Before we 
end, I will highlight a particular additional issue for learning necessity modals, that 
comes from the flavor variability of modals.  
As discussed in Chapter 1, the flavor variability of English modals could in 
principle make the learners’ task easier, in particular, if they expect a modal to always 
express the same force. For instance, having figured out that must expresses deontic 
necessity could allow them to infer, by extension, that it also expresses necessity when 
used to express epistemic flavor. If the contrast in force is easier to grasp for some 
flavors (e.g. deontic) than for others, this might be particularly helpful.  
However, for the learner, the salience of ability interpretations of modals might 
create an additional issue to learn force. This is another kind of Subset Problem, but 
this one is not a matter of pure truth-conditional logic. The problem is not that necessity 





most cases when a necessity root modal is used (be it deontic or teleological), an ability 
statement would hold as well: when “you mustdeontic”, then “you canability”.
90  
One argument that supports this additional possibility for why children may 
struggle figuring out the meaning of their necessity modals comes from a Novel Word 
learning experiment conducted with adults (Dieuleveut, Cournane & Hacquard, 2020). 
In this experiment, (adult) participants were asked to learn various novel modals for 
different ‘flavors’ of modals: teleological (goal-based) versus epistemic (knowledge-
based) (e.g. “We sig go down the blue road”; “The keys gleeb be in the blue box”), in 
various situations of possibility and necessity, as illustrated in Figures 5.1a-b and 5.2a-
b. Results show that, both when tested in epistemic and teleological scenarios, adults 
behave as expected when learning these new modals in ‘possibility’ situations 
(5.1b/5.2b): they accept these novel modals when tested in ‘necessity’ situations 
(5.1a/5.2a). However, when they learn new modals in ‘necessity’ situations, they 
successfully learn the force (i.e., they reject them when tested in ‘possibility’ situations) 
for epistemic scenarios only; with teleological scenarios, they accept them in 








                                               
 







Figure 5.1 Visual stimuli and sentence frames used in Dieuleveut et al. (2020), for 
teleological condition, by situation type: 
 
‘We sig go down the [blue] road.’ 
  
5.1.a NECESSITY situation 5.1.b POSSIBILITY situation 
 
 
Figure 5.2 Visual stimuli and sentence frames used in Dieuleveut et al. (2020), for 
epistemic condition, by situation type: 
 
‘The keys sig be in the [blue] box.’ 
  
5.2.a NECESSITY situation 5.2.b POSSIBILITY situation 
 
 
These results are particularly interesting for us, as they open up a new 
possibility for what might make the meaning of necessity modals potentially 
challenging for children. Scenarios like the one illustrated in Figure 5.1.a make an 
ability interpretation salient: the question of whether it is ‘possible or not’ to go down 
the yellow road might be more relevant than whether it is ‘possible or necessary’ to use 
this road to get to their goal. In epistemic scenarios, the same problem may not arise 





interpretation is less likely; but as we saw, epistemic modals are rare in children’s actual 
input, especially necessity ones. Adult learners’ behavior in the teleological condition 
might be explained by differences in perspectives between them and the experimenter. 
This overlap in modal flavor, specifically, this competition with an ability interpretation 
when speakers use root necessity modals, could also contribute to children’s difficulties 
with necessity modals we have described: If children tend to interpret situations as 
ability situations where parents intend a teleological necessity statement, they could 
lexicalize a possibility meaning for necessity modals. How compatible with an ability 
interpretation are natural occurrences of epistemic and root necessity modals, in 








Appendix A: Corpus results 
Table (i). Counts and percentages of modal uses by force and flavor, for adults and 
children (excluding tags and repetitions), breakdown by lemma. 
 
 ADULT (n=18,853) CHILD (n=4,800) 
 root epistemic root epistemic 
ALL 17187 91.2% 1665 8.8% 4686 97.6% 114 2.4% 
POSSIBILITY 12175 90.2% 1324 9.8% 3705 97.6% 93 2.4% 
can 10742 99.7% 37 0.3% 3619 100% 1 0% 
might NA 1154 100% NA 80 100% 
could 1096 90.4% 117 9.6% 79 91.9% 7 8.1% 
able 315 100% NA 3 100% NA 
may 22 57.9% 16 42.1% 4 44.4% 5 55.6% 
NECESSITY 5012 93.6% 341 6.4% 981 97.9% 21 2.1% 
have to 2392 99.7% 6 0.3% 351 99.7% 1 0.3% 
got to 930 99.3% 7 0.7% 288 100% 0 0% 
should 641 92.1% 55 7.9% 19 90.5% 2 9.5% 
need to 493 100% NA 217 100% NA 
supposed 326 97.3% 9 2.7% 9 100% 0 0% 
must 147 35.8% 264 64.2% 96 84.2% 18 15.8% 
ought to 83 100% NA  1 100% NA 
 
 
Table (ii). Embedding under attitude predicates (adults). The most frequent embedding 
verbs are think, see and know. think is very frequently used to embed epistemic modals 
(24.7% of possibility epistemic modals, 11.7% of necessity epistemic modals). see 
never embeds epistemic modals, but is quite frequent with possibility root modals. In 
children, we found 35/4800 cases of modals embedded under attitude predicates (think: 
22, see: 4, know: 3, say: 3; ask, bet, wish).  
 
 ADULT (n=18,853) 
 root epistemic 
 possibility necessity possibility necessity 
no embedding 11218 92.1% 4548 90.7% 968 73.1% 297 87.1% 
think 298 2.4% 383 7.6% 327 24.7% 40 11.7% 
see 427 3.5% 3 0.1% 0 0% 0 0% 
know 55 0.5% 32 0.6% 9 0.7% 0 0% 
say 45 0.4% 11 0.2% 2 0.2% 0 0% 
be sure 28 0.2% 9 0.2% 0 0% 3 0.9% 
suppose 18 0.1% 7 0.1% 5 0.4% 0 0% 
bet 28 0.2% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 
tell 8 0.1% 6 0.1% 1 0.1% 0 0% 
wonder 6 0% 0 0% 5 0.4% 0 0% 
 
Else: mean, show, hope, expect, look like, wish, ask, presume, use to, be better, be 
determined, be insistent, believe, happen, have a feeling, have a look, insist, keep, like, 





Appendix B: Experimental material 
Input Experiment 1 
 http://spellout.net/ibexexps/modsquad/HSP_FC_epiP/experiment.html 
 
You will read short excerpts from real conversations between mothers and their two-year-old 
children. In these conversations, there will be one or more words missing, indicated by ________. 
Complete the sentence by choosing the best of the two options below the conversation.  
Pick the option that seems the most likely to correspond to what the mother actually said! 
 
Here is an example:  
 
MOTHER: time for a game.  
MOTHER: what are they playing with?  
CHILD: sand.  
MOTHER: do you like to play with sand ?  
CHILD: yeah.  
MOTHER: what's that baby doing ?  
CHILD: taking all the sand out.  




The correct answer is "putting". 
 
Input Experiment 2 
 https://spellout.net/ibexexps/modforce/modforce_FC0cxt_epiP/experiment.html 
 
You are going to see short sentences. In these sentences, there are one or more words missing, 
indicated by ________. Your goal is to complete the sentence, by choosing the best of the two 
options. Pick the option that sounds the best to you! 
 
Here is an example: 
 




The best answer is "putting". 
 
Sometimes, you will also be asked to solve simple additions or subtractions. 
 











Input Experiment 3 
 https://spellout.net/ibexexps/modforce/modforce_hspdesF_rootP1/experiment.html 
 
You will see activities that came up in conversations between two year old children and their 
mothers. For each, say whether the activity sounds fun or not. Sometimes it might be hard to tell, 
but give your best guess. 
 
Here is an example: 
 
Doing a puzzle 
 




Sometimes, you will also be asked to solve simple additions or subtractions. 
 




The right answer is "2". 
 
GF Experiment 1&2 
 https://spellout.net/ibexexps/modsquad/HSP_FC_dilch_rootP2/experiment.html 
 
You will read short excerpts from real conversations between mothers and their two-year-old 
children. In these conversations, there will be one or more words missing, indicated by ________. 
Complete the sentence by choosing the best of the two options below the conversation.  
Please answer based on what makes sense in the given context. Consider what you find most natural 
to fill the blank. 
 
Here is an example:  
 
MOTHER: are you tired now?  
CHILD: take that elastic band off her.  
MOTHER: would you like to go to bed? 
MOTHER: Aran. 
CHILD: take that elastic band off. 
MOTHER: try please. 
CHILD: please. 
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